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I. INTRODUCTION
Justification
In 1985, the Victorian WorkCare workers' compensation system was implemented,
replacing the private market in workers' compensation insurance coverage with a state
monopoly fund scheme. Unfortunately for Victorians, WorkCare proved to be unworkable; it
gave rise to increasing costs for employers, an "epidemic" of long-term disability claims, and
huge unfunded liabilities. The WorkCare scheme was abandoned in 1992 hi favor of
WorkCover, which uses a unique blend of private market and state monopoly principles. Thus
the Victorian Government embarked on a comprehensive workers' compensation reform plan,
which began with the introduction of WorkCover hi December 1992.
The WorkCover scheme restructured benefits, dispute resolution procedures, and
administration of the system. Private insurers were incorporated into the system as "authorized
insurers" (essentially marketing and claims management agents). The premium system was
revised, introducing incentives for employers through experience rating and other devices.
Additional legislation hi 1994 introduced the latest stage of Victoria's transition, making a
number of minor adjustments hi the scheme to further streamline claims management and
rationalize incentives for workers and employers. (Victorian WorkCover Authority, 1993-94
Annual Report)
Thus far, the WorkCover scheme seems to be a great success (Boston Consulting,
1994). The last step in the reform plan involves possibly privatizing the scheme, once past
liabilities are fully funded and the fund itself is stable. This could happen as early as 1997,
based on the rapid progress to date. Since WorkCover began hi December 1992, reported
claims have dropped by 40 percent, and average premium levels have been reduced by 25
percent, accompanied by a significant increase hi weekly benefit levels. Most significantly, the
unfunded liability has been reduced from 53 percent to zero, a swing of over $2 billion in less
than three years. (Victorian WorkCover Authority, 1994-95 Annual Report)
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Because of this recent history, and because the pendulum seems to be swinging back
toward private market solutions in Victoria, as well as in Australia as a whole, there is an
interest in other models of workers' compensation systems. It seemed relevant to the authors
of this report to offer an outside perspective, one rooted in North American workers'
compensation experience. Our hope is that a review of U.S. and Canadian experiences, as
highlighted in careful reviews of two "successful" systems that have not wavered hi their
dedication to private market and state monopoly principles respectively, might help inform the
final debate on privatization in Victoria.
Of course, there is no universally accepted definition of "public" or "private" workers'
compensation systems. In North America, "public" would be taken to refer to a state or
provincial monopoly workers' compensation insurance system. "Private" would refer to some
version of a system that allows private insurance carriers to sell workers' compensation
insurance. In fact, of course, there is a continuum of systems and of system features that might
affect the basic judgment as to whether a particular system is more public or private in its
orientation. The question is how are different functions of the workers' compensation system
allocated among government or public entities and private firms.
It should be clear that we do not mean "private" to be synonymous with "marketoriented," although there are a number of obvious linkages between these abstract concepts hi
workers' compensation practice. The Victorian WorkCover system is an example of a hybrid
system that uses private agents to sell the insurance, service the employers, and manage the
claims, but retains public ownership of the underwriting and rate-making functions. In
addition, Victoria maintains extensive private incentives through an aggressive experience
rating program. Thus, private economic incentives are a strong influence on the Victorian
WorkCover system, even though the fundamental underwriting and pricing functions are held
in public hands.
Among the issues we will consider here are the following. Who carries the
underwriting (insurance) risk for workers' compensation benefits? How is workers'
compensation insurance priced, and by whom? What fundamental principles guide the
insurance pricing system? Who monitors benefits for compliance with statutory requirements?
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Are the availability of coverage and the payment of insurers' claims obligations guaranteed? Is
self-insurance allowed and, if so, for whom? How are incentives for prevention of accidents,
and resulting workers' compensation claims, maintained? What is the performance of the
overall system? In summary, how are these questions answered and what do the answers
reveal about how these responsibilities are allocated among government agencies, other public
entities, and private firms?
Since there are probably no universal statements that can be made about workers'
compensation systems, we have selected two "exemplars" of successful public and private
workers' compensation systems from North America to carry our analysis. While this may
distort some comparisons, due to non-workers' compensation system factors, it has the
advantage of grounding our judgments hi a specific factual context that can also provide
examples and illustrations of basic principles.
Relevance of North American Experience
There are a number of reasons to believe that the lessons of North America may be
relevant for the decision makers in Victoria. First, in a rough policy sense, the Canadian and
U.S. models of workers' compensation bracket the Victorian WorkCover Authority scheme.
That is, the Canadian systems represent one variant of the monopoly fund model that Victoria
has been moving away from since 1992, and the U.S. systems represent one version of the
privatized model that Victoria experienced previously. This is not to suggest that any specific
North American model would fit the Australian environment, but simply to argue that
experiences in the same "policy neighborhood" may be relevant. In addition, it is very clear
that Australia, Canada, and the United States share a great deal of common culture and shared
institutions, partially owing to our mutual British heritage. The commitment to representative
government, free and independent trade unions, individual ownership of property, and private
enterprise constitutes a powerful shared paradigm.
In the workers' compensation sense, it is also clear that Canada, the United States, and
Australia share a good deal of common ground. In the first place, these nations are unique in
that all have workers' compensation systems based at the state or provincial, rather than the
1-3

national, level. 1 Thus, each nation's experience is the sum of many different state or provincial
systems' experience. While Canadian models are less diverse, it is probably true that there is
as much variety within both Australia and the United States as there is among all three
countries. The point is that our 70 state and provincial workers' compensation models (total
from Australia, Canada, and U.S.) have a great deal in common, as well as considerable
differences. This is manifest hi the fact that the International Association of Industrial Accident
Boards and Commissions (IAIABC), the professional organization for administrators of
workers' compensation programs, includes members from the Australia, Canada, and United
States. Apparently the administrators of the workers' compensation systems in these three
countries have had sufficient common interest to hold them in the same association.
Why British Columbia and Michigan?
The choice of British Columbia and Michigan as exemplars of "public" and "private"
workers' compensation systems, respectively, may not be entirely obvious. The first reason
for then: selection is familiarity. Since the W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research
had conducted administrative inventories for each of these systems in the last five years, we
had a basic familiarity with their institutional features and operations2 (Hunt and Eccleston,
1990; Hunt, Barth, and Leahy, 1991; Hunt, 1992). Having the personal contacts to facilitate
developing updated information on these particular systems rapidly and efficiently was
especially important.
However, there is more than convenience to recommend the choice of these two
systems. British Columbia is one of only three large Canadian systems (the others are Alberta
and Saskatchewan) that are approximately fully funded today. This represents a signal
achievement and indicates that there is something different about the system or its political
*See American Insurance Association (1993) for one description of the variety of systems operating in
nine highly developed nations.
2The Administrative Inventory is a device developed by the Workers Compensation Research Institute
(WCRI) in the United States. It represents a detailed examination and description of the structure and performance
of an individual workers' compensation system using a common pattern that facilitates comparison across systems.
To date, AI's have been published for 14 U.S. states and one Canadian province.
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setting. More impressively, there is evidence that this circumstance is not simply a matter of
good luck. British Columbia started to spiral down into large-scale deficits in the mid-1970s,
just like Ontario, Quebec, and other Canadian systems. (Vaillancourt, 1994) However, British
Columbia turned this situation around in the early 1980s with policy choices that restored the
Workers' Compensation Board (WCB) to financial health. Hence, British Columbia has a
workers' compensation system that appears to be in balance and working relatively well.
Presumably, that means that some or all of its system features may be viable for certain other
jurisdictions.
Michigan too has justification for selection as an exemplar of U.S. private marketdominated workers' compensation systems. In the first place, Michigan was one of the first
states in the U.S. to implement competitive rating for workers' compensation insurance. This
bold commitment to the market mechanism in 1983 meant that Michigan abandoned the
administered pricing model that had dominated workers' compensation insurance since the
origins of these systems hi the early 20th century and embraced a competitive market system,
which a majority of states have since implemented to some degree.
More fundamentally, like British Columbia, the record that Michigan compiled in
reforming its workers' compensation statute in 1980, 1981, and 1985 showed that Michigan
was willing and able to grapple with tough policy issues and arrive at sound long-term
conclusions. (Hunt, 1986). This effort foreshadowed many similar reform movements in other
states by 5 to 10 years, and was precipitated by the fact that Michigan had reached a point
where the cost of workers' compensation was thought to be interfering with economic growth
in the state.3
In addition, there are a number of characteristics of these jurisdictions that make them
interesting examples. They are both large, significant states with substantial workers'
compensation exposure. Although British Columbia is characterized more by primary, or
extractive, industries (fishing, logging, mining) and Michigan more by secondary, or

3Elson and Burton (1981) had calculated that Michigan workers' compensation insurance rates for a
sample of manufacturing classifications were 80 percent above U.S. average in 1978.
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manufacturing, industries, they both have many employers with lots of injuries. They also
both have heavily unionized labor forces, although Michigan's is much less influenced by
labor than a decade ago, largely due to the downsizing of the auto industry in Michigan.
Limitations of Exemplars
There are also some reasons why these two jurisdictions are not perfect exemplars.
Michigan is theoretically a "wage-loss" workers' compensation system, as opposed to an
"impairment" or "loss of wage-earning capacity" system. This places it in a minority among
U.S. jurisdictions. However, the "redemption" of employer liability available in the Michigan
system is both an accommodation to make the wage-loss system more workable and a feature
that makes the handling of permanent partial claims more like that in other jurisdictions.
Michigan uses a litigation process to arrive at the permanent partial implicit ratings however.
More important, Michigan has one of the highest proportions of self-insurance hi the
U.S., due largely to the fact that the auto industry is dominated by three huge firms, General
Motors, Ford and Chrysler. All three firms have their corporate headquarters and, especially
for GM and Chrysler, multiple large manufacturing installations hi the State of Michigan. This
has produced an environment that is "friendly" to self-insurance. This has also been extended
to include the participation of some 9,000 small firms in 35 different industry-specific group
insurance plans in Michigan, which has increased the competitive pressures on private
insurers.
Another unique aspect of the Michigan system is the "privatization" of the competitive
state-owned Michigan Accident Fund in 1994. The trend of the last several years in the U.S.
has been to create new competitive state funds (although no exclusive, or monopolistic, state
funds beyond the six that have existed for years). At least six U.S. states have created new
competitive state funds hi the last five years, and Michigan is the only state to be privatizing a
fund. We regard this as an anomaly, that reflects the current Governor's philosophical position
on government entities competing with the private market, rather than a major policy change.
While it may prove to have significant consequences in the long-run, it does not
represent a dissatisfaction with the performance of the fund as an insurance company. In fact,
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it is ironic that the Michigan Accident Fund increased its market share from 3.4 percent in
1982, the year before open competitive rating to 15.6 percent in 1993, while remaining
profitable and increasing its net worth. Over this decade, the fund had earned a reputation for
being willing to write the smaller risks that the large private carriers did not want to insure
and did so successfully.
British Columbia, also, is somewhat unusual among Canadian jurisdictions in that the
WCB structure also contains the Prevention Division (previously Occupational Safety and
Health). The administrative inventory of the British Columbia system in 1991 urged the WCB
to move to exploit the potential synergy between the prevention and compensation missions hi
workers' compensation. (Hunt, Barth and Leahy, 1991) However, there is little evidence to
date that being housed under the same roof provided significant performance advantages for
the WCB. In addition, the WCB maintains their own world class worker rehabilitation center
at the central offices in Richmond. This facility should make it possible to integrate
compensation and rehabilitation more effectively. While this is a relatively unique system
feature, it only involves a small minority of WCB claimants, so we believe it unlikely that it
has a substantial impact on the system as we will analyze it here.
Administration of Public vs. Private Workers' Compensation Systems
In this volume, we maintain the hypothesis that, while there is no pure test of the
public vs. private workers' compensation insurance mechanism, there are indicators of the
significant differences that underlie these fundamental scheme choices. In other words, it
would be inaccurate to say that any given system feature is necessarily characteristic of either
public or private workers' compensation systems. All systems seem to be a unique blend of
features that reflect the specific socio-political-economic environment within which they were
created. However, we still think we see some specific aspects of our exemplary systems that
reflect the underlying public/private scheme orientations that they represent.
Of course, relying on market mechanisms to organize the behavior of system actors can
be shown to provide the highest level of consumer satisfaction in conventional competitive
markets for consumption goods. However, the private workers' compensation insurance
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market has a great many discrepancies from such a simple "perfectly competitive" model. The
lack of good information on both sides of the market, agent-principal problems of
administering a program (insurance carrier) for a group of beneficiaries (injured workers) on
behalf of another party (employer), public interest in guaranteeing certain outcomes, and many
divergences from the perfect competition model exist. Some of the market imperfections, and
the way they are dealt with, will be discussed below.
While economists (including the authors) have great respect for the unfettered market
as an optimal resource allocation mechanism, the particular example of workers' compensation
insurance does not yield to simple, knee-jerk judgments of the superiority of private markets.
Traditional neo-classical economic analysis leads to the judgment that compensating wage
differentials that arise from free and unfettered labor markets should be sufficient to optimize
the social level of occupational injury and, perhaps, illness.4 However, we know of no
example where the market has been left completely alone to solve this social problem.
Societies have seen fit to interfere in the market solution in one way or another, to one degree
or another, in pursuit of what becomes a political-social-economic solution. This is certainly
true of the workers' compensation systems we will examine here.
We believe that private market forces can be constrained to serve public goals in this
case, without automatically leading to sub-optimal social outcomes. In one sense, the entire
history of workers' compensation programs reflects the political judgment that the unfettered
market solution (compensating wage differentials combined with employer's tort liability) was
not an efficient or effective remedy to the problem of compensating injured workers for
injuries sustained in the course of their employment. The political authority of the state found
in the late 19th century that the tort solution to these increasingly frequent events was not
sufficient. Thus, the very origin of workers' compensation programs at the dawn of the 20th
century can be said to reflect interference with market forces.
Some economists would have us seek a market solution to this social problem, but this
volume maintains an agnostic view. We seek to describe the institutions and probe the system

4See Moore and Viscusi (1990).
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performance for two exemplary workers' compensation systems in North America, one
predominantly public, the other predominantly private. We attempt to distill from this
examination some policy lessons that relate to the specific mix of public and private workers'
compensation institutions that may prove relevant to other jurisdictions, including Victoria.
Obviously, the selection of a particular workers' compensation insurance mechanism
has broad implications for the admrnistration of the system. The difference between public and
private workers' compensation systems in North America seems to constitute a choice between
direct system administration by a public entity (as hi Canada and those U.S. jurisdictions with
"exclusive" state funds) or a market regulatory approach to system administration (as hi
Michigan and most other U.S. jurisdictions). For example, in British Columbia the public
administrative agent (WCB) makes all benefit payments and is directly responsible for making
them correctly and promptly. In Michigan, the public administrative agent Bureau of Workers'
Disability Compensation (BWDC) is responsible for monitoring the performance of private
insurance carriers and self-insured employers in making such payments correctly and
promptly. These are two very different roles and have different staffing and performance
monitoring requirements. This accounts for the emphasis on regulation in U.S. jurisdictions,
which is almost unknown in Canada.
The adjudication, termination, and re-opening of claims provide additional examples.
In British Columbia, all these are the responsibility of the WCB and the staff they employ for
this purpose. Fundamentally the public entity is determining whether benefits are payable in a
given instance, based on the statutory, policy, and legal interpretive superstructure. In
Michigan, private decision makers are deciding these things, with recourse to the dispute
resolution procedures provided by the public entity in the event of a difference of opinion.
However, it is fundamentally different for employers to have the right to seize the initiative,
subject to a subsequent legal challenge, as in Michigan from having to secure the basic
decision from a public entity as in British Columbia. Again, these administrative arrangements
have manifold implications for worker and employer client satisfaction with the system.
This also applies to the appellate dimension. In the British Columbia system, appeal
procedures allow workers and employers to seek redress from alleged errors by the public
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decision maker. Thus, the matter of the independence of appellate bodies has assumed great
importance in Canada. In Michigan, by contrast, appeal procedures settle differences between
private parties in interpretation of law or fact. Presumably, this is the reason for greater
interest in, and utilization of, alternative dispute resolution procedures like mediation and
arbitration in the Michigan system. Fundamentally, the interest of the public body is to secure
an agreement between the private parties within the confines of the statutory and regulatory
environment.
One area where we do not observe fundamental differences is in the approach to
prevention of workplace injuries and illnesses. Both Michigan and British Columbia follow a
3-pronged approach of incentives, regulation, and education to promote occupational safety
and health. Prevention incentives are embedded in the workers' compensation systems hi the
institution of experience rating for the premiums of individual employers, with their cost of
insurance coverage varying with the number and cost of their claims. While there is greater
scope for variation in premiums due to experience rating and other risk sensitive pricing
adjustments in Michigan than in British Columbia, the institution is fundamentally the same.
In addition, both British Columbia and Michigan have aggressive regulatory
approaches to occupational safety and health. Inspectors from the public sector visit and
evaluate workplaces based on a set of standards, with punitive or remedial actions resulting. In
addition, both programs utilize voluntary consulting and education programs to raise the
awareness of prevention as a fundamental issue. The fact that the administrative agent for the
workers' compensation system (WCB) in British Columbia also administers this program,
while in Michigan it is a separate agency (Bureau of Safety and Regulation) does not appear to
have significant programmatic implications, although in theory it could.
Finally, there is a significant difference hi what might be called the collective "voice"
of the workers' compensation system. In the most basic sense, including private insurers in the
workers' compensation system means that there is another powerful set of stakeholders whose
interests will be defended. In British Columbia, the administrative agent (WCB) speaks for the
system as a whole in a way that would be completely unacceptable in Michigan. While
statutory initiatives from stakeholder interest groups are not unknown, they have been
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relatively rare in British Columbia, and are subject to examination and endorsement by the
public body. In contrast, the multiplicity of stakeholders and their unique individual versions
of "the truth" serve to fragment and confuse public opinion and statutory initiatives in
Michigan and other U.S. jurisdictions. Frankly, it is difficult to determine what the public
interest is under such a regime.
Only hi the State of Wisconsin does this problem seem to have been permanently
averted, by recourse to the institution of a Workers' Compensation Advisory Council, which
serves as a deliberative body to forge consensus recommendations from employer and worker
stakeholder groups.5
The council meets as needed to study legislative proposals
submitted by labor, management and the division (public
administrative agent), and to hold public hearings.... Council
members reach agreement on proposed legislation through a
series of meetings, public hearings, and negotiations, culminating
in the submission of a single bill to the assembly and senate labor
committees of the state legislature. To date, bills submitted by
the council have been passed virtually unchanged. (Ballantyne
andTelles, 1992, pp. 10-11)
However, there is nothing magical about the institution of an advisory council itself, since it
has been tried hi other jurisdictions without achieving the same remarkable status of respect
from legislators that seems to be enjoyed in Wisconsin. Further, the suspension of the
Governing Board of the WCB hi British Columbia in the summer of 1995 raises the issue of
whether the political authority will continue to allow the WCB to "speak" for the workers'
compensation system. Certainly, it has become obvious that there has been a change in the
degree to which all stakeholders hi British Columbia share the same set of assumptions about
system structure and performance.

5Although temporary consensus has been reached in a number of jurisdictions, most recently Oregon and
Maine.
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Core Workers' Compensation Insurance System Functions
Since a major focus of this report is the way that public and private workers'
compensation insurance systems actually work, significant attention will be paid to the core
functions of such an insurance system. Table 1.1 lays out the general principles of the public
monopoly and private market models that will be treated here. While minimum workers'
compensation benefit provisions are always specified by law, the exact insurance policy
"design" features can vary substantially in the private market case. In all cases, statutes
specify minunum benefits for injured workers and assign the financial responsibility for those
benefits to the employer, individually or collectively. However, private insurers have proven
to be more innovative hi meeting the perceived needs of their customers.
This is vividly manifest in the rush to managed care in the U.S. workers' compensation
market over the past five years. Each insurance company has developed its own version of
managed care and touts it as superior to all others. British Columbia, on the other hand, has
just began to discuss the possibilities inherent in such systems. 6 It seems clear that this is a
difference deriving from the competitive versus monopoly character of the workers'
compensation insurance market.
Marketing differs very significantly between public monopoly and private market
systems. In British Columbia, virtually every employee must have workers' compensation
coverage, and there is only one source. In Michigan, there are over 100 insurance groups
aggressively competing for the employers' business. While this competitive process insures
more choice for the employer-consumer, it does not necessarily assure that the right choice is
made for the workers. Therefore, the insurance regulatory function seeks to guarantee
"adequate" performance by the carriers, i.e., to prevent excessive downward pressure on
benefit payments. In addition, the marketing function must be funded out of policy revenues,
and this is not a trivial cost to be absorbed, as we will see later.
Under the subject of underwriting selection, the public monopoly model essentially
offers no choice; all employers who require coverage are automatically part of the system.

6See Hunt, Earth, and Leahy (1996).
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Under the private market model, insurers have a choice of who they want to insure. This is the
obverse side of the marketing coin. Insurers want to insure "good risks," and they seek to
avoid "poor risks." But there is also a more subtle selection process that insurers use to find
risks that "fit" their prices. This means there is room for different underwriting strategies. In
fact, some insurance carriers devote a great deal of time and effort to selecting the risks they
want to insure, believing that this guarantees better results. So underwriting selection as it
affects the availability of coverage is a major public policy concern in a private market system,
because workers' compensation coverage is guaranteed to all workers, regardless of their
likelihood of being injured.
Pricing/premium verification refers to the dual functions of setting the price for
insurance coverage and verify ing that employers are being charged the appropriate price.
Again, this is a universal concern and must be provided by either a public monopoly or private
market system, but the range of pricing schemes available to an insurer may depend on its
competition and the regulatory authority. The case is similar with loss prevention services. In
most public monopoly systems, workers' compensation or another agency provides loss
prevention services to employer clients. However, the loss prevention incentives employed by
private insurers are likely to produce greater effort, since a major avenue to increased profits
in a competitive system is cost reduction. This is offset by concerns that private incentives also
produce behaviors designed to fight claims, which is thought to be less typical of public
systems.
Claims adjustment and case management services would show little difference between
a public monopoly and private market system, except insofar as the potential for cost reduction
in the private system seems again to focus the attention of the insurer on reducing expenditures
as opposed to making sure the injured worker receives every benefit to which he/she is
entitled.
There is no necessary difference in the statistical reporting function, although in
practice some additional statistical reporting may be necessary hi private, regulated systems to
monitor insurer performance and compliance with statute. Public monopoly workers'
compensation systems generally perform their own data collection and analysis, whereas
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private market systems generally use private statistical agents (who also must be regulated) to
pool data across insurers, with the result that access to system data is usually restricted
because of competitive concerns. Consequently, workers' compensation administrative
agencies in private market systems tend to have their own statistical systems, although far less
comprehensive than those in public systems.
The availability of insurance coverage is a major issue for private market systems. As
indicated in the underwriting selection discussion, private insurers are generally not compelled
to write policies for all comers. The result in private market systems is that some employers
are left outside the voluntary market and must be provided coverage through some other
system, generally a residual market or a state fund. This creates equity problems among
employers, among insurance carriers, and potentially among injured workers. It can also
impose additional administrative costs and other inefficiencies on the workers' compensation
system. Severe residual market problems can even drive a workers' compensation system into
crisis, as happened in Maine in the early 1990s.
Finally, the solvency of the system must be assured. Mechanisms must be provided to
guarantee that the means to pay future benefits to injured workers will be safeguarded. In the
event of an insurer, or self-insured employer, bankruptcy, the payment of future benefits to
injured workers must be assured. There are similar issues for public systems, of course,
particularly regarding the adequacy of reserves for future benefit commitments. Public insurers
can be underfunded and accumulate huge deficits, which must eventually be resolved.7 While
we are not aware of any public insurer that has ultimately failed to pay its claims obligations,
the measures that may eventually be implemented to restore solvency could have significant
equity effects on both employers and workers.

7The Ontario WCB accumulated a deficit of approximately $12 billion (CD) during the decade of the
1980s.
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Workers' Compensation Insurance Market Failures
In theory, regulation is designed to address market failures that would otherwise impair
economic performance and reduce social welfare. The purpose of regulation is to correct
market failures, or at least minimize their negative effects, and improve allocative efficiency.
The principal market imperfections that regulation is intended to address are: barriers to entry
and exit; externalities, where transactions create costs for third parties; and internalities, i.e.,
costs and benefits of transactions that are not reflected in the terms of exchange (Spulber,
1989). To correct or counteract these problems, regulators may impose controls on entry, exit,
prices, product quality, inputs to production, refusal to serve, and other private activities.
Insurance markets, including workers' compensation, are subject to several types of
market failures that insurance regulators seek to counteract. The principal market failure that
led to insurance regulation in the U.S. is the problem of excessive risk of insurer insolvency
that derives from inefficiencies created by costly information and agent-principal problems
(Munch and Smallwood, 1981). Owners of insurance companies have diminished incentives to
maintain a high level of safety to the extent that their personal assets are not at risk for
unfunded obligations to policyholders caused by insolvency.
It is costly for consumers to properly assess an insurer's financial strength in relation to
its prices and quality of service. Insurers also can increase their risk after policyholders have
purchased a policy and paid premiums. Thus, hi the absence of regulation, imperfect consumer
information and agency problems would result hi an excessive number of insolvencies.
Solvency regulation is intended to limit the degree of insolvency risk in accordance with
society's preference for safety. This regulatory function is considered to be particularly
important for workers' compensation, to guarantee that injured workers will receive the
benefits to which they are entitled.
One of regulators' concerns is that insurers' incentives to take on excessive financial
risk and even engage hi "go-for-broke" strategies may result hi inadequate reserves and prices.
Some consumers will buy insurance from low-price carriers without properly considering the
greater financial risk involved. This potential is exacerbated for third-party liability lines such
as workers' compensation where employers may seek to escape their obligations to workers by
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declaring bankruptcy in the event of then- insurer's insolvency. The regulatory concern is that
poor incentives for safety could induce a wave of "destructive competition" in which all
insurers are forced to cut their prices below costs to maintain their market position. Thus, it is
argued that regulators must impose some degree of discipline by placing a floor under prices
to prevent the market from imploding.
At the same time, circumstances may arise where consumer search costs can impede
competition and lead to excessive prices and profits (Varian, 1992). Further, imperfect
information and unequal bargaining power between insurers and consumers can make
consumers vulnerable to misleading marketing and claims practices of insurers and agents. It
also has been suggested that it is costly for insurers to ascertain consumers' risk characteristics
accurately, giving an informational advantage to insurers already entrenched in a market and
creating barriers to entry that diminish competition (Cummins and Danzon, 1991). Under
these circumstances, regulators may seek to enforce a ceiling that will prevent prices from
rising above a competitive level and to protect consumers against unfair market practices.
The tension between insurers' tendencies to either underprice or overprice insurance
coverage may contribute to the cyclical pricing behavior that is observed in commercial
property/casualty insurance lines, such as workers' compensation. This phenomenon is
commonly termed the "property/casualty underwriting cycle." It is apparent that, over time,
workers' compensation and other commercial insurance prices in the U.S. have moved up and
down in relation to loss costs in alternating "hard" and "soft" markets.
The conventional wisdom is that this cyclical behavior is caused by "cash-flow
underwriting," i.e., insurers cut prices below costs to increase their market share and rely on
cash flows from premiums and investment income to sustain their operations, causing a "soft
market." However, losses eventually mount as claims are paid, causing insurers to retrench,
tighten their underwriting, and raise prices, which leads to a "hard market." The resulting
improvement in profits establishes the conditions for another soft market, and the cycle is
perpetuated.
Some analysts have challenged this explanation of the underwriting cycle and suggest
other causal factors such as movements in interest rates and loss shocks (see Cummins,
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Harrington, and Klein, 1991). While these alternative theories are supported by empirical
evidence, there appears to be a residual "behavioral" component to cyclical patterns in
commercial insurance pricing and underwriting that defies explanation simply by changes in
external economic variables. This cyclicality can increase uncertainty and instability for
employers in terms of the availability and cost of worker' compensation coverage. Workers
also may be adversely affected to the extent that market cycles influence insurers' quality of
service.
Potential agent-principal problems raise other issues with respect to reliance on private
markets to finance and deliver workers' compensation insurance. Private insurers, employers,
and workers have different interests and incentives. Workers seek to maximize their wages and
benefits, while employers and insurers seek to maximize their profits. Statutory provisions
governing workers' compensation benefits necessarily leave some room for interpretation and
application by insurers to specific claims. Insurers can increase profits by minimizing workers'
compensation benefit payments within the parameters set by law. Employers may support
insurers' efforts to minimize benefit payments if it serves to lower their workers'
compensation premiums and total labor costs.
In theory, workers' ability to bargain for wages and other benefits should impose some
check on employers' and insurers' inclination to "low-ball" workers' compensation benefit
payments. However, in practice it is costly and difficult for workers and employers to monitor
and control insurers' claims adjustment practices. Workers are unlikely to choose to leave an
employer on the basis of its workers' compensation carrier, and an injured worker must
engage in costly litigation if the worker cannot reach an agreement with the carrier on the
payment of the claim. Consequently, under a system where workers' compensation benefits
are privately financed, workers' interests may be compromised without regulatory protections.
The problems of adverse selection and moral hazard also plague insurance markets,
including workers' compensation, and induce insurers to reject some risks and limit the
coverage provided to others (Borch, 1990). Adverse selection refers to the greater tendency of
high-risk individuals to seek insurance, particularly if the premium they would pay is less than
their expected loss. Workers' compensation insurers are subject to adverse selection unless
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they are able to reject high-risk employers or charge them a rate commensurate with their
higher risk. Insurers subject to adverse selection are forced to increase their prices to cover
higher loss costs, which, in turn, leads to further concentration of high-risk employers among
these insurers. Low-risk employers will be discouraged from buying insurance from insurers
charging premiums that exceed the employers' expected loss costs. Insurers attempt to avoid
adverse selection by coordinating their selection of risks and pricing so that every risk they
insure is charged an adequate rate. This is the reason for insurance groups, with different
companies and different prices designed for different market segments. However, this can lead
to situations where some employers are unable to obtain workers' compensation insurance
through the voluntary market.
Moral hazard occurs when insurance diminishes an insured's incentive to prevent or
contain losses. Insurers counteract moral hazard by offering less than full coverage and using
an employer's previous loss experience as a rating factor. Partial coverage is an issue in
workers' compensation because of the concern that injured workers may become a burden to
society, particularly if they fail to receive the benefits due them from the employer/insurers.
Consequently, in the U.S., workers' compensation policies are structured so that insurers pay
full benefits to workers and seek reimbursement from employers for any residual portion of
benefit costs for which the employers are responsible.
Plan of the Presentation
As we describe these two exemplary workers' compensation systems, we will utilize a
common framework. This comes from the desire to provide consistent descriptions of the two
systems in spite of the considerable differences in details between them. After giving a picture
of the general administrative organization of the workers' compensation system, we will
describe the claims administration process. This will be followed by a discussion of the
benefits provided to injured workers. Then the dispute resolution mechanisms employed will
be described, followed by a discussion of the incentives implicit in the systems. This
thumbnail sketch should be sufficient to give a flavor of the day-to-day operation of the
systems, as they are experienced by injured workers, employers, and providers.
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Next, the insurance models will be examined in separate sections. There is less
consistency in the treatment here, because there is not so much in common. The British
Columbia section will describe the assessment structure and function at the WCB. Then some
specific policy issues will be considered, including self-insurance, experience rating, and
protection for extremely small risks. Last, the two basic performance issues of revenue
sufficiency and cross-subsidization among classes of employers will be discussed.
The Michigan analysis is more formal and utilizes a structure-conduct-performance
model to examine the Michigan insurance mechanism. This discussion should be particularly
valuable hi identifying the issues and possible outcomes from different approaches to
privatizing various workers' compensation functions. While this discussion focuses primarily
on Michigan, it draws on other jurisdictions where needed, and uses U.S. averages as bases of
comparison.
The parallel analysis culminates with a side-by-side comparison of system performance
in British Columbia and Michigan. The coverage of the workers' compensation statute, the
incidence of injuries and illnesses, the number of workers' compensation claims, vocational
rehabilitation benefits, promptness of payment, dispute resolution, employer costs of workers'
compensation coverage, and administrative cost levels are all considered.
The final section of the report extends our analysis to consider some policy
implications of alternative approaches to public and private provision of these core workers'
compensation system functions. Based on the underlying framework of the report and prior
analysis, we discuss the potential outcomes of the options available to policy makers hi
structuring the public and private sector roles in a workers' compensation system. This
discussion also considers the interrelationship among the policy choices for administering the
core system functions. While it is not possible to predict the effects of different measures in
Victoria without a detailed study of its system features and environment, we do offer some
observations on possible outcomes for policy makers in Victoria to assist hi considering
options for privatization.
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Table 1.1 Core Workers' Compensation Insurance Functions
Core Functions

Public Monopoly Model

Benefit provisions and policy Uniform benefits and
coverages set by law
design

Private Market Model
Law establishes uniform
benefits and basic coverages
but insurers may vary
services and risk sharing
with employer

Marketing/distribution

Limited policy issuance
activities performed by
agency

Competition among private
insurers necessitates
marketing and distribution
efforts and
commissions/salaries to
agents

Underwriting selection

Employers are automatically
part of system

Insurers evaluate and can
refuse to accept certain risks

Pricing/premium verification

Agency administers uniform
price or cost allocation

Insurers determine prices
and audit premiums
governed by competition
with limited regulatory
oversight

Loss prevention

Performed by agency

Service provided by insurers
and other vendors

Claims adjustment/case
management

Performed by agency

Performed by insurers and
third party administrators

Statistical reporting

performed by agency

Function shared by agency
and private statistical agents
appointed by regulators

Availability guarantee

Not an issue in public
system

Residual market mechanism
administered by state or
private entity under
regulatory supervision

Solvency protection

Not needed in public system

Solvency regulated and
claims obligation insured by
private association of private
insurers

1-20

II. OVERVIEW OF BRITISH COLUMBIA (PUBLIC) WORKERS' COMPENSATION
SYSTEM
Introduction
In British Columbia, as in Canada generally, workers' compensation from the
beginning was considered to be a public matter handled by a public body. The Workers'
Compensation Board (WCB) of British Columbia has administered the Act continuously since
1917 as an independent provincial agency. The WCB is charged with the responsibility to pay
the benefits specified by the Act to injured workers, then- dependents and survivors.
It has the corresponding authority to assess employers subject to the Act for the monies
necessary to "meet all amounts payable from the accident fund during the year" and to
"provide in each year capitalized reserves sufficient to meet the periodical payments of
compensation accruing hi future years in respect of all injuries which occur during the year."
(Workers' Compensation Act, Section 39) Thus, the WCB does not administer a "pay as you
go" system, but one that is intended to be fully funded and actuarially sound.
Coverage is mandatory for industries enumerated hi the Act, and since 1994 it is nearly
universal. Certain occupations are excluded from the definitions of "worker" or "employer"
by statute. These include casual workers (under eight hours per week), professional athletes,
and members of the employer's immediate family. The Appeal Division of the WCB provides
review of actions and policies taken to implement the Act, and its decisions are subject to
judicial review only on the grounds of "denial of natural justice" or lack of WCB jurisdiction.
Organization of the Workers' Compensation System8
The WCB is an independent provincial agency whose Board of Governors is appointed
by the Lieutenant Governor in Council. The Board is not dependent on the provincial
government for any revenues, as these are raised by WCB assessment against employer

8See Hunt, Earth, and Leahy (1996) for a thorough discussion of the structure and performance of the
WCB of British Columbia.
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payrolls throughout British Columbia. The Ministry of Skills, Training and Labour exercises
general oversight of the WCB and it is this Ministry which transmits the Annual Report of the
WCB to the Lieutenant Governor. In actual fact, the WCB has operated with very considerable
independence from the provincial government.9
There are 13 voting members on the Board of Governors of the WCB. It is presided
over by a Chairperson, with five of the members designated as "representative of workers,"
five designated as "representative of employers" and two additional voting governors who are
"representative of the public interest." In addition, the President of the WCB and the Chief
Appeal Commissioner are non-voting members of the Board of Governors by virtue of their
office.
The Board of Governors is the highest authority of the WCB, and Section 82 of the Act
specifies they "shall approve and superintend the policies and direction of the board..." The
voting members of the Board of Governors are part-time office holders. The Board issues its
policy pronouncements in Decisions, which are published in the Workers' Compensation
Reporter as well as through amendment of the various internal manuals that have been adopted
by the Governors as their stated policy.
The Appeal Division was established by Bill 27 of 1989 and came into existence on
June 3, 1991. The Division consists of a Chief Appeal Commissioner appointed by the Board
of Governors and a variable number of Appeal Commissioners appointed by the Chief Appeal
Commissioner and selected in accordance with policies established by the Board of Governors.
The Appeal Commissioners are appointed expressly as representative of workers,
representative of employers, or nonrepresentational members. The WCB is the final arbiter on
questions of both law and fact, notwithstanding the existence of an independent Workers'
Compensation Review Board.

9This may be changing. In the Summer of 1995, the Board of Governors of the WCB was replaced by the
provincial government with a Panel of Administrators under emergency legislation. The justification for this
action was the failure of the governors "... to put the interests of injured workers and their families before the
interest of the individual governors and then- sectors." See Hunt, Barth, and Leahy (1996) for more details.
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The Appeal Division has authority to hear appeals from Review Board findings by
employers or workers (or their dependents), referrals of Review Board findings from the
President of the WCB, reconsideration of previous Appeal Division or Commissioners'
decisions, occupational safety and health penalty appeals, appeals of assessment matters, and
appeals of decisions under the Criminal Injury Compensation Act (which is also administered
by the WCB).
Other Organizations in the WC System
While the Workers' Compensation Board is the primary player in providing benefits to
disabled workers in British Columbia, there are a number of other organizations that play
important supplementary roles in the workers' compensation system.
The decisions of the WCB are subject to review by the Workers' Compensation Review
Board (WCRB). The Review Board is appointed and supervised by provincial government. It
has jurisdiction over matters "with respect to a worker." As such it is the first line of appeal
for workers and employers who feel that an error has been made hi adjudicating a claim for
benefits under the Act.
There are also organizations created by the Act to facilitate access by workers and
employers to its provisions. (See Figure 2.1) The Workers' Advisers Office (WAO) assists
workers or their dependents in bringing claims, including actually representing them before the
WCB or WCRB if necessary. Similarly, the Employers' Advisers Office (EAO) has a staff to
perform advisory and representative services on behalf of employers subject to the Act.
All these organizations report administratively to the Ministry of Skills, Training and
Labour and then: budgets are approved by the Ministry before being invoiced to the WCB to
be included in the WCB assessment rates. Thus, the employers of British Columbia bear the
direct cost of the entire workers' compensation system and its administration.
In addition, the Ombudsman of British Columbia is involved in oversight of the
workers' compensation system, primarily through the request of injured workers for
assistance. The Ombudsman is not permitted to become involved in an issue that is, or could
be, subject to an appeal, so its direct involvement with claimants is limited.
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Other WCB Functions
The Board has responsibility for a number of other functions that are not typically a
part of workers' compensation systems. First, the WCB also administers the occupational
safety and health program in British Columbia. 10 The Prevention Division of the WCB
administers a program of standards setting and enforcement throughout the province. The
Division also maintains an extensive worker and employer safety education program.
The WCB administers the Criminal Injury Compensation Act in British Columbia, as
well. This Act provides compensation for personal injury or death to victims of crimes within
the province. Victims of criminal acts, or their dependents, are eligible for medical, loss of
earnings, pain and suffering, and rehabilitation benefits up to $50,000. These claims are
administered within the Legal Services Division of the WCB, and the claim costs are
reimbursed by the provincial government.
Organizational Structure of the WCB
Figure 2.2 shows the overall organizational structure of the WCB. There are three
main operational divisions, plus a number of special purpose divisions and departments, which
report dkectly to the President/CEO. Each of the Divisions is headed by a Vice President. The
next level is generally the department, headed by a Director. The Compensation Services
Division is the largest division of the WCB. Compensation Services has responsibility for
administering wage loss, pension, vocational rehabilitation, and health care benefits to injured
and occupationally diseased workers. It is the benefit delivery agent for the WCB.
The Finance and Information Services Division is responsible for raising the funds for
the WCB and allied organizations through its Assessments Department and for managing the
Board's substantial investments by the Treasurer. Financial Services also includes the offices
of the Controller, the Actuary, and the Statistical Services Department. Information Services is
responsible for the information and data processing needs of the WCB; this includes
supporting hardware, software, and database applications.

10Quebec, the Yukon, and New Brunswick also are organized in this way.
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Claims Administration
Since the WCB operates an "inquiry" as opposed to an "adversary" system, WCB
adjudicators are obligated to both investigate and adjudicate claims for compensation to the
best of their ability. Further, the Board has exclusive jurisdiction to determine all questions of
fact and law in claims for compensation, and the decision of the WCB is final and conclusive
and is not open to review in any court. While representation by the parties is allowed in initial
adjudication, it is very rare.
The WCB is not bound by legal precedent, but decides each claim according to the
merits and natural justice of the case. Board personnel making decisions on claims are guided
by WCB policies, as promulgated by the Board of Governors. The Claims Adjudicator is not
to begin fact finding with any presumption against the worker, nor with any presumption in
his/her favor. However, the Act does specify that "... when there is doubt on an issue and the
disputed possibilities are evenly balanced..., the issue is to be resolved in favor of the
worker." (Section 99) The Claims Adjudicator is to examine the evidence to determine
whether it is sufficiently complete and reliable to provide a conclusion with some confidence.
This judgment, however, is up to the adjudicator operating within the law and WCB policy,
subject to review by management or upon appeal.
In the majority of claims, the issues of compensation are determined with reference
solely to the evidence submitted in the injured worker's application, the employer's report, and
the attending physician's report. However, where this is not sufficient in the judgment of the
Claims Adjudicator, the Board has broad powers of investigation, including the power to
compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of materials germane to the claim (by
subpoena). Once the Claims Adjudicator certifies compensability, wage-loss benefits
commence, generally in 15 to 25 days from disablement depending on complexity of claim.
Temporary wage-loss payments (whether total or partial) continue as long as the
temporary disability lasts. When the physical impairment is no longer temporary, either
because it has become permanent or because the worker has recovered, a new determination of
eligibility must be made. When an injured worker returns to work, his/her employer files an
"Employer's Statement of Return to Work." Absent contrary evidence, this will terminate
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wage-loss payments, although medical benefits continue, if necessary, to effectuate as
complete a recovery as possible. The entitlement to medical treatment and wage-loss benefits
for the injury or illness never terminates, but is dependent on contemporary circumstances.
When a physician, or other qualified practitioner, determines that the worker has
plateaued in his/her recovery, but some residual impairment remains, adjudication for a
permanent pension must be conducted by the Disability Awards Department. Usually
temporary total benefits are terminated before the Disability Awards Department can
adjudicate the permanent pension entitlement. In this case, the Vocational Rehabilitation
Consultant can authorize continued wage-loss payments in anticipation of permanent disability
benefits.
Workers' Compensation Benefits
Injured workers in British Columbia are entitled to a wide variety of fairly generous
benefits, depending on the nature and severity of their disability.
Health Care Benefits
Workers with compensable injuries or illnesses receive a very broad range of health
care benefits. Under most circumstances the Board will pay all the costs of physician and
hospital services, medications, diagnostic requirements and appliances. British Columbia
allows the worker free choice of attending physician or other qualified practitioner. The latter
include chiropractors, dentists, podiatrists and naturopaths. Health care services can also be
provided by optometrists, dental mechanics, nurses, and physiotherapists.
Health care providers are paid according to a negotiated fee schedule. Presently, the
WCB pays physicians at a rate of 104 percent of the rate agreed to between the government
and the British Columbia Medical Association under the provincial health care system. The
WCB also pays physicians to provide required medical reports to the WCB. Attending
physicians are expected to provide such reports upon initial exam and at approximately twoweek intervals during the course of the treatment.
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It is included under its health care provisions, that the Board will pay for six types of
allowances and services, over and above the benefits already noted. They include:
clothing allowance
homemaker services
independence and home maintenance allowance
personal care or nursing allowance
subsistence allowance
transportation allowance
It is up to the adjudicator to determine which of these benefits are payable in a particular case.
In 1993, the WCB processed 56,186 health-care-only claims at a total cost of $14.3 million
(US), or $254 (US) per claim.
Temporary Disability Benefits
Where a worker has incurred a compensable impairment, he/she is entitled to a wageloss benefit, beginning the first working day after the day that the injury or illness occurred
(i.e. no waiting period). Indemnity benefits for temporary total disability are set at 75 percent
of the worker's average gross earnings, subject to the statutory maximum and minimum
benefits. Benefits are paid for the duration of the disability and are tax-free.
Temporary total disability benefits are terminated when the worker is no longer
temporarily and totally disabled. If the worker returns to employment, total disability no
longer exists. Where the worker's condition is judged to have stabilized or "plateaued," it is
no longer temporary. The decision rests with the Claims Adjudicator, based upon information
received from the worker and/or employer and from the biweekly reports of the attending
physician or other practitioner. When temporary total disability benefits are terminated, either
indemnity benefits end, temporary partial benefits are paid, or the person is evaluated for a
permanent pension.
Temporary partial benefits are paid where the worker has some actual or potential
earnings, after sustaining a compensable injury or disease. The worker is entitled to an
indemnity benefit of 75 percent of the difference between the average earnings before the
injury and the average amount earned, or that could potentially be earned, after the injury.
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This benefit is terminated when the worker no longer has any wage loss, or when the medical
condition is judged to have stabilized. A decision to reduce or to terminate a wage-loss benefit
may be appealed by the claimant. In 1993, the WCB paid $273.9 million (US) in wage-loss
and health care benefits to 75,601 temporary disability claims, an average of $3,623 (US) per
claim.
Permanent Disability Benefits
If a worker suffers a permanent residual impairment due to an occupational injury or
disease, the worker may be entitled to a pension award for permanent disability. Depending
upon the condition of the worker, the benefit can be either for permanent partial or permanent
total disability. British Columbia employs a "dual" approach to benefits for permanent partial
disability. A claimant receives benefits based on an assessment of either the degree of
impairment, called a permanent functional impairment, or the loss of earnings capacity,
whichever provides the larger award.
Permanent disability awards are the responsibility of the Disability Awards Department
within the Compensation Services Division. As soon as it becomes evident that a permanent
disability is likely to result from a claim, the worker's file is forwarded to that unit for
purposes of determining the average earnings level. When temporary benefits are terminated
the worker is examined by a Disability Awards Medical Adviser (DAMA). This examination
results in a recommended value of Permanent Functional Impairment. Most physical
impairments are "scheduled" according to values spelled out in the AMA Guides to the
Evaluation of Permanent Impairment, but other guidelines are also employed on occasion.
Benefits are based on the degree of impairment. If the worker is determined to have a
permanent functional impairment of 20 percent, for example, the worker is entitled to a
lifetime pension benefit of 20 percent of 75 percent of the worker's average earnings as
determined by the Disability Awards Department, subject to the maximum and minimum
earnings levels. The award is modified based on age so that for each year that the worker's
age exceeds 45 at the date of the award, the percentage rate of compensation is increased by
one percent up to a maximum of 20 percent (age 65) of the assessed impairment. This is to
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compensate for the reduced pension entitlement consequent upon the disability. After one year,
permanent pension benefits are subject to revision semiannually based on changes in the
consumer price index. In the vast majority of claims, the impairment is scheduled.
It has been noted that the worker's benefit is based on either the degree of impairment
or on the loss of earning capacity, whichever is higher. Initially, the procedure is the same,
since an impairment rating must be made first. Then, a Vocational Rehabilitation Consultant
(VRC) prepares an employability assessment. It will describe the person's work history, the
training and education that the worker has received, and any work activity since the injury. It
is also possible that the worker will be sent by the rehabilitation consultant to the Functional
Evaluation Unit (FEU). There the worker is evaluated over a two week period and a technical
report on the worker's capabilities is prepared by the FEU. The report covers the areas of
occupational therapy, remedial therapy, and functional evaluation based on activity in an
occupational setting. This report is used by the VRC to prepare the employability assessment.
With this information, the consultant is expected to identify two or three jobs that the worker
could perform, and that are potentially available hi the relevant labor market. The pay rates for
these jobs at the tune of the injury are also identified.
A numerical example may help clarify how the projected loss of earnings capacity is
calculated. Suppose a worker is injured in 1994, with average earnings of $2,000 per month
(below the earnings maximum at that time). He/she is assessed as having a 30 percent,
scheduled, permanent functional incapacity. If the worker is below age 45 hi 1994, there is an
entitlement to a lifetime monthly pension of .30 x .75 x $2,000 or $450 per month.
Alternatively, the Disability Awards Committee accepts the rehabilitation consultant's
determination that the worker is capable of working no more than 60 hours per month at
clerical work (that is available) and that paid $10 per hour in 1994. Perhaps the worker is
already employed at this job and working a 15 hour week. Or perhaps, the judgment is made
that after a 3-month training course, the worker would be able to do that job, working up to 60
hours per month, and that the pay in that job in 1994 was $10 per hour. Hence, the worker's
monthly earnings loss due to the injury or disease is $2,000 minus $600 (60 hours @ $10 per
hour) or $1,400 per month and there is an earnings loss entitlement of .75 x $1,400 or $1,050
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per month, clearly exceeding the benefit based solely on the assessment of permanent
functional impairment. In this instance, the worker would receive a loss of earnings pension of
$1,050 per month.
Benefits based on impairment assessment alone are payable for life, though they will be
adjusted if the impairment assessment changes. Benefits paid for projected loss of earnings are
not lifetime benefits for two reasons. First, the WCB will reassess the worker's income status
two years after setting the pension. Thereafter, the WCB has discretion over whether or not to
reassess the worker. In some cases, a physician's report or hospital charge will indicate that
the worker's physical condition may have changed, in turn requiring that a new assessment be
made of the permanent functional impairment and of the worker's projected earnings level. A
second reason that the earnings loss is not a lifetime benefit is that workers are not projected to
work and earn for a lifetime, but instead, to retire in their later years. However, the WCB is
mindful that a worker's retirement benefits are likely to be reduced due to earnings losses as a
consequence of a compensable injury or disease.
An injured worker may also be entitled to a lump-sum benefit where the injury or
industrial disease results in a permanent disfigurement. This award will be paid only if the
disfigurement is judged to be serious and potentially harmful to the worker's projected earning
capacity. Thus, the WCB will take into account the worker's occupation and the visibility of
any disfigurement. In practice such payments are rare.
The process of setting the permanent disability award is one of the most difficult, and
potentially contentious, aspects of the benefits scheme. The use of schedules allows for some
degree of consistency in the rating of permanent functional impairment. The core issue,
however, is the extraordinary difficulty in identifying the worker's projected earnings
capacity. Where the worker has suffered some earnings loss, the Board is asked to decide what
type and quantity of work the person can be expected to achieve, that could reasonably be
available, perhaps with the assistance of a retraining program and perhaps after geographic
relocation. Of course, the worker always has a right to appeal the Board's decision. In 1993,
the WCB accepted 3,778 permanent disability claims valued at $250.7 million (US), or
$66,357 (US) per claim.
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Vocational Rehabilitation Benefits
Vocational rehabilitation services are provided to injured workers, and in some cases to
the workers' dependents, in order to offset the effects of compensable injuries, industrial
diseases and fatalities in accordance with Section 16 of the Workers' Compensation Act.
Services provided include vocational assessment and planning, counseling, skill development,
job readiness and placement assistance, and employability assessments.
The Vocational Rehabilitation Consultants also provide certain benefits to the injured
worker to sustain rehabilitation efforts. Wage-loss equivalency benefits are payable when
temporary wage-loss benefits have concluded. These benefits may be awarded when workers
are awaiting or undertaking specific vocational programs. In addition, transportation and
subsistence allowances, as well as accommodation at the WCB's Rehabilitation Residence are
available in support of the vocational rehabilitation programs.
If work site or job modifications are required to facilitate reemployment, the WCB may
provide the required financial assistance to accommodate the work site or job hi relation to the
worker's functional needs, including expenditures for special equipment and tools. When
training on the job is utilized as a training and placement strategy, the WCB will develop
shared cost arrangements with the employer. When the WCB is supporting a formal training
program for an injured worker, the benefits provided would normally include: a training
allowance at wage-loss equivalency when enrolled in a mil-time program, tuition, fees and any
required books, materials and equipment; and travel and subsistence allowance where
appropriate. In certain cases, the WCB may contribute to the cost of starting a business in lieu
of providing training.
In 1993, there were about 9,000 referrals for Vocational Rehabilitation Services.
Approximately 60 percent of these received significant services with a return to work rate of
about 50 percent. Total expenditures for vocational rehabilitation in 1993 were $37.6 million
(US).
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Death Benefits
In compensable death claims, funeral and accidental death expenses are paid by the
WCB, subject to a maximum that is adjusted semiannually. Death benefits are paid to
dependents of the worker, that is, family members who were wholly or partly dependent upon
the worker's earnings. The benefit is determined by the family status and earnings level of the
decedent. Children cease to be dependents when they become 18, or at age 21 if they are
regularly attending school. Children who are handicapped dependents continue to receive
benefits beyond age 21.
Where the surviving spouse has two or more children, the monthly compensation
benefit, when combined with any federal benefits to or for those dependents, is the
compensation rate that would have been paid had the worker been permanently and totally
disabled at the date of death, plus a monthly stipend for every child beyond two in number.
Where the surviving spouse with two or more children may receive a benefit under the Canada
Pension Plan, the Board offsets the workers' compensation benefit so that together, benefits do
not exceed 75 percent of the worker's average earnings, plus the stipend for any children
beyond two. The worker's average earnings are subject to the permanent total disability
maximum and to a minimum average earnings level that differs from the one utilized in cases
of permanent total disability.
Where there is a surviving spouse and one child, the benefit is 85 percent of what
would have been paid had the worker sustained a permanent and total disability at the date of
death, As above, this benefit is subject to an earnings maximum and minimum, and an offset
for any federal benefits. Benefits are subject to recalculation when children cease to be
considered children, or where a dependent survivor is no longer an invalid.
If the dependent spouse has no children, the death benefit then depends upon the age of
the person. Subject to the earnings maximum, if the survivor is 50 years of age or older, or an
invalid, the survivor's benefit is 60 percent of the monthly compensation that would have been
paid had the worker been permanently and totally disabled at the date of death, subject to the
offset for any Canada Pension Plan benefits. There is a minimum benefit level set by the
WCB, and hi such cases there is no offset for federal benefits. If the surviving spouse is
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without a child, not an invalid, and below the age of 40, the benefit paid is a capital sum, with
an instalment paid immediately and the entire balance paid within six months. It is noteworthy
that the size of this benefit (about $27,400 (US)) is invariant with respect to the worker's
average earning level. In 1993, the WCB initiated payments to 124 fatal claims for a total
incurred expenditure of about $24 million (US), or $188,000 (US) per claim.
Dispute Resolution
There are three bodies, excluding the court system, that constitute appellate bodies of
the workers' compensation system in British Columbia. These are the Workers' Compensation
Review Board, Medical Review Panels, and the Appeal Division of the WCB. The source of
disputes is mostly decisions made by Board officers, that is, Claims Adjudicators, Claims
Officers, or Vocational Rehabilitation Consultants in the Compensation Services Division of
the WCB. If either a claimant or employer is dissatisfied, they may ask the officer to
reconsider the decision, usually in the light of additional information that the complainant will
provide. Where the matter is not reconsidered, or where it has been reconsidered but the party
remains dissatisfied, a manager's review can be requested. The manager is able either to
accept (including modify) or reject the appellant's view or return the file to the originating unit
for further investigation. The manager's review was developed to allow aggrieved parties to
have a rapid decision on an officer's decision without involving one of the three appellate
bodies.
A party that wishes to formally appeal a decision at this point may have a choice. If the
issue hi dispute is a medical one, the appeal can be to a Medical Review Panel (MRP),
otherwise to the Workers' Compensation Review Board (WCRB). The decision of the MRP is
final on medical issues and cannot be appealed. Findings of the Review Board can be appealed
to the Appeal Division of the WCB.
Workers' Compensation Review Board
The WCRB has jurisdiction over appeals of decisions by any officer of the WCB with
respect to a worker. It is required that the decision must affect a worker, hence there is no
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right of appeal to the WCRB by an employer on a decision regarding an assessment, for
example. Employer appeals to the WCRB occur where the employer is dissatisfied with a
WCB decision regarding a worker's claim. Virtually all appeals to the WCRB come from
workers or their dependents.
The WCRB consists of 15 three-person panels, plus some single-person panels. A 3member panel consists of one person drawn from the ranks of labor, another person with a
background on the management side, and a third person, often a lawyer, who is a neutral. A
one-person panel, always employing a person of a neutral background, is most frequently used
in those cases that consist only of a "read and review" of the record. Usually, the choice of
the one- or 3-person panel is left to the appellant. The chair of each panel, the
nonrepresentational member, is called a Vice Chairman of the WCRB.
Appellants are frequently represented by union representatives, private lawyers or the
Workers' Advisers Office. Employers may be similarly represented by private lawyers, the
Employers' Advisers Office, or some other consultant. Witnesses are not normally sworn, oral
hearings are taped but transcribed only if there is a subsequent appeal. When the panel
completes its deliberations, it issues its findings, with reasons, in writing. The panel decision
need not be unanimous, but a dissenting panel member must also explain in writing his/her
decision.
The data in Table 2.1 highlight the types of issues appealed to the WCRB. The most
frequent issue decided is the one of compensability; that is, one-fourth of Review Board
decisions were hi cases where the WCB had disallowed the claim. In 45 percent of these, the
WCRB decided either to allow benefits or to send the matter back to the WCB claims unit for
further work. The next most frequently appealed issues were refusals by the WCB to reopen
cases, WCB decisions to terminate wage-loss payments, and disputes over the size of a
permanent partial disability pension awarded. The allowance rate for these appeals varies from
40 percent to 50 percent. Decisions of the WCRB can be appealed to the Appeal Division of
the WCB.
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Medical Review Panels
The Lieutenant Governor in Council appoints physicians to serve as Chairs of Medical
Review Panels. Currently, 16 persons serve in this capacity. When the Board accepts an
appeal for an MRP, it sends a list of specialists practicing in the field hi which the medical
dispute occurs to the worker and to the employer, asking them to choose a specialist. The
party requesting the panel must exercise that choice within eight days, or no further action is
taken on the matter. If the party that did not request the panel, usually it is the employer, does
not choose a specialist from the list within eight days, a selection is made by the Ministry of
Skills, Training and Labor.
In order to be allowed to appeal a decision to an MRP, there must be a bonafide
medical dispute. That determination is usually left to the worker's attending physician who
submits a letter (certificate) attesting to the presence of such a dispute. The certificate is
evaluated by a medical appeals officer of the WCB. It is either accepted or the worker is given
further opportunity to procure a certificate indicating that there is a good faith medical dispute.
If the WCB finds that there is no bonafide medical dispute, that determination may be
appealed to the Workers' Compensation Review Board. A set of 10 questions is given to the
MRP with instructions that the panel limit its response to those issues only. The panel is
absolutely bound by the WCB's nonmedical findings hi the case.
The panel chairman and the two specialists meet the worker, customarily at the
chairman's office. The panel has access to any reports contained hi the WCB claim file. They
each physically examine the worker; a medical history is usually taken as well. The panel is
able to request that other tests be conducted if they believe it to be necessary. The three
physicians then discuss their findings, and a report is prepared for the file by the chairman.
The chairman also drafts the certificate and distributes it to the specialists for their approval.
Only two of the three panel members need agree. This certificate contains the answers to the
questions the panel was charged with.
Almost all MRP cases involve appeals by workers. A few issues seem to predominate.
The most common issue that goes to an MRP is the question of causality, or work-relatedness
of the condition. A second very common medical issue is the evaluation of the worker's
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condition. Though many types of conditions are assessed by MRPs, back conditions are the
ones most commonly involved.
The WCB receives about 400 requests for Medical Review Panels per year. Of
approximately 300 MRP decisions per year, about 50 percent uphold or partially uphold the
WCB's previous decision.
Appeals Beyond the Board
Applications for judicial review can be made to the court system on the grounds that
WCB decisions have deprived the litigant of his/her right to "natural justice" in the WCB
administrative process. These applications would be to the British Columbia Supreme Court
and the British Columbia Court of Appeals. In practice these appeals are not common, with
only 2-3 cases annually. The Act contains a very strong privative clause prohibiting court
review of the WCB decisions. WCB decisions are overturned where the court finds that the
WCB has failed to comply with principles of natural justice or if it has rendered a patently
unreasonable judgment.
Role of Lawyers
Aside from the three offices created by law to assist workers and employers in coping
with the workers' compensation system (Workers' Advisers, Employers' Advisers,
Ombudsman), persons also have access to private lawyers. However, WCB policy prohibits
paying legal fees in workers' compensation cases. Nevertheless, lawyers represent the clients
in about 15 percent of the appeals to the WCRB. Unlike most jurisdictions in the United
States, there is no trial bar domination of workers' compensation adjudication or appeals
systems. Part of the reason for this may be historical, but much of it is likely due to the strong
posture in the Act and by the WCB that it should administer the law in an inquiry, rather than
an adversarial, manner. The prohibition of legal fees and the virtual absence of lump-sum
awards also surely play some role. It is apparent that the provision of public Workers'
Advisers, and a tradition of representation by union representatives, along with an active office
of the Ombudsman limit the perceived need to retain private lawyers to redress the inevitable
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errors of a system as large and complex as the workers' compensation system of British
Columbia.
Incentives
In this section, we will reconsider the British Columbia workers' compensation system
with a focus on the incentives present in the system. Incentives for employers to prevent
accidents, for employees to return to work, provider incentives, and litigation incentives will
each be considered. This discussion will help to frame the comparative analysis to be
presented later.
Safety and Prevention Incentives

Mainly Employer

The WCB relies more on direct standards setting and enforcement mechanisms to
promote safety and prevention activities than on indirect financial incentives. The "collective
liability" principle and labor's strong philosophical opposition to experience rating dictate this
result. Employers have some financial incentive to improve then- safety and health
performance, but the most they could achieve (assuming they start at maximum demerit) would
be a 50 percent reduction in their workers' compensation assessment bill.
The WCB Prevention Division conducted nearly 55,000 work site visits during 1993,
resulting in over 60,000 orders written. Penalties and fines levied for violation of occupational
health and safety standards in British Columbia hi 1993 totaled $1.5 million. A field services
staff of nearly 200 persons provides sufficient coverage to insure that every business hi the
province could be inspected about once in every three years. This is a much higher level of
enforcement effort than exists in any jurisdiction in the United States.
Return-to-work Incentives

Mainly Employee

There are reduced incentives for injured workers to return to work in British
Columbia. Wage replacement is quite generous at 75 percent of gross, and some workers
actually realize more in spending power when disabled than when working, due to the high
marginal tax rates in Canada. This is not meant to imply that injured workers do not have
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other incentives to return to work. In the first instance, the treating physician makes a medical
determination whether an injured worker is ready to return to work at least every two weeks.
Then the WCB claims Adjudicator makes a judgment as to whether a return to work is
indicated by the whole record. There are also social and personal incentives that motivate
individuals to seek an early return to work. However, repeated empirical studies in the U.S.
environment have indicated that duration of disability is sensitive to income replacement rates.
Both over time and across jurisdictions, the higher the average replacement rate, the higher the
duration of disability, other things equal. 11
Also, since the WCB adjudicates the injured worker's claim, there is less pressure than
in the U.S. from the employer to foster return-to-work. Unlike U.S. jurisdictions, the
employer in British Columbia does not have the opportunity to influence the first
determination of compensability. This is thought to provide a "softer" test of disability than in
U.S. jurisdictions. While this initial employer/insurer decision is subject to public agency
scrutiny or review, it is still very different from the decision a public agency might make. In
addition, there is the specific provision in the Act, that the benefit of the doubt is to be
resolved in the worker's favor when adjudicating workers' compensation claims.
Provider Incentives
Providers in British Columbia are essentially on a negotiated fee contract basis. They
will be compensated for any procedure they perform on an injured worker, the only question is
whether it will ultimately be paid by the provincial health plan or the WCB. If it is the latter,
they will receive an additional 4 percent reimbursement, plus direct payment for the required
medical reports. Since the "form fees" are quite large, it seems there are incentives to continue
treatment until the patient cannot benefit from treatment any longer. 12 Given this possibility of

"See Worrall and Butler (1985), Butler and Appel (1990), Johnson and Ondrich (1990), Curington
(1994).
12See Hunt, Barth, and Leahy (1996), Chapter 5.
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perverse incentives, it is unlikely that much pressure is generated to encourage providers to
urge workers to return to work.
Litigation Incentives
There are some incentives for litigation in the British Columbia system. Relatively few
claims are denied, but for those that are, the cost of appeal is low. The Workers'
Compensation Review Board will most likely reconsider the case, and 50 percent of the
original WCB decisions are overturned. So there is a very good chance for a "second bite at
the apple." In addition, the British Columbia provincial legislature has seen fit to provide
public alternatives to private lawyer representation in workers' compensation matters. Because
of the Workers' Advisers Organization, and the active representation of injured workers by
their unions, injured workers should not experience difficulty in pursuing their appeal rights.
On the other hand, the WCB has been granted a strong role in the system that is not easily
overturned, particularly not based on the facts. So, on balance, one would have to say that
incentives for litigation in the British Columbia system are also low.
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Table 2.1 Reason for Appeal and Allow Rate at WCRB, 1990
Percent of
Sample

Reason for Appeal

Allow
Rate

Claim Disallowed - No compensable injury

25%

45%

Reopening Denied

19%

39%

Wage-Loss Benefits Terminated

13%

41%

PPD Award Insufficient

12%

52%

Other

30%

47%

Total Sample Size = 2,322

Source: Workers' Compensation Review Board
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Figure 2,1
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HI. BRITISH COLUMBIA (PUBLIC) INSURANCE MODEL
Introduction

The sophisticated economic analysis of market structure, conduct, and performance that
will be presented hi Section V below for the private market-oriented workers' compensation
system hi Michigan is simply not appropriate for the British Columbia environment. There is
only one insurance carrier, so the market structure is that of a monopoly. Further, this
insurance carrier is also the workers' compensation administrative agent, so there are few
issues of market conduct, and they tend to arise hi different ways than hi a private market
system. Since the state controls the market, there is little or no need for regulation,
particularly regulation that is designed to ensure that the private market provides a socially
desirable outcome. Thus, the discussion of the public monopoly insurance model of workers'
compensation hi this section (British Columbia) is much briefer than that of the private market
insurance model hi Section V (Michigan). These very different workers' compensation systems
need to answer the same fundamental questions, but they go about it hi very different ways.
The WCB of British Columbia operates a workers' compensation system under the
principle of "collective liability." This means that all employers share the responsibility for
paying compensation benefits to injured workers. In historical terms, this is referred to as the
German, or Bismarck, system as opposed to the English "individual responsibility" system
that is more dominant in the United States. In practice, this has meant the development of an
elaborate assessment system to determine each employer's financial contribution to the
collective liability.
However, there were major exceptions to this principle of collective liability, right
from the beginning. The Workmen's Compensation Act of 1917 in British Columbia provided
for 12 separate classes of employers for the assessment of revenues sufficient for the payment
of workers' benefits, not one rate for all employers as the pure collective liability principle
would suggest. Thus, back hi 1917, there was a basic policy choice made that the collective
liability principle was not absolute. In particular, it should allow room for another fundamental
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principle, that the cost of workers' compensation should be somehow proportional to the
hazard rate. This provides, at least theoretically, that the price of the goods and services
produced should include the cost of compensating and rehabilitating workers injured in
producing those goods and services.
The objective of the WCB Assessment Department is stated in the Assessment Policy
Manual as follows:
The primary objective of the Assessment Department is to
maintain the Accident Fund at a sufficient level required to
administer the provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act.
This objective must be met through the orderly and equitable
collection of assessments from the employers under the Act,
since the underlying economic theory of workers' compensation
is that the economic loss through personal injury or industrial
disease resulting from employment should be borne by industry,
and considered a component of production costs. (Section
10:20:00)
This section of the report will describe the WCB assessment procedure and consider its
performance. The overall adequacy of funding (macro) will be considered, as will the question
of equity among and between classes of employers within British Columbia.
WCB Assessment Structure and Function
As shown earlier (Figure 2.2), the Assessment Department of the WCB reports to the
Vice President, Finance and Information Systems. It is responsible for registering and
canceling employer accounts, administering the classification system, establishing the
assessment base, collecting assessment receivables, maintaining data on employers, and
ensuring employer compliance. In short, it is the job of the Assessment Department to
determine who is an employer, their assessable payroll, the assessment rate to be applied to
that payroll, and the collection of assessments due.
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Registration and Classification
The Registration Section is really the front line of the WCB in terms of its relationship
with employers. It is the Registration Section that new employers first encounter when they
seek information about their obligations under the Workers' Compensation Act. It is up to the
Registration Section to determine: (a) whether they are mandatory for coverage, (b) whether
they might be eligible for Personal Optional Protection, or (c) whether they are not allowed to
be covered under any circumstances because they are in an excluded category, such as casual
workers (less than 8 hours per work) or professional athletes.
Once employers are determined to be subject to the Act, then it is up to the Assessment
Department to assign them to one of 71 particular sub-classifications for purpose of
determining their basic assessment rate. Under the collective liability system, members of a
given sub-class bear all the claim costs, and appropriate pro rata share of administrative and
other costs, for the workers of all employers in the sub-class. The WCB of British Columbia
maintains a classification system with 71 sub-classes for which separate assessment rates are
determined.
As shown hi Table 3.1, other Canadian provinces range from a minimum of 6 rate
classes (Yukon) to 321 classes (Quebec), with most jurisdictions providing more rating classes
than British Columbia. 13 In a rough sense, the number of classifications can be taken as an
expression of the degree to which the individual versus collective liability principle is
maintained. The fewer the number of classifications, ceteris paribus, the more likely there will
be significant cross-subsidization effects between employers because they will be grouped into
a smaller number of classification units with more diversity.
The Assessment Policy Manual offers the following general guidelines for assigning
classifications.
Classifications are assigned to accounts on the
basis of the industry in which the employer is
operating. In assigning the classification, some of
the factors considered are the type of product or

13U.S. jurisdictions would generally maintain 300 to 350 active classifications.
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service that is being provided and the type of
industry with which the employer is in
competition. It is desirable that the assessment
classification system not be an economic factor in
the way business is conducted in the province.
(Section 30:20:10)
However, the Manual also contains the following; "This manual does not contain the specific
criteria for putting a firm in a particular classification, because of the immense number and
detailed nature of these rules." (Section 30:20:10) This is an explicit recognition of the
complexity of the classification decisions, and of its significance for the employers involved.
Once the Assessment Department has determined the sub-class (or classes) to which an
employer will be assigned, the base assessment rate is set. These rates are changed each year
according to the collective experience of each sub-class and the system as a whole.
Audits and Collections
Employers in British Columbia report then- payrolls, and calculate and send in their
WCB assessments on either a quarterly or annual basis. These payments are on a retrospective
basis, they are for past insurance coverage. Those firms whose total assessment is expected to
be under $500 file annually; those with larger assessments file quarterly. 14 Since the WCB
Assessment system is a self-reporting system, there is a need for an audit function to ensure
that all employers are meeting their reporting requirements and payment obligations in an
accurate and timely manner. The audits are the "enforcement" side of the Assessment
Department, but they also serve a vitally important equity function by assuring employers that
everyone is carrying their fair share of the load.
The audits are performed by Assessment Officers, who are the WCB field
representatives for assessment matters. They audit a variety of financial, payroll, and other
records of registered firms to determine the accuracy of the reported assessable earnings.

14Some smaller firms also file quarterly. These are in industries characterized by wide swings in
assessments, such as logging, construction, etc.
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Depending on the outcome of the audit, they adjust assessments as necessary and communicate
this information to the employer involved. They also review the industry classification of the
audit target firm, and perform other related assessment functions, as needed. About 10 percent
of registered firms are audited annually.
The Collections Section is responsible for collecting delinquent employer accounts, i.e.
those who have failed to send hi their WCB assessment payments on time. About 10 percent of
employer accounts involving 4 percent of WCB assessments are delinquent at the end of each
year. About 60 percent of this money will be recovered and 25 to 30 percent written off
during the following 12 months. In addition, this Section performs the "clearance" function
where employers, for purposes of contract or sub-contract, need to certify that they have
current WCB coverage. The WCB processes approximately 100,000 clearance requests
annually from registered employers to prove that they are registered and current hi their WCB
obligations, mostly for sub-contract purposes.
Self-Insurance at the WCB
As discussed above, British Columbia and other Canadian jurisdictions, have adopted
the principle of collective liability among employers for workers' compensation benefits. This
means that British Columbia employers as a whole have the responsibility of paying for
workers' compensation benefits to injured workers, rather than the individual employer
holding this responsibility.
Section 42 of the Workers' Compensation Act provides that:
The board shall establish subclassifications,
differentials and proportions in the rates as
between the different kinds of employment hi the
same class as may be considered just; and where
the board thinks a particular industry or plant is
shown to be so circumstanced or conducted that
the hazard or cost of compensation differs from the
average of the class or subclass to which the
industry or plant is assigned, the board shall
confer or impose on that industry or plant a special
rate, differential or assessment to correspond with
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the relative hazard or cost of compensation of that
industry or plant, and for that purpose may also
adopt a system of experience rating, (emphasis
added)
From the beginning of workers' compensation in British Columbia, separate classifications
were maintained for the railroad operating companies. These classes are the progenitors of
today's Deposit Accounts, which include the provincial government, Canadian Pacific
Limited, Air Canada, and the railroads.
These accounts involve a "deposit" of approximately two month's benefit costs, and
then monthly billing by the WCB for benefit payments on behalf of the firm involved, plus a
pro rata share of administrative costs. 15 In effect, these firms are self-insured for workers'
compensation benefits, with the WCB acting as the claims administrator and guarantor of
benefits. Self-insurance is not available to any other firms in British Columbia. Deposit
Accounts have generated 5 to 7 percent of assessment revenues in recent years.
Experience Rating (ERA)
The first experience rating plan for employers subject to the collective liability
principle was adopted for the forest industry in 1932. In 1941, this plan was extended to
include metal mining. By 1957, the logging portion of the forest industry was able to secure its
own experience rating plan, i.e. separate from the general forest industry plan, and in 1960 yet
another plan was extended to the construction industry.
In 1986, this piecemeal approach was swept away by the introduction of the new
simplified ERA (Experience Rated Assessment) experience rating program. Employer interests
had long favored such a move on the basis of equity among employers with different accident
and claims experience. They argued that it was counter-productive to force an employer with a
good safety and claims record to pay the same WCB assessment rate as an employer with a
bad record.

15Pension awards, however, are capitalized and billed immediately.
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During 1986-88 the WCB gradually phased in a universal experience rating plan after
extensive public consultation. The ERA plan was moderate hi its provisions; it sought to
encourage individual employers to create safer workplaces, but without unduly compromising
the fundamental principle of collective liability. The maximum merit and demerit was set at 33
percent; that is, the best (worst) employers would receive merits (demerits) of 33 percent, and
hence would be assessed up to one-third less (more) than the average for their sub-class. This
means that the worst employers in a sub-class pay exactly twice the assessment rate paid by the
best employers in that sub-class. It should be noted that this is far less than the variance within
classifications in the U.S. 16
The WCB applies ERA prospectively, as a reward for good performance in the past,
rather than retrospectively, to try to balance the individual employer's claims cost with his/her
assessments after the fact. The WCB also uses two years of claims data to determine the ERA
merit/demerit as a compromise between the two opposing goals of quick feedback (suggesting
a short term) and actuarial credibility (suggesting a longer term). Further, the ERA plan is
designed to be balanced, that is, each sub-class is supposed to show a balance between costs
and revenues on an annual basis, after all positive and negative deviations are summed.
However, this goal has not been achieved with 10 of 63 sub-classes showing at least $10
million unfunded liabilities as of the end of 1993. Three sub-classes had surpluses of $10
million or more on the same date. 17
An additional compromise was made on the participation of smaller firms hi the ERA
program. Actuarial credibility argues against the participation of small firms, since their shortterm accident and claims record reflects a much greater influence of chance than is true for
larger firms. But equity and policy objectives argue that they should also have the opportunity
to reduce their workers' compensation costs through effective injury prevention programs, or
pay more if their performance is inadequate. The WCB allows smaller employers a reduced
degree of participation hi ERA. Those employers with aggregate assessable payrolls of less

16There is perhaps a tenfold to twentyfold variation within most classifications in Michigan.
17The cross-subsidization issue at the WCB will be examined in more detail below.
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than twice the maximum assessable wage base for each of the past two years ($98,600 CD in
1993) participate in ERA, but only at the 50 percent level. This means that their maximum
merit/demerit is only one-sixth of the average assessment rate. 18
To keep the claims experience upon which the merit/demerit is based as recent as
possible, two years of actual incurred claims costs are the basic determinant of experience
rating. 19 Further, since there must be some specific point in time at which the ERA
merit/demerit factor is calculated, the WCB adopted June 30 as the cutoff point for claims cost
accumulation when calculating the relative claims costs for ERA purposes. This means that
long duration claims will not count against an employer's ERA merit/demerit beyond the two
and one-half year maximum period. It also means that if inefficient claims adjudication,
retarded medical recovery, or slow appeal procedures delay the award of a permanent
disability pension beyond two and one-half years from date of injury, this amount will not
count against the employer's experience rating evaluation.
In addition, industrial diseases with average latencies of two years or more are
excluded from the calculations on the theory that it is inappropriate to punish employers for
the mistakes of the distant past, since there is nothing they can do now to correct these
mistakes. Therefore, the feeling is that this does not encourage safer workplaces, but merely
operates as a punitive measure. However, the aggregate impact of these various exclusions is
estimated by the Assessment Department to result in only about one-third of all claim costs
figuring in the ERA determination. Another way of interpreting this is that British Columbia
employers' experience rated workers' compensation assessments are determined more by the
frequency of injuries than by their severity.

18Farm industry classifications have an additional step. The smallest firms only participate in ERA at the
25 percent level.
19Versus three to five years in U.S. jurisdictions.
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Personal Optional Protection Program
Personal Optional Protection (POP) is available to individuals who do not require
mandatory coverage, and who are not prohibited from coverage. Generally speaking, these are
individual owner/operators engaging in contract work, or proprietors or partners involved in
small businesses. Because of the need by contractors to require proof of WCB coverage from
all sub-contractors, so as to insure they do not inadvertently acquire WCB liability for such
individuals, there is a large demand for POP accounts from individuals who are entering sub
contractor status. This means that they need to be registered, classified, and absorb all the
administrative effort that goes into setting up a new employer account.
Relief of Cost Applications
Under Section 39(l)(d) and (e) of the Act, employers are entitled to "relief of cost" for
assessment purposes when claims are paid that involve pre-existing conditions, or that result
from disasters. Because of ERA experience rating, employers have a direct financial interest in
the claims that are charged against their account. If they can shift responsibility for a particular
claim, their ERA merit/demerit will be proportionately affected. Over the last five years, an
aggressive consultation industry has grown up to help employers find examples of, and file
applications for, relief of these costs, thereby lowering their assessment bills retrospectively.
The consultants generally receive one-third the firm's recovery as a contingent fee.
There are a number of unfortunate aspects to this situation. First, it feeds the fears of
labor that ERA's major impact is to encourage "claims avoidance" behavior rather than
accident prevention. Second, it is obvious that these allocations affect individual employer
costs, but it is hard to see what difference it makes to the general welfare whether a given
claim is charged to one individual employer or to the sub-class as a whole. In fact, since the
WCB can not go back and reassess everyone for the relevant time period, it could be argued
that these after-the-fact adjustments threaten the adequacy of claim reserves.
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Performance Issues
The major performance issues that arise in the British Columbia (or other public
monopoly) system are two: "Are sufficient revenues raised to finance the scheme?" and "Are
they raised from the right sources?" The first is usually expressed in the unfunded liabilities of
the scheme, at least in North America. The second is a question about class equity; are costs
being allocated fairly, or are there significant cross-subsidizations occurring? This section will
consider these two issues as they relate to the workers' compensation system of British
Columbia.
Revenue Sufficiency
Table 3.2 lays out 10 years of experience on the assessment revenue side, together with
the statement of cumulative unappropriated balance/unfunded liability at the end of each year.
British Columbia began the decade with an unfunded liability of $241 million (CD) and ended
it with an unfunded liability of $191 million (CD). However, for nearly the entire decade in
between the fund maintained an unappropriated balance ranging from $50.9 million to $291.9
million. Further, this was done with very substantial reductions in average assessment rates
(37 percent) from 1985 through 1990, followed by a 20 percent rise through 1993. So for the
entire decade, the average assessment rate fell by 3.0 percent per year.
The table also shows that this was done on the basis of a 5.9 percent annual increase in
the maximum assessable wage and a 9.8 percent annual growth in total assessable payrolls.
Actual assessment income grew by 4.8 percent per year for the decade shown in Table 3.2. In
fact, the performance of the WCB fund was so strong that $115 million (CD) was returned to
employers in the form of special rate abatements in 1987 and 1988. The decade ends with a 3
percent unfunded liability, in other words 97 percent of expected future benefit payments have
been collected and are invested for the time they will be needed.
Table 3.3 shows how important the investment income from those reserves has been in
furthering the WCB's financial performance. Investment revenues have grown at 9.1 percent
annually, rising from 25 percent of total income in 1984 to 37 percent in 1990, then falling
back slightly to 33 percent in 1993. The result has been that assessments have had to grow at
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only 4.8 percent per year, while compensation expenses grew more than twice as fast, at 10.8
percent per year. The operating surplus/deficit column shows that the WCB operated with a
surplus in 4 of the 10 years. The only clouds in this rosy picture are a rapid rise in
administrative costs (12.0 percent annually) and the fact that recent years have tended to deficit
rather than surplus.
Cross-Subsidization Issues
While the overall financial performance of the WCB has been outstanding by North
American standards, Table 3.4 indicates that there may be some problems at the sub-class
level. The table shows the estimated assessment income and claims costs for each of the 64
sub-classes in use for calendar year 1993.20 A pro rota share of administrative expenses and
investment income are added to these figures to derive the current year surplus or deficiency.
Investment income should be offsetting long-term claim costs, so this current year measure
tells us the adequacy of assessment income to meet current costs. Table 3.4 reveals that only
14 sub-classes showed a surplus for 1993, while 46 show a deficit. The total current year
deficit for all classes during 1993 was estimated at $97.3 million (CD), or about 16 percent of
claim costs in that year.
While any given sub-class in a single year may be subject to adverse experience based
on policy changes, natural disasters, etc., the fact remains that the goal is to achieve overall
balance and sufficiency of funding over time. From that perspective, the data in the last
column of Table 3.4 are somewhat concerning. According to these data, fully half the sub
classes are in long-term surplus or deficit (unappropriated balance/unfunded liability),
amounting to more than 1-year's claims costs for the sub-class. Further, 21 of these are in a
state of unfunded liability (deficit), while only 9 show an unappropriated balance (surplus).

20The table includes the deposit class employers as well, but they will not be considered hi this
discussion.
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This tendency to unfunded liability has plagued most of the public workers' compensation
systems in North America.21
The difficulty of tackling these persistent problems in a public system can be illustrated
by the recent British Columbia experience with sub-class 6-21, Retail Stores. It has been
obvious that there was a persistent imbalance in this class since about 1991. The unfunded
liability mounted steadily from 1989 and reached nearly $64 million (CD) by the end of 1994.
Also, it was common knowledge that the large food supermarkets in the province were
virtually all at maximum demerit and therefore were being subsidized by the rest of the firms
in the sub-class.
This problem was attacked recently by the WCB when a decision was reached to split
the sub-class into three parts; supermarkets, department stores, and general retail. This will
provide more accurate pricing for these different lines of business and reduce the implicit
cross-subsidization that has been going on. The Board adjusted the assessment rates to reflect
past claims experience, setting the supermarket base rate at $2.57 per $100 (CD) of payroll,
the department store rate at $1.36 per $100 (CD) and the general retail rate at $1.01 per $100
(CD), compared to the old combined sub-class rate of $1.31 per $100 (CD). But, to resolve
the unfunded liability problem, the WCB elected to levy a special 5-year assessment of $.30
per $100 (CD) on all previous members of the 6-21 sub-class to pay down the accumulated
deficit. Since general retailers had about 63 percent and department stores 14 percent of the
total payroll hi the old sub-class, this meant that only a minority (approximately 23 percent) of
the unfunded liability would assessed against those employers who were directly responsible.
Needless to say, the general retailers and department stores are extremely unhappy
about this decision. The need for a general classification study and review at the WCB was
cited in the 1992 Assessment Department Administrative Inventory (Hunt, 1992), but facing
the political fallout of "correcting" such inequities is not a pleasant task. More importantly,
this example illustrates the difficulty of making significant marginal adjustments in the status
quo. Most public workers' compensation agencies in North America have not been willing to

21See Vaillancourt (1994) for an analysis of the Canadian experience.
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do so, and the result is huge unfunded liabilities, the most noteworthy and best-documented
being the Ontario WCB deficit of $11.5 billion (CD) at the end of 1993. This is a problem that
public workers' compensation systems need to resolve.
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Table 3.1 Canada Jurisdictional Summary
Number of Sector/
Classes

Total Number of
Rate Groups

Alberta

12

151

British Columbia

14

71

Manitoba

8

249

New Brunswick

5

58

Newfoundland

7

84

Northwest Territories

8

37

Nova Scotia

9

150

Ontario

9

219

Prince Edward Island

6

38

Quebec

5

321

Saskatchewan

11

86

Yukon

6

6

Source:

Association of Workers' Compensation Boards of Canada, "Workers'
Compensation Industry Classifications, Assessment Rates, and
Experience Rating Programs in Canada, 1995," p. 11.
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Table 3.2 WCB Assessment Performance, 1984-93

Year

Maximum
Assessable
Wage
$(CD)

Total
Assessable
Payrolls
$Billion (CD)

Average
Assessment
Rate
$(CD)

Assessment
Income
$Million (CD)

Unappropriated Balance
(Unfunded Liability)
$Million (CD)

1984

$30,200

$16,244

$2.78

$480.1

($241.1)

1985

$32,400

$16,764

$2.77

$478.2

$50.9

1986

$40,000

$18,481

$2.19

$421.3

$291.9

1987

$41,100

$20,912

$1.97

$323.3

$249.5

1988

$41,300

$23,755

$1.79

$442.0

$228.6

1989

$42,200

$26,531

$1.78

$520.7

$243.2

1990

$43,400

$28,676

$1.75

$551.0

$131.5

1991

$45,800

$29,825

$1.83

$575.6

$66.6

1992

$48,000

$34,256

$1.95

$645.0

($97.0)

1993

$50,600

$37,523

$2.11

$729.1

($191.5)

(3.0)%

4.8%

Annual
Rate of
Growth

5.9%

9.8%

Source: WCB Annual Report, 1993.
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Table 3.3 WCB Financial Performance, 1984-93
Expenses

Income

Operating Surplus
(Deficit)

Year

Assessments
$Million (CD)

Investments
$Million (CD)

Compensation
$Million (CD)

Administration
$Million (CD)

1984

$480.1

$162.5

$393.6

$67.0

$181.9

1985

$478.2

$200.9

$318.9

$68.2

$292.0

1986

$421.3

$227.5

$334.3

$73.6

$241.0

1987

$323.4

$244.0

$528.3

$81.5

($42.4)

1988

$442.0

$269.9

$638.6

$94.2

($20.9)

1989

$520.7

$310.5

$712.0

$104.6

$14.6

1990

$551.0

$324.9

$858.1

$129.5

($111.7)

1991

$575.6

$329.6

$818.9

$151.1

($64.9)

1992

$645.0

$316.1

$952.3

$172.4

($163.6)

1993

$729.1

$356.6

$994.2

$186.0

($94.5)

4.8%

9.1%

10.8%

12.0%

Annual
Rate of
Growth

Source: WCB Annual Report, 1993.
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$Million (CD)

Table 3.4 WCB Sub-Class Financial Performance, 1993

Class & SubClass

Description

1

Forest Products

Claims Costs

Administration
& Other
Expenses

Current Year
Excess
(Deficiency)

2

Logging

68,464

63,780

18,624

(13,940)

48,563

4

Pulp & Paper

11,687

13,343

3,595

(5,251)

(12,281)

5

Sawmills

41,240

46,393

13,025

(18,178)

(66,485)

7

Plywood Mills

9,286

6,562

2,006

718

(13,316)

9

Shake & Shingle

2,919

4,148

1,019

(2,248)

484

133,596

134,226

38,269

(38,899)

Quarries, Cement Mfg.

5,144

4,290

1,277

(423)

11

Mining (not coal)

6,971

7,266

3,743

(4,038)

18

Alum. Smelter

1,985

1,317

327

30

Coal Mining

4,669

3,864

18,769

18,547

I

m
vo

Assessments
Income

(Unfunded
Liability)
Unappropriated
Balance
Dec. 31 Balances

(43,035)

Mining, Quarrying & Mfg

4
3

4,338
(7,271)

341

(2,946)

1,545

(740)

(7,925)

16,737

6,892

(4,860)

(13,804)

17,787

4,926

(4,166)

(4,343)

Light Mfg., Service, Trade

6
2

Misc. Mfg.

Table 3.4 WCB Sub-Class Financial Performance, 1993 (Continued)

I

Current Year
Excess
(Deficiency)

Class & SubClass

Description

Assessments
Income

Claims Costs

3

Light Mfg.

3,287

2,471

950

(134)

3,525

10,793

8,400

2,425

(32)

(10,003)

619

380

155

84

1,345

3,488

2,863

782

(157)

197

4 Woodwork, Boat Bldg.

ON
O

Administration
& Other
Expenses

(Unfunded
Liability)
Unappropriated
Balance
Dec. 31 Balances

5

Amusement Fac.

8

Beverage Mfg.

17

Textile Mfg.

392

497

110

(215)

(36)

18

Clothing, Drape Mfg.

895

869

319

(293)

(4,868)

20

Food Prod. Mfg.

5,851

5,664

1,268

(1,081)

1,538

21

Retail Stores

38,293

34,282

7,801

(3,790)

(52,047)

22

Apt. Bldg. Oper.

9,972

8,168

1,682

122

(10,710)

24

Fruit Pack. , Dairies

5,898

3,820

1,281

797

(5,157)

25

Laundry Serv.

1,388

997

418

(27)

(2,145)

26

Hospital & Related

63,071

40,314

8,999

13,758

(2,537)

27

Hotel, Restaurant

17,000

15,664

4,363

(3,027)

5,760

31

Surveying

365

764

195

(594)

64

32

Grain, Seed Dealer

2,966

2,289

575

102

247

Table 3.4 WCB Sub-Class Financial Performance, 1993 (Continued)

Class & SubClass

M
M
I

Description

Assessments
Income

Claims Costs

Administration
& Other
Expenses

Current Year
Excess
(Deficiency)

(Unfunded
Liability)
Unappropriated
Balance
Dec. 31 Balances

36

Oil Refining/Distr.

966

1,259

699

37

Meat Cutting/Pack.

6,594

3,915

786

39

Printing

3,737

3,360

1,030

(653)

43

Farming

7,508

7,372

1,511

(1,375)

46

Theatre Oper.

108

147

53

(92)

(148)

54

Wholesalers

7,778

9,175

2,712

(4,109)

(15,684)

56

Labor/Trade Union

118

304

115

(301)

(680)

57

Builders' Supplies

7,814

6,477

2,034

(697)

(3,373)

58

Domestics

3,314

2,795

530

(11)

(5,645)

59

Auto Sales/Serv.

19,208

19,363

5,879

(6,034)

(6,793)

239,970

199,396

51,598

(11,024)

(116,947)

(992)
1,893

778
(4,253)
(4,860)
2,881

Heavy Mfg., Construction,
Air

7
5

Construction Trade

13,467

12,606

4,392

(3,531)

(3,921)

6

Building Construction

64,595

60,244

21,438

(17,087)

(16,701)

7

Heavy Mfg.

58,874

42,245

13,974

2,655

(16,725)
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Class & SubClass

H
M
I

Description

Assessments
Income

Claims Costs

Administration
& Other
Expenses

Current Year
Excess
(Deficiency)

(Unfunded
Liability)
Unappropriated
Balance
Dec. 31 Balances

11

Electrical Wiring

8,406

6,996

2,489

(1,079)

13

Janitorial Serv.

3,090

2,652

576

(138)

4,285

21

Shipbuilding

6,936

4,896

1,928

112

(19,598)

25

Heavy Construction

2,843

3,037

1,393

(1,587)

(9,029)

26

Road Bldg. & Related

25,919

26,300

8,073

(8,454)

12,977

47

Consulting Eng.

684

407

283

(6)

1,257

48

Oil/Gas Well Drilling

798

1,848

609

(1,659)

9,226

185,612

161,231

55,155

(30,774)

(43,386)

(5,157)

Utilities, Comm., Transp.

8
1

Gas/Elec. Supply

4,974

3,652

1,092

230

(6,128)

8

TV/Phone Systems

5,954

2,685

578

2,691

(6,851)

11

Bus Line Oper.

3,817

3,207

752

(142)

(886)

12

Taxi Oper. & Rel.

1,429

1,947

367

(885)

(2,407)

20

Sched. Airline Serv.

886

1,241

254

(609)

19,931

23

Charter Air Service

1,469

1,611

295

(437)

8,933

Table 3.4 WCB Sub-Class Financial Performance, 1993 (Continued)

Claims Costs

30,321

30,846

7,264

(7,789)

6,071

48,850

45,189

10,602

(6,941)

663

Water Transport.

2,051

3,250

1,109

(2,308)

3,870

2 Wharf Operation

7,966

8,873

1,600

(2,507)

(40)

3,911

3,829

840

(758)

990

157

609

76

(528)

265

6,642

6,376

1,786

(1,520)

(1,677)

20,727

22,937

5,411

(7,621)

3,408

51

Description
Trucking

Water Transport., Fishing

9
1

U)

Current Year
Excess
(Deficiency)

Assessments
Income

Class & SubClass

H
H
H
I

Administration
& Other
Expenses

(Unfunded
Liability)
Unappropriated
Balance
Dec. 31 Balances

6

Fish Processing

9

Marine Shipping Serv.

11

Fishing

Municipalities

14
1

Municipalities

29,620

20,024

5,231

4,365

6

School Boards

19,280

16,488

4,514

(1,722)

12,952

48,900

36,512

9,745

2,643

13,364

278

151

24

103

8,239

696,702

616,379

177,696

38
Total Classes

Fed. Gov't. Works, Grants

(97,373)

412

(191,498)

Table 3.4 WCB Sub-Class Financial Performance, 1993 (Continued)

Administration
& Other
Expenses

Current Year
Excess
(Deficiency)

(Unfunded
Liability)
Unappropriated
Balance
Dec. 31 Balances

Assessments
Income

Claims Costs

Canadian Pacific

4,014

8,758

1,541

(6,285)

0

12

Canadian Nat'1

7,037

2,343

898

3,796

0

13

Provincial Gov't

26,297

15,483

3,932

6,882

0

18

Burlington Northern

(135)

60

45

(240)

0

19

Federal Gov't

7,644

891

1,877

4,876

0

44,857

27,535

8,293

9,029

0

741,559

643,914

185,989

(38,344)

(191,498)

Class & SubClass

Description

10

Total Self-Insured Employers
Total Self-Insured Employers & Classes
Silicosis

2
3

Coal Mining

(3,378)

0

0

(3,378)

0

4

Metal Mining

(9,125)

0

0

(9,125)

0

(12,503)

0

0

(12,503)

0

5

6

(3)

729,061

643,920

185,986

Hounding
Grand Total

Source: WCB Annual Report, 1993

2
(100,845)

21

(191,477)

IV. OVERVIEW OF MICHIGAN (U.S.) WORKERS' COMPENSATION MODEL
Introduction

Michigan adopted its Workmen's Compensation Act in 1912. The entire Act was
reorganized hi 1969 and called the Worker's (sic) Disability Compensation Act of 1969.
Employers with one or more full-tune employees (35 hours per week) are subject to the law.
The Michigan system is a "voluntary pay" system, which means that employers or their
insurance carriers are expected to pay compensation claims voluntarily, i.e. without
intervention by the state. This ideal is achieved in more than 80 percent of compensable
claims.
Organization of the Workers' Compensation System

The Bureau of Workers' Disability Compensation (BWDC) is the administrative
agency hi the Department of Labor responsible for administering most aspects of the Workers'
Compensation Act. This includes monitoring benefit payments by insurance carriers and selfinsured employers, providing mediation for disputes and supporting the formal adjudication by
the Board of Magistrates, providing public information, determining self-insurance status, and
other functions. The BWDC is headed by a director, who is appointed by the governor for a 3year term with the advice and consent of the Senate and reports to the director of the
Department of Labor. Figure 4.1 shows the overall organization within state government.
Costs of administering the system are borne principally by the State General Fund, with
supplementary funding from redemption fees and penalties.
Organizational Structure of the BWDC

As shown in Figure 4.2, the BWDC is organized into five divisions. The Claims
Processing Division administers the Act as it relates to voluntary payment claims and litigated
cases. It processes injury reports, handles inquiries from claimants and employers, sets and
serves applications for mediation or hearing, and sends out decisions and orders. It also
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maintains the automated database, which serves the needs of both the BWDC and the Board of
Magistrates. During 1993, the Claims Processing Division received 765,695 pieces of
correspondence, including 88,259 Employer's Basic Report of Injury. A total of 60,541 new
wage-loss claims were established (initial payments made in 1993). The Division also set and
served 22,496 new applications for mediation or hearing. They mailed out 9,251 decisions,
8,900 mediation orders, and 15,542 redemption orders.
The Mediation Division handles a variety of situations. Foremost among these are
formal mediation hearings, hi which an application for hearing has been filed and the case is
referred to a mediator hi an attempt to resolve the case before a trial is scheduled with a
magistrate. Informal mediations are those in which the parties request a conference to resolve
the case without a formal application for hearing. In addition, the Mediation Division handles
vocational rehabilitation, health care service, and other miscellaneous disputes. During 1993,
the Division held 8,069 formal hearings (resolving 44 percent) and 1,252 informal hearings
(resolving 73 percent). They also were involved in settling 462 vocational rehabilitation
disputes and over 5,000 disputes involving health care services rules. The Division also held
hearings on over 1,000 cases referred by magistrates and logged over 68,000 phone calls
related to workers' compensation issues.
The Insurance Division is responsible for verifying insurance coverage for insured
employers and certifying self-insurance eligibility for individual and group applicants. There
are over 600 self-insured employers in Michigan, plus about 9,000 smaller employers in 35
different group self-insurance funds. The self-insured employers, including self-insured
groups, made 46 percent of all wage-loss payments in Michigan during 1993.
The Health Care Services Division is responsible for administering the Workers'
Compensation Health Care Services Rules as established under Section 418.315 of the Act.
The rules establish reimbursement amounts for health care providers and require carriers to
maintain certified professional utilization review programs. They also collect data on medical
costs and conduct training seminars for insurers and providers. The Division was responsible
for oversight on over 525,000 medical claims during 1993, at an average cost of $696 (US)
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per claim. The Division estimates that their activities saved Michigan employers some $70
million (US) in health care costs during 1993.
The Vocational Rehabilitation Division monitors vocational rehabilitation efforts by
private carriers and self-insured employers in Michigan. This unit provides referrals to
certified private and public sector vocational rehabilitation providers, and responds to requests
for information and assistance. During 1993, the Division reported that the average vocational
rehabilitation success rate was 38 percent, resulting in a total of 3,621 injured workers assisted
back to work through rehabilitation programs.
Other Organizations in the Workers' Compensation System
As shown in Figure 3.1 the Board of Magistrates, the Appellate Commission, and
Funds Administration are separate entities who play major roles in the workers' compensation
system in Michigan. In addition, the Bureau of Safety and Regulation provides safety standards
setting and enforcement and voluntary consultation on safety and health matters under terms of
the Michigan and federal Occupational Safety and Health Acts (MIOSHA and OSHA).
Board of Magistrates
The Board of Magistrates is an autonomous entity in the Department of Labor that
conducts hearings and issues decisions in workers' compensation cases in which there is an
unresolved dispute. Each of the 30 Magistrates is appointed by the Governor with
confirmation by the Michigan Senate. The Qualifications Advisory Committee (QAC)
evaluates the performance of magistrates and makes recommendations for magistrate
appointments. It is quite unusual in the U.S. for the first-level hearing officers to be political
appointees, but this was part of a move in the mid-1980s to make the Michigan system more
responsive to political changes in the state. Magistrates are appointed to 4-year terms for a
maximum of 12 years total service. The term limit was another move designed to prevent the
establishment of a permanent bureaucracy, unresponsive to political forces in the state. The
Chairperson has general supervisory control and serves at the pleasure of the Governor.
During 1993, the Board of Magistrates received 22,034 petitions for hearing. It produced
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23,580 dispositions during the year, including 8,338 decisions and 15,065 redemption
approvals. There were 24,162 cases pending at the end of the year, approximately one year's
output.
Appellate Commission
An Appellate Commission of seven members serves as "an independent body with the
authority to review the orders of the BWDC Director and the orders and opinions of the
Magistrates." Members of the Appellate Commission are recommended by the Qualifications
Advisory Committee and appointed by the Governor, with the advice and consent of the
Senate, and they must be attorneys who are members of the state bar as well. They serve 4year terms, limited to a maximum of 12 years total service. The Chairperson of the
Commission has general supervisory control and is in charge of the employees of the
Commission. The chairperson also assigns and schedules the work of the Commission.
In its review process, the Commission functions as a panel of three members, randomly
assigned to each case. The decision reached by a majority of the three member panel is the
final decision of the Commission. The Appellate Commission does not take direct testimony.
They review the written record of the case and determine whether the law has been correctly
applied. Attorneys have the right to move for oral argument, but this is rare. By statute, the
findings of fact by the magistrate are to be overturned only on the basis of "substantial
evidence." In cases that may establish a precedent with regard to workers' compensation, or
any matter which two or more members of the commission request, is reviewed and decided
by the entire Commission. During 1993, the Appellate Commission received 1,178 claims for
review, disposed of 636 cases by opinion and 475 by order (generally minor issues). At the
end of the year, a backlog of 1,197 cases remained, approximately one year's output.
The decisions of the Appellate Commission can be appealed to the Michigan Court of
Appeals, whose decisions can, in turn, be appealed to the Michigan Supreme Court. The
Supreme Court typically issues three or four decisions per year in workers' compensation
cases.

IV-68

Other Agencies
Other agencies carry out limited responsibilities in the Michigan workers'
compensation system. The Attorney General represents the special funds and the BWDC in
legal matters. The Insurance Commissioner regulates workers' compensation insurance
providers. Funds collected from fees on redemption settlements are kept in a revolving fund
with the State Treasurer's office. The Bureau of Safety and Regulation, Michigan Department
of Labor enforces the Michigan Occupational Safety and Health Act (MIOSHA), Act 154 of
1974. It also provides safety information and holds seminars and on-site consultation with
employers and employees on the subject of preventing workplace injuries. It is not directly
associated with the workers' compensation system, but both agencies report to the same
Deputy Director of the Labor Department. The Public Health Department promulgates and
enforces occupational health standards and supports the Labor Department in promoting safe
and healthy workplaces in Michigan.
Funds Administration
There are four separate funds relevant to workers' compensation claimants in
Michigan: the Second Injury Fund; the Silicosis, Dust Disease and Logging Industry
Compensation Fund; the Self-Insurers' Security Fund; and the Compensation Supplement
Fund. The first three fall under the authority of the Funds Administration, while the last one is
administered by the Claims Administration Division of the Bureau of Workers' Disability
Compensation.
The Funds Administration is legally separate from the BWDC, but works closely with
BWDC administrators. The Funds are governed by a 3-member Board of Trustees consisting
of one representative of the insurance industry, one representative of self-insured employers,
and the director of the BWDC. The first two are appointed by the Governor with the advice
and consent of the Senate, while the director of the BWDC is an ex officio trustee.
The Funds operate like a pay-as-you-go insurance system with a variable assessment
level. The difference is that generally speaking they are reimbursing carriers or self-insured
employers for payments made to individuals with entitlements. The Second Injury Fund makes
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payments directly to permanently and totally disabled claimants, and to claimants in multiple
employer cases. As might be expected, there is a significant amount of litigation involved hi
the administration of these funds. The Attorney General represents the Funds for legal
purposes, plus the Fund employs part-time attorneys on a geographically dispersed basis to
represent the Funds as necessary, under the direction of the Attorney General.
Second Injury Fund
The Second Injury Fund (SIF) in Michigan has a number of responsibilities. First, the
SIF compensates those permanent and total disabilities that result from a subsequent injury. If
an employee has a permanent disability in the form of the loss of a hand, arm, foot, leg, or
eye and subsequently has another disability resulting in another of the these losses, he/she is
deemed to be totally and permanently disabled and the SIF pays the benefits for permanent and
total disabilities after completion of payments for the second injury. In addition, SIF is
responsible for the payment of limited inflation adjustment benefits to claimants who are
permanently and totally disabled. These payments are designed to bring claimants up to the
maximum weekly benefit payable at the time of then* injury.
The Second Injury Fund also is involved in paying workers' compensation benefits for
disability beyond 52 weeks (104 weeks for those hired before July 30, 1985) to persons who
have been certified as "vocationally handicapped individuals" prior to then- (re) injury. This
provision is designed to encourage the employment of individuals with pre-existing
impairments of the back or heart, or who are subject to epilepsy or diabetes.
The Second Injury Fund is financed by assessments on workers' compensation insurers
and self-insureds in Michigan according to the total indemnity payments (excluding medical,
rehabilitation, and death benefits) hi the previous year. Carriers and self-insured employers are
assessed a sum equal to their pro rota share of 175 percent of the total disbursements made
from the fund during the preceding calendar year, less net assets in excess of $200,000 at the
end of the year. By statute the assessment shall not exceed 3 percent in any year. For 1993,
total assessments were $29.3 million.
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Silicosis, Dust Disease, and Logging Industry Compensation Fund
The Silicosis, Dust Disease and Logging Industry Compensation Fund has
responsibility for various occupational diseases and special circumstances. The Silicosis and
Dust Disease Fund reimburses carriers and self-insured employers for weekly benefits paid in
excess of $25,000 for employees disabled due to silicosis or other dust disease. The Logging
Industry Compensation Fund was established effective January 1, 1982 and provides for
reimbursement of weekly benefits to insurers for indemnity costs greater than $25,000 for a
single claim in the logging industry. Total assessments during 1993 by the Silicosis, Dust
Disease, and Logging Industry Compensation Fund were $9.5 million.
Self-Insurers Security Fund
The Self-Insurers Security Fund provides for payment of workers' compensation
benefits to employees of private, self-insured employers who have become insolvent. Payments
from the Self-Insurers Security Fund are raised by assessment against private, self-insured
employers only and totaled $3.2 million in 1993.
BWDC Compensation Supplement Fund
The Compensation Supplement Fund pays inflation adjustment supplements in cases
involving injury dates between September 1, 1965 and January 1, 1980. The supplement is
computed using the total annual percentage change in the state average weekly wage from the
year of injury (but not earlier than 1968) to 1981. The supplement is limited to 5 percent or
the inflation rate, whichever is smaller, compounded for each calendar year in the adjustment
period. It is paid as a percentage of the weekly compensation rate by the carrier or self-insurer
and reimbursed by the Compensation Supplement Fund. Lump-sum payment cases (i.e.
redemptions) are not eligible for supplement payments. During calendar year 1993,
reimbursements were processed for about 8,000 claims totaling $14.8 million.
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Claims Administration
In the event of a workplace injury, an employee should provide a notice of injury,
either oral or written, to the employer within 90 days after the occurrence of the injury. Most
injuries are reported much sooner, usually on the same day as the injury. The absence of such
notice, however, does not preclude the injured worker from receiving benefits. In the event of
a workplace injury that results in disability extending beyond seven consecutive days, or an
injury that results in a death, or a loss of body member enumerated in a schedule, the
employer is required to submit a report of injury to the BWDC. It is the employer's
responsibility to see that notice is given to the workers' compensation insurer, if any, that is
carrying the risk on behalf of the employer.
A claim for compensation may also be made directly by the employee to the BWDC,
and a copy is mailed to the employer. A claim for compensation is not valid unless made
within two years from the date of injury, or the date the disability manifests itself, or the last
day of employment with the employer against whom the claim is being made. The employee
must also obtain and furnish to the employer and/or insurance carrier, a report setting forth the
medical history, the diagnosis, the prognosis, and other information reasonably necessary to
properly evaluate the injury. Usually this is not an extra burden since the employee must go to
the employer-chosen physician for treatment in the first 10 days of the disability. Thereafter,
at reasonable intervals, not more than 60 days, the employee must obtain and furnish a current
medical report containing the same information.
Once the insurer or self-insured employer is notified of the injury, and assuming there
is no dispute, payment is required within 30 days, or else a penalty may be assessed. It is
possible that the employer will be responsible for payment of the penalty if it is found that it
failed to notify the carrier of the claim; however, this is rare in actual practice.
It is sometimes the case that the first notice of a claim that the BWDC receives is by
way of a request for a hearing. In recent years, about 10 percent of case files have started by
this method. This indicates that the employer is unaware of the injury alleged (especially in the
case of an occupational disease or cumulative trauma claim) or simply has not filed a notice of
injury, and the employee has not filed a claim for compensation.
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In most instances where there is compensable lost time, benefits for temporary total
disability, specific loss, or death benefits commence with no controversy. In that case the selfinsurer or insurer is required to file a Bureau informational form on the day after the first
payment is disbursed. The BWDC enters the information into its computerized database for
future tracking. Weekly compensation rates and other audit checks are also performed at this
time. Additionally, if a death occurs as a result of the workplace injury, a supplemental report
of fatal injury is filed by the insurer or self-insured employer.
If the employer or insurer chooses to contest compensability of the claim, it can simply
refuse to commence payment. To protect against possible penalties, they would also file a
Notice of Dispute with the BWDC. If the employee persists with the claim, he/she may
request a hearing or mediation on the issue. At the time of filing an application for hearing,
the claimant must provide the carrier or employer with any medical records relevant to the
claim that are in his/her possession. The BWDC will then set the matter for hearing by the
Board of Magistrates and send out a notice of mediation or pre-trial. The opposing party to a
request for hearing or mediation must file an answer within 30 days of receipt of notice from
the BWDC, along with all copies of medical records in its possession.
Once weekly payments have begun, they continue until the worker returns to work and
no longer experiences a loss of wages, or the insurer or self-insured employer files a notice of
stopping compensation along with a medical report that releases the worker to return to
work.22 If the payment of compensation is a result of a final order directing payment of
benefits "until further order," benefits may not be terminated until a hearing can be held based
on the filing of a petition to stop. Otherwise, the initiative lies with the employer or insurance
carrier.
If a worker objects to the stopping of compensation, the burden is then on the worker
to prove in a hearing that his/her disability continues and payment of compensation should be
resumed. The injured worker generally attempts to prove this through his/her testimony,

22In the case of a specific loss or death claim, benefits continue for a specified number of weeks. An
individual receiving benefits for a specific loss may, however, be evaluated at the end of the specified time period
for general disability benefit eligibility.
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together with a medical report from a physician that contradicts that of the defense (sometimes
referred to as "dueling docs"). In such cases, the worker is nearly always represented by an
attorney.
Workers' Compensation Benefits
The Michigan Workers' Disability Compensation Act authorizes six different types of
benefits. They are:
medical benefits
wage-loss benefits
total and permanent disability benefits
specific loss benefits
death benefits
rehabilitation benefits
Medical Benefits
The Act provides that the employer shall furnish reasonable medical treatment for
employees injured at work. It also states that after ten days from the inception of medical care,
the employee may treat with a physician of his or her choice. This means that the employer is
able to choose the physician who will provide treatment during the first 10 days.
The right to medical treatment begins immediately and continues indefinitely as long as
the condition is related to a compensable injury or occupational disease. Disputes over medical
treatment are relatively infrequent. The disputes generally result when the employer denies any
relationship between the work and the claimed injury, or asserts that, after a certain tune, the
continuing medical problems are no longer related to the compensable injury. In these cases it
is the responsibility for the medical bills, as well as compensability of the disability that is at
issue.
Wage-Loss Benefits
Wage-loss benefits are based on the weekly compensation rate. For injuries and
illnesses occurring after January 1, 1982, this rate is equal to 80 percent of an injured
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worker's after-tax average weekly wage and is subject to stated maximum and, in some
instances, minimum benefit levels. The value of fringe benefits (those that do not continue
during the disability) are to be included in the base average weekly wage. Wage-loss benefits
are free of all state and federal tax.
The after-tax average weekly wage on which benefits are based is defined as the
average weekly wage (for the best 39 of the last 52 weeks) reduced by the weekly amount that
would have been paid for federal Social Security taxes and state and federal income taxes,
based on the employee's number of dependents. A table of the average weekly wage and 80
percent of after-tax average weekly wages is published annually to simplify conversion of an
average weekly wage into a weekly compensation benefit.
The maximum benefit for all benefit types is adjusted once each year in accordance
with the change in the state average weekly wage in covered employment. Workers with an
injury occurring in any given year are subject to the maximum benefit rate as established for
that year for the duration of their claim; there is no inflation adjustment for general benefits.
The maximum rate is established as 90 percent of the state average weekly wage for the 12
months prior to the previous June 30, adjusted to the next higher multiple of $1.00. The
maximum weekly benefit was $475 in 1994. The minimum benefit differs depending on the
type of benefit. There is no minimum for general disability benefits. For total and permanent
or specific loss benefits the weekly minimum is $132, and for death benefits the minimum was
$264 in 1994.
Benefits commence on the eighth day after the injury. If the incapacity continues for 2
weeks or longer, compensation is paid from the date of the injury (i.e. a 7-day waiting
period). If a disabled worker returns to work and earns wages equal to or greater than his or
her pre-injury average weekly wage, no wage-loss compensation is payable. If the disabled
worker returns to work and earns wages lower than the pre-injury average weekly wage, the
amount of compensation will depend on what the current earnings are. A partially disabled
worker receives the difference between 80 percent of the after-tax value of the current average
weekly wage and 80 percent of the after-tax value of the pre-injury average weekly wage. This
would continue for the duration of any wage loss due to disability.
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Generally, wage-loss benefits extend for the duration of the disability. However, for
workers' compensation recipients of retirement age, benefits are reduced 5 percent each year,
beginning with the year of the worker's 65th birthday and continuing until the 75th birthday.
By that time, benefits will have been reduced by 50 percent; they then continue at that level.
This reduction does not apply if the worker is not eligible for federal Social Security benefits,
or if the worker's compensation benefit is being coordinated with other income maintenance
benefits.
Total and Permanent Disability
The Michigan legislature has created a conclusive presumption that a worker is totally
and permanently disabled if he or she fits into a specifically listed impairment category.23
Those meeting this criterion are compensated according to the formula described above, but hi
addition their benefits are partially indexed to the state average weekly wage. These
"differential benefits" are paid by the Second Injury Fund and are designed to bring weekly
benefits up to the maximum benefit allowed at the time of disablement. They should be
distinguished from those partial inflation adjustment benefits paid by the Compensation
Supplement Fund described earlier.
An injured worker who is totally and permanently disabled may receive benefits for
life. However, the conclusive presumption of total and permanent disability extends only for
800 weeks (just over 15 years). This means that for 800 weeks an injured worker who is
deemed totally and permanently disabled will receive benefits, even if he or she is working
and receiving wages. At the end of 800 weeks, either the employer or Second Injury Fund can
file a petition and seek to prove a change in the plaintiff's condition. The burden of proof,

23These conditions are:(a) total and permanent loss of sight of both eyes; (b) loss of both legs or both feet
at or above the ankle; (c) loss of both arms or both hands at or above the wrists; (d) loss of any 2 members of
faculties in subdivisions (a),(b), or (c); (e) permanent and complete paralysis of both legs or both arms or of one
leg and one arm; (f) incurable insanity or imbecility; (g) permanent and total loss of industrial use of both legs or
both hands or both arms or one leg and one arm; for the purpose of this subdivision, such permanency shall be
determined not less than 30 days before the expiration of 500 weeks from the date of injury.
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however, is on the employer or the fund to establish that the plaintiff is no longer totally and
permanently disabled.
Specific Loss Benefits
The Act also provides a precise number of weeks of benefits for certain specific
losses.24 Benefits are paid for the number of weeks specified, regardless of whether or not
wages are being earned. The rate of weekly benefits is determined as with any other disability.
When the specific loss period expires, an injured worker may be entitled to continuing wageloss benefits if the disability continues to cause reduced earnings. If the worker suffers
successive specific injuries, benefits are paid consecutively rather than concurrently. A worker
who suffers concurrently from a specific loss and a separate general disability may receive
concurrent benefits. Payments of specific loss benefits commence with the tune that the hope
of restoring the member is abandoned.
Death Benefits
If death results from a work-related injury, weekly benefits are paid to persons wholly
dependent on the worker for a period of 500 weeks.25 If there are no dependents, the only
compensation due is a burial allowance of $1,500. The benefit rate is calculated hi the same
manner as general disability benefits. If at the expiration of the 500-week period any
dependent person is still less than 21 years of age, the dependent may continue to receive
weekly compensation until the dependent reaches age 21. If the worker leaves dependents that
are only partially dependent upon his or her earnings, the weekly compensation is equal to the
same proportion of the weekly benefits payable to wholly dependent persons as 80 percent of
the amount contributed by the employee to such partial dependents bears to the annual earnings
of the deceased at the time of injury. Wholly dependent persons are defined as a spouse who
24The specific losses enumerated in the schedule include loss of fingers, toes, hand, arm, foot, leg, or an
eye.
25Most U.S. jurisdictions do not restrict death benefits to a specific term. This provision is an
anachronism.
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lives with the deceased worker at the time of death, or is found to be living apart for justifiable
cause, and a child under the age of 16, or over 16 if he or she is physically or mentally
incapacitated from working.
Rehabilitation Benefits
Michigan was one of the first states to include vocational rehabilitation hi its workers'
compensation act, hi 1965. The statute mandates that if a worker is unable to perform work
for which he or she has been trained as the result of a workplace injury, he or she is entitled to
such vocational rehabilitation services as may be reasonably necessary to restore them to
useful employment. If such services are not voluntarily offered and accepted, the BWDC on its
own motion or upon application of the employee, carrier, or employer may refer the employee
to a Bureau-approved facility for vocational rehabilitation services. The self-insured employer
or insurance carrier pays for the vocational rehabilitation expenses.
The statute mandates that vocational rehabilitation services shall not extend for more
than 52 weeks, except in cases when the director of the BWDC has made special provision. If
there is an unjustifiable refusal to accept rehabilitation pursuant to a decision of the BWDC,
there may be a loss or reduction of compensation, hi an amount determined by the BWDC for
each week of the period of refusal (except for specific loss or total and permanent disability
compensation). Disputes over vocational rehabilitation issues can be heard by mediators or at a
magistrate hearing. The vast majority of the disputes are resolved voluntarily

without the

need for a formal order.
Coordination of Benefits
Michigan has one of the most aggressive benefit coordination programs hi the U.S.26
An employer's workers' compensation liability is reduced proportionately for virtually any
other benefits the worker receives that were financed by the employer. Specifically, the
employer's obligation to pay weekly benefits is reduced by:

26British Columbia does not coordinate benefits, except for certain retired workers.
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50 percent of the amount of the old-age insurance benefits received under the
Social Security Act;
the after-tax amount of the payments received under a self-insurance plan, or
under a disability insurance policy provided and paid for by the employer;
the proportional amount, based on the ratio of the employer's contributions to
the total insurance premiums for the policy period involved, of the after-tax
amount of the payments received pursuant to an insurance policy provided by
the employer;
the after-tax proportional amount of the employer's contributions to a pension
plan or retirement plan;
the after-tax proportional amount of the employer's contributions to a profit
sharing plan.
This coordination of benefits, combined with a rebuttable presumption that retired
workers did not suffer wage loss, significantly reduced a problem with retirees that were
securing benefits in the Michigan worker's compensation system prior to this reform.27
Total Benefit Payments
Injured workers in Michigan received about $934 million (US) in indemnity benefit
payments hi 1993, $505 million (US) of which was paid by carriers (54 percent), and $429
million (US) was paid by self-insurers (46 percent). Total medical payments to workers'
compensation claimants were $374 million (US) in 1993. Thus, medical payments are about 29
percent of all workers' compensation benefit costs, relatively low by U.S. standards.
Dispute Resolution
A dispute may arise on a variety of issues on any type of claim. The resolutions of
these disputes are also diverse. Sometimes, issues are resolved by the parties themselves,
without any agency intervention at all. The claim may be accepted voluntarily by the insurer,
or withdrawn by the worker. Other times, mediation or a pre-trial hearing will provide the
opportunity for the parties to work things out. In a minority of cases, about 6 percent in 1993,

27See Hunt (1986), pp. 76-77.
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a formal Board of Magistrates' decision is required. The emphasis in Michigan is on getting
the parties to agree on a solution, rather than imposing one.
The most common resolution of disputed claims in Michigan is the "redemption
agreement." This compromise and release settlement "redeems" the employer's liability for
the claim in exchange for the payment of an agreed sum of money, generally a lump sum, and
possibly though not usually future medical benefits. Nearly 60 percent of disputed cases in
1993 were settled with a redemption agreement. The Board of Magistrates requires a review of
redemption agreements, but these hearings are very simple, with the Magistrate simply
insuring that the claimant understands that he/she is releasing the employer and/or insurer
from any further liability for the injury in question.28
An application for hearing cannot be denied; if either party requests a hearing, the
Board of Magistrates is obligated to provide it. At present, it is taking approximately 12
months from application to receive a formal hearing on a workers' compensation dispute in
Michigan, although there is some variation across magistrates. Cases that come from
mediation tend to be scheduled for earlier trial dates than cases that go through the pre-trial
conference procedure.
Formal Hearings
The hearings use formal rules of evidence, and a transcript is prepared by a court
reporter. However, the atmosphere is less rigid than in a court of law, and normally there is a
fairly easy give-and-take among participants. Decisions are based on a preponderance of the
evidence and the magistrates' findings of fact are final. Both parties are nearly always
represented by attorneys, although occasionally a plaintiff, and very rarely a defendant, will
appear without benefit of counsel. As outlined earlier, magistrate decisions can be forwarded
to the Appellate Commission for a decision on whether the law was correctly applied to the
facts, as determined by the magistrate.

28Such agreements are not allowed in British Columbia.
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Medical testimony is taken by deposition (sworn interrogatory), but the claimant
usually is asked to testify on his/her own behalf. There may be other witnesses called to testify
as well, depending on the nature of the claim or the strategy of the defense. However, it is
quite common that the plaintiff will be the only person to testify. Magistrates are supposed to
issue then* written opinions within 30 days, but this goal is frequently not achieved.
About 70 percent of the hearings result in redemption orders (compromise and release
settlements). Generally, redemptions include a final release from liability of the insurer for the
injuries claimed in the petition for hearing. A lump-sum payment is made to the claimant, less
attorney's fees (generally 15 percent of settlement) and litigation costs (usually several hundred
dollars for medical depositions or other costs). In addition, there is a $100 (US) redemption
fee paid to the BWDC by each party to a redemption.
About 30 percent of the formal hearings result in BWDC decisions or other
dispositions (ignoring withdrawals and dismissals). Generally, this involves an order by the
magistrate directing the carrier or self-insured employer to begin paying weekly compensation
to the claimant, or denying the claim if it is found to be not meritorious. There are also orders
involving medical costs, vocational rehabilitation issues, and other matters.
The gap between the number of applications for hearing and the number of magistrate
dispositions is accounted for by washouts and pending claims. Washouts are those petitions
that are withdrawn or dismissed for lack of prosecution. Little is known about these claims,
but they may re-enter the system at a later date. The system absorbs extra petitions for
hearings by lengthening or shortening the queue for hearings.
Role of Attorneys
Attorneys are involved hi almost all cases with disputes. Typically an attorney gets
involved when an insurer denies compensation to a claimant. Given the degree of litigation in
the system, it would be surprising if most claimants did not know that they could resort to an
attorney to help them win benefits. There is some advertising by attorneys for workers'
compensation claimants hi Michigan. Attorneys fees in Michigan are a contingent percent fee,
and depend on the final outcome of the case. For cases "tried to completion" a maximum fee
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of 30 percent of accrued compensation, after deducting the costs of litigation, is specified by
administrative rule. For redemptions, a fee of 15 percent of the first $25,000, and 10 percent
of any amounts over $25,000 is conventional, again after deducting the costs of litigation from
the total amount. Typically the attorney pays the costs of litigation for cases that are not
compensated.
Incentives
In this section, we will reconsider the Michigan workers' compensation system with a
focus on the incentives present in the system. Incentives for employers to prevent accidents,
for employees to return to work, provider incentives, and litigation incentives will each be
considered. This discussion will help to frame the comparative analysis to be presented later.
Safety and Prevention Incentives ~ Mostly Employer Side
The Michigan system provides strong incentives for employers to prevent injuries.
Large employers hi Michigan are very likely to be self-insured, which provides the maximum
connection between the employer's cost and performance in preventing workers' compensation
claims.29 Those large employers that are not self-insured will be fully experience rated by their
workers' compensation insurance carrier. This means that an employer's actual premium level
will adjust to the claim costs he or she experiences over time. Most experience rating plans in
Michigan are based on 3 to 5 years of loss experience. The range in experience modification
factors in Michigan is approximately tenfold, that is, the worst employer in a class will pay up
to ten times what the best employer will pay for equivalent insurance coverage. In addition,
large employers are likely to receive significant loss-reduction services from their carriers
designed to assist them in reducing claims costs.
However, for smaller employers the picture is different. Below a premium level of
$4,000 annually, experience rating is generally not provided. The justification for this is that

29Most self-insured employers will also have some kind of excess, or reinsurance, policy to protect them
against catastrophic claims.
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the experience of such small employers is dominated by random events rather than their own
efforts at prevention. Thus, smaller employers are only class rated. 30 The obvious problem
with class rating is that it dilutes the financial incentives for prevention.31 If a small employer
constitutes an insignificant percent of the class, his or her experience will have no significance
for the costs of the class as a whole. Thus, their individual performance will not impact the
cost of insurance coverage and the incentive to prevent injuries is accordingly reduced.
The existence of group self-insurance can mitigate this lost incentive effect. To the
extent that the group is small enough that each employer believes he/she matters to the overall
performance, or to the extent that the group administrator makes this clear to members of the
group, the incentives for prevention can be restored. In Michigan, a number of self-insured
groups are known to screen applicants for their past claims experience and their current
commitment to safety and prevention activities. This probably means that the insured sector in
Michigan is subject to rather heavy adverse selection tendencies.
Return-to-work Incentives ~ Mostly Employee Side
Paralleling employers' prevention incentives, are employer and employee incentives to
return to work as soon as possible. From the employer perspective, the cost savings from early
return to work can be nearly as great as the incentives to prevent the injury in the first place.
One study that sought to quantify these effects among a cross-section of Michigan employers
found that the payoff to return-to-work policies was about half the size of the payoff to
prevention strategies. (Hunt, Habeck, Scully, and VanTol, 1993) Based on comparisons
among a random sample of 222 establishments in seven industries, the study concluded that 10
percent better performance on safety diligence was associated with nearly 17 percent fewer lost
workdays per 100 employees. On the other hand, 10 percent better performance on proactive
return-to-work behaviors was associated with just over 7 percent fewer lost workdays per 100
30There is a "merit" rating in Michigan for employers with premiums of $500 to $4,000 per year, but it
provides very limited premium swings ( 10 percent).
31As in a public monopoly system without experience rating, or with restricted experience rating, as in
British Columbia.
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employees. Both results control for a large number of objectively measurable employer
specific factors that were included in the estimation models.
There is a growing recognition among employers that they can influence their workers'
compensation costs. This has been assisted by a program in the Michigan Department of
Commerce that urged employers to "shop around" for then* workers' compensation coverage.
This became critically important after the introduction of open competitive rating for workers'
compensation insurance in 1983.
Employee incentives promoting return to work are not so straight forward. However,
the policy justification for replacing less than 100 percent of lost earnings in temporary
disability cases is to maintain the economic incentive to return to work. In Michigan, with a
replacement rate of 80 percent of estimated spendable earnings, this incentive seems strong.
Using spendable earnings as the basis for a tax-free income benefit ensures that no injured
workers will benefit financially from staying away from the job. For workers with earnings
above the average weekly wage, this incentive is even stronger since they actually receive less
than 80 percent due to the imposition of the benefit maximum.
Some would argue that the 7-day waiting period before income replacement benefits
begin also constitutes an incentive to return to work swiftly. However, the fact that all days of
disability are compensated if the disability lasts beyond 14 days may negate this. Once a
disability has lasted for 5 or 6 days, the incentive is very strong to remain off 14 days or
more.
In addition, Michigan has gone farther than any other U.S. state in coordinating
workers' compensation with other benefits paid for by the employer. The only benefit that is
not coordinated by BWDC is Social Security Disability Insurance, and that is because the
federal government enacted a statute that allowed them to coordinate first.32 Thus, federal
Disability Insurance payments will be reduced to reflect any workers' compensation payments
for Michigan workers, rather than the other way around. Employer financed pensions,
unemployment insurance, even Social Security Old Age and Survivors Insurance benefits are

32States that enacted coordination of benefit provisions before the federal statute continue to coordinate.
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coordinated with workers' compensation benefit payments in Michigan. The purpose of these
provisions is to reduce employer's costs and maximize employee incentives for return to work.
Last, it is clear that giving the employer (or insurance carrier) the initiative in stopping
benefits (assuming medical evidence justified this action), allowing the employer to stop
benefits if the worker refuses an offer of reasonable alternative employment, requiring the
worker to cooperate with vocational rehabilitation efforts, and other such provisions all
operate to reinforce the financial incentives for injured workers to return to work as soon as
they are able. In sum, there are substantial incentives for early return to work in the Michigan
system.
Provider Incentives
Incentives for various service providers are also built into the system, either explicitly
or implicitly. Fees for medical treatment are controlled in Michigan by a fee schedule and
utilization review procedures. Since fees are easier to monitor than utilization, it is a logical
deduction that the incentive effect is to promote extra treatment at a fixed cost. Whether this
promotes more rapid return to work is not clear.
Litigation-Settlement Incentives
Attorneys also affect and are affected by incentives in the workers' compensation
system. Since claimant's attorney fees are regulated as a percentage of the award (15 percent
of lump-sum settlements and 30 percent of accrued liability in weekly payment cases), the
attorney clearly has an incentive to make the disability liability as large as possible. The
attorney understands that the size of the settlement depends crucially on how badly disabled
the worker is. Therefore the emphasis, at least through the hearing date, is on demonstrating
disability, not the residual work ability that remains.
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V. MICHIGAN (PRIVATE) INSURANCE MODEL
The Structure-Conduct-Performance Paradigm
The analysis of private systems for providing workers' compensation insurance
presented here is based on principles of market function commonly used by industrial
organization economists. Economists postulate a theoretical relationship between market
structure and market results, which is labeled the "structure-conduct-performance hypothesis."
The basic hypothesis is that market structure determines market conduct, which determines
market performance. An atomistic market structure causes firms to behave independently and
competitively, which hi turn leads to good market performance.
Market structure encompasses the number of buyers and sellers and their size
distribution, the height of barriers to entry into (and exit from) the market, cost
structures, the degree of vertical integration, the character of buyer and seller
information, and the degree of product differentiation.
Market conduct refers to the actual behavior (i.e., degree of independence) of firms hi
setting prices and output levels, product design, advertising, innovation, and capital
investment.
Market performance covers price, profit, and output levels, production and allocative
efficiency, the rate of technological progress, and equity. The solvency of firms and the
availability of coverage also are important performance parameters in insurance
markets.
The empirical analysis of markets is complicated by the presence of regulation and
other forms of government intervention, which affect structure, conduct and performance. It is
important to identify and evaluate government institutions and policies that may significantly
influence market behavior. This is often a difficult task, given the complex interaction between
regulation and market forces, but it is necessary to understanding all of the relevant
determinants of market outcomes.
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Market Structure
The first step in understanding how well workers' compensation markets function is to
examine their underlying structure. This examination starts with looking at the number of
insurers and their size distribution to determine whether insurers possess sufficient market
power, individually or collectively, to affect market price and output levels. This is followed
by an analysis of entry and exit conditions to assess whether entry or the threat of entry helps
to impose competitive discipline on workers' compensation markets.
Number and Size of Firms
The workers' compensation insurance market in the U.S. has a large number of
competitors at the national level. At least 359 private insurers wrote workers' compensation
insurance in 1993. 33 In addition, 26 state funds provided workers' compensation coverage as of
1993. Among the states, the average number of workers' compensation insurers was 92. There
were 107 carriers in Michigan. The number of carriers in a state tends to vary with the size of
the market.
The degree of concentration hi the market is more significant than the number of firms.
Workers' compensation insurance in the U.S. is not dominated by one or a handful of
insurers, but there typically are several leading carriers which write a significant share of the
market in the various states. These leading carriers vary somewhat from state to state, and
their positions change over time. Table 5.1 shows the top 20 writers of workers' compensation
in Michigan in 1993. The Michigan State Accident Fund was the largest writer with a 16
percent market share in 1993. The America Group and the Liberty Mutual Group were the
second and third largest carriers with 9.7 percent and 7.2 percent market shares, respectively.
Market concentration is typically measured in terms of "concentration ratios," which
represent the combined market share of some given number of the largest sellers, or in terms

33As used here, the term "insurer" refers to a group of affiliated companies under common ownership or
control or a stand-alone company that is not a member of a group. This figure is based on insurers filing annual
financial statements with the NAIC. There may be a small number of other insurers who write workers'
compensation but do not file a statement with the NAIC.
V-89

of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), which is the sum of the squares of the percentage
market shares of each firm. The HHI reflects the distribution of the leading firms' market
shares as well as the composition of the rest of the market. The HHI also weights the market
shares of the larger firms more heavily, which better reflects their relative market power. 34
While neither economic theory nor experience establish a critical level of concentration
for the absence of competition in a particular industry, the U.S. Department of Justice has
established merger guidelines for industries which refer to the HHI (DOT, 1984). Under the
Justice Department guidelines, a post-merger market with an HHI in excess of 1,800 is
considered highly concentrated. A proposed horizontal merger between two firms that would
result hi such a market is likely to provoke a challenge from the Justice Department,
depending on other circumstances. A post-merger market with an HHI between 1,000 and
1,800 is considered to be moderately concentrated. A proposed horizontal merger resulting in
this land of market would be less likely to be challenged. A post-merger market with an HHI
of less than 1,000 is considered to be unconcentrated. A horizontal merger resulting in such a
market is unlikely to encounter opposition. It should be pointed out that these criteria have
been developed to evaluate mergers in national industries, broadly defined. Higher
concentration levels may be expected and acceptable hi smaller state insurance markets where
there is a greater threat of entry that undermines insurers' ability to exert market power.
Table 5.2 shows Michigan, state average, and U.S. concentration ratios and HHIs for
workers' compensation insurance for the period 1982-1993. All insurers writing workers'
compensation are reflected in the U.S. figures.35

34For example, a market with four firms, each with a 25 percent market share, would have an HHI of
2,500. If the firms' market shares were 50, 30, 15 and 5 percent, then the HHI would be 3,650. The highest
possible HHI is 10,000 which would occur when one seller has the entire market, i.e. a monopoly.
35States with monopolistic state funds are excluded from the state average to avoid distortions. Arguably,
because state funds are generally managed to provide coverage at the lowest possible cost or to serve other public
policy objectives, their effect on market concentration should be considered separately.
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Market concentration in workers' compensation insurance at the national level
increased during the early and mid-1980s but has declined in recent years. 36 The increase in
concentration is the result of extremely soft market conditions in 1983 and 1984, which drove
some carriers out of the market. In 1993, the top four insurers accounted for 20.3 percent of
the workers' compensation premiums written nationwide and the top eight insurers accounted
for 34.6 percent. The HHI fell from 309 in 1988 to 238 in 1993, which is considerably below
the Justice Department threshold for even moderate concentration.
As expected, concentration is higher at the state level, but generally not high enough to
cause concern about the structural competitiveness of state markets. The average four-firm
concentration ratio (CR4) among the states in 1993, including competitive state funds, was
47.2 percent and the average eight-firm concentration ratio (CR8) was 63.6 percent. Excluding
monopolistic fund states, state HHI values ranged from 307 in Indiana to 4,702 in Rhode
Island; all but 12 states had HHIs below 1,000. The states with high market concentration tend
to have small markets and/or competitive state funds with large market shares. The average
state HHI in 1993 was 1,198, including competitive state funds, and 918, excluding all state
funds.
While concentration is declining at the national level, it appears to be on the rise at the
state level. This reflects some insurer withdrawals from and retrenchment in state workers'
compensation insurance markets. It also could reflect the growth in the residual market which
concentrates more direct business in the hands of a limited number of larger companies which
are servicing carriers for residual market mechanisms.
Michigan's workers' compensation market is relatively unconcentrated compared with
other states. The top four insurers (including the state accident fund) wrote 38.1 percent of the
Michigan market, and the top 20 insurers wrote 76.3 percent. The 1993 Michigan HHI was
548, including the state fund, and 293, excluding the state fund.

36Market concentration estimates are based on direct premiums written by insurers. There is a possibility
that market concentration estimates are affected by the growing amount of residual market business assigned to
authorized servicing carriers which are a limited group of large insurers.
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Concentration has increased in Michigan as it has in other states. In 1983, 117 insurers
wrote workers' compensation insurance in Michigan and the HHI was 352, excluding the state
fund. The increase in concentration is due to the significant growth hi the state fund.
Entry and Exit Conditions
In some respects, entry and exit conditions appear to be relatively conducive to
competition in workers' compensation insurance. The property-casualty insurance industry
generally is not characterized by significant barriers to entry. The initial investment in physical
facilities needed to start an insurance company is relatively small compared with other
industries. Almost 80 percent of property/casualty insurers' assets are held in cash, bonds and
stocks that can be quickly sold to pay claims. Insurers can easily move their capital from
unprofitable to profitable markets. The amount of capital that most states require insurers to
have to sell insurance ranges from $500,000-$6,000,000, which is a small amount compared
to the premium volume of most insurers. For safety and competitive reasons, new insurers are
generally capitalized at higher levels than state regulatory minimums but even these levels do
not impose a significant barrier.
Insurers do incur costs in setting up marketing, underwriting and claims operations to
service various markets, but they can also take advantage of "economies of scope."
Independent agency companies can essentially plug into the agency network hi any given state
in order to market their policies.37 Entry for direct writers is more difficult in that they must
set up their own agent network to sell policies. However, both agency companies and direct
writers can use the same facilities and personnel to market several different lines of insurance.
In commercial lines, the economies of scope involved in packaging several types of coverage,
including workers' compensation, may be more significant than efficiencies achieved from
being a direct writer. Carriers also can utilize regional or central underwriting and claims

37Independent agents sell insurance for more than one insurance company. Alternatively, direct writers
sell insurance through exclusive agents or agents who are employees of the direct writer.
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facilities to service insureds in various states. This greatly facilitates entry into and exit out of
a specific state.
The experience insurers gain in writing workers' compensation business, generally, and
certain occupations or industries, specifically, represents an investment which could serve as a
deterrent to entry and exit. Insurers also acquire private information about the specific
employers that they write. Cummins and Danzon (1991) hypothesize that insurers holding
private information about favorable risks are able to maintain prices above competitive levels.
If the policyholders return to the market to seek insurance from a different company, much of
this private information is lost. Policyholders with favorable risk characteristics may be
charged a higher price in the open market because other carriers do not have as much
information on the policyholders' risk characteristics. Thus, policyholders may be willing to
pay a supra competitive price without switching. This kind of informational barrier may be
less significant in workers' compensation than in other lines of insurance, given that historical
workers' compensation experience information on employers is available to all insurers
through mandated experience reporting.
There are also costs involved with exit. Insurers will lose the value of any sunk
investments they have made in establishing operations in the market from which they
withdraw. These costs will serve as some deterrent to entry. They also may induce insurers to
sustain inadequate profits for a period of time before withdrawing from a market. Government
exit restrictions also can discourage entry. At present, exit restrictions hi workers'
compensation are generally limited to prior notice requirements and residual market
assessment obligations. While these restrictions should not prevent insurers from withdrawing
from a market, they can delay and/or raise the cost of withdrawal.
Data on the frequency of entries into and exits from workers' compensation markets in
the U.S. suggest that barriers have not been high enough to significantly restrict insurers'
movement. Table 5.3 shows the pattern of entries into and exits from workers' compensation
insurance markets in Michigan, states on average, and the U.S., over the period 1983-1993.
There have been some entries and exits every year at the national level, with marginally more
exits than entries. The highest level of exits occurred from 1987 to 1988 hi response to the soft
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market and declining profits that occurred in 1983 and 1984. On average, over the period
1985-1993, 21 insurers have entered the U.S. market and 24 insurers have left the market
every year. These figures represent approximately 5.6 percent and 6.3 percent of the insurers
selling workers' compensation insurance countrywide, respectively.
As would be expected, the rate (in percentage terms) of entry and exit is somewhat
higher at the state level than at the national level. Over the period 1985-1993, seven insurers
entered and nine insurers exited the average state market every year. These figures represent
7.9 percent and 9.3 percent of the average number of insurers operating hi a state,
respectively. Exits have out paced entries to a greater degree at the state level than at the
national level, reflecting the fact that some carriers have reduced the number of states in which
they write workers' compensation business. This is consistent with an overall industry trend in
which insurers are consolidating their operations hi states where they have a more significant
market presence. A large number of market exits have been concentrated among a minority of
states with significant market problems. Klein, Nordman, and Fritz (1993) found that only half
of the states experienced a net decrease in workers' compensation writers over the period
1986-1991, and only five states lost more than 10 percent of their carriers.
Entries and exits have occurred at a somewhat slower pace in Michigan. On average, 5
insurers have entered and 6 insurers have exited the market every year over the period 19831993. These figures represent 4.3 percent and 5.5 percent of the total number of carriers hi the
Michigan market, respectively. Michigan experienced a relatively large number of exits (11) in
1983 after the introduction of competitive rating and lost 12 carriers in 1986 at the tail of the
soft market.
These data tend to support the view that entry and exit barriers are not significant
impediments to competition hi workers' compensation insurance. At the same tune, the costs
of entry and exit are not incidental and could have some effect on the industry's performance.
To the extent that entry and exit are costly, competition could be unpaired, resulting in higher
prices. The impact on prices will be limited by the magnitude of entry and exit costs.
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Conduct
The second major area that is examined is the market conduct of workers'
compensation insurers. This aspect is more elusive than structure and performance because it
involves assessing whether insurers are making pricing and output decisions independently and
not taking other strategic actions to impede competition. This study examines two sources of
evidence on the conduct of workers' compensation insurers: (1) the distribution of insurers'
manual rates and their "competitive" adjustments to those rates; and (2) observations on
insurers' efforts to develop innovations to improve service and lower costs.
Pricing
Evaluating market conduct hi workers' compensation insurance is difficult because of
the complexity of the product and the pricing system. One parameter that is sometimes
examined is the degree of independence in insurers' pricing. If a market is competitive,
insurers will not be able to set their prices in concert to increase profits or protect inefficiency.
Historically, workers' compensation insurers were forced to use uniform bureau rates with
little opportunity for deviation. Regulation of bureau rates substituted for competition. In
recent years, many states have moved away from administered pricing systems, although they
may still review and approve advisory rate filings. Today, in most states, insurers can file
independent rates or deviations from advisory rates. In states with "loss cost" systems,
insurers must file full independent rates or multipliers applied to advisory loss costs. Insurers
also can compete through various kinds of adjustments to manual rates to determine the
premium for a specific employer. At the same time, the publication of advisory rates or loss
costs and other advisory rating information could serve as a focal point for insurers' pricing
systems and diminish independent price competition.
The rates and rating rules filed by insurers with regulators are based on extensive
analysis of a huge amount of data. Historical data on losses, expenses and premiums are
developed to a current basis and then projected forward to the period in which the filed rates
will be hi effect. This projection considers the effect of medical cost and indemnity trends, law
changes, payroll trends, investment income and many other factors. If projected costs,
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including a provision for insurers' cost of capital, exceed projected premiums, a rate increase
is requested. If projected premiums exceed projected costs, a rate decrease is filed. The
indicated rate change is allocated to the various classifications according to their relative
historical costs.
It is difficult to ascertain whether insurers are setting prices independently simply by
looking at the distribution of prices. In theory, in a perfectly competitive market, all insurers
will charge the same price for a common policy. The structure of insurance markets is more
akin to monopolistic competition than perfect competition, however. Even in workers'
compensation, insurers are differentiated by their quality of service and underwriting
standards, and their prices should vary accordingly. Hence, in a monopolistically competitive
workers' compensation market, we would expect to see a range of prices among insurers. On
the other hand, similar employers would not be expected to pay widely varying prices for the
same coverage, unless acquisition of information about rates is very costly.
Detailed information on insurers' pricing structures for workers' compensation has not
been compiled and summarized at the national level. However, information on the distribution
of insurers' workers' compensation prices has been compiled in Michigan, as part of its
competition monitoring efforts. Table 5.4 reproduces an exhibit from the most recent
Michigan report, which shows the distribution of policies by insurers' manual rates for the 100
largest classes in 1993. This table shows the highest and lowest rate for each class as well as
the percentage of policies written at rates in each of five equal divisions between the low and
high rates. The distribution of prices tends to be skewed towards lower rates but some policies
are written at relatively high rates. On average, 88 percent of all policies were written at rates
within the lowest three divisions. Nine percent of all policies were written in the first division
and 36 percent of all policies were written in the second division. These data indicate that
insurers' manual rates for a given classification range widely.
While these data do not suggest that workers' compensation insurers are engaging in
concerted pricing hi Michigan, the Michigan report expresses concern that employers with
"similar" operations pay such different manual rates, depending on which insurer they place
their business with. There is a problem if some insureds are paying excessive premiums for
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the amount of coverage and quality of service that they receive. Unfortunately, this cannot be
discerned from manual rate distributions alone. As the Michigan report observes, there are a
number of possible explanations for manual rate differences that would not represent a market
failure. First, differences hi manual rates could be offset by differences in the other rating
adjustments that insurers apply in calculating final premiums. Second, insurers with higher
manual rates could offer better service in terms of loss prevention, claims adjustment, financial
strength, etc. Third, experience rating and schedule rating adjustments may not fully account
for differences in risk among employers within the same rating classification. Consequently,
insurers with lower rates will tend to apply tighter underwriting standards, which forces
higher-risk employers towards higher-rate carriers. Finally, some variation in prices is to be
expected in a dynamic market affected by changes hi external factors, requiring pricing
adjustments which take time to implement.
Some information is available on the "competitive" pricing adjustments insurers make
to the advisory manual rates approved by regulators. Insurers use these adjustments to fine
tune the price for a particular employer to respond to the employers' particular risk
characteristics as well as competition from other insurers. Thus, even in states that appear to
maintain uniform rates across employers, there may be more variation in final, realized prices
than appears at first glance.
Deviations are pricing adjustments made by individual insurers to the manual rates filed
by the advisory or rating organization. They are applicable only in states that still allow the
advisory organization to file full manual rates that include expense and profit loadings. A
deviation is a departure, usually downward, from the rates filed on the insurer's behalf by the
advisory organization. Many insurance departments require that deviations be supported by
appropriate loss and expense information. Often insurers will file a deviation for one or more
affiliated insurers within a group. This allows the insurer group to have more than one set of
manual rates on file within the group. Having more than one set of manual rates on file allows
underwriters to place an employer hi a company with a filed downward deviation if the risk
represents a better than average exposure to loss.
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"Schedule rating" attempts to reflect risk characteristics that are not included in the
experience rating plan. It attempts to measure such variables as: condition and care of the
premises; type of equipment and its care and condition; classification peculiarities; cooperation
of management with respect to medical facilities and safety programs; and selection, training,
supervision and experience of employees. Although some states have taken measures to
ascertain that schedule rating plans have been appropriately applied, these plans are often used
for competitive purposes when an insurer wants to reduce the price it is quoting to an
employer. This is evidenced by the fact that schedule rating typically results in a credit (as
opposed to a debit) hi those states where it is allowed.
The competitive pricing adjustments discussed above are front-end adjustments.
Policyholder dividends are back-end price adjustments that occur after the policy has already
expired to reflect favorable loss experience of the insurer. The insurer and the policyholder
contractually agree to participation hi the dividend program. In most jurisdictions, the insurer
is prohibited by law from guaranteeing that dividends will be paid. Actual payment of
dividends is not determined until the board of directors of the insurer has reviewed the
insurer's loss experience over the time period for which the dividend is being calculated. Flat
dividend plans pay a certain percentage of premium back to each policyholder, regardless of
the policyholder's loss experience. Loss-sensitive plans pay dividends based on the favorable
loss experience of the policyholder. These plans are usually based on a schedule that returns a
certain percentage of premium for achieving a certain loss ratio after application of the
individual experience modification, if any.
Table 5.5 tracks these competitive pricing adjustments as a percentage of standard
earned premium for Michigan and all NCCI states combined over policy years 1984-1993.
These data indicate that competitive pricing adjustments hi all NCCI states fell from 12.9
percent, in 1984, when the soft market bottomed out, to 6.4 percent, in 1991, and then rose
slightly to 6.9 percent hi 1993. In Michigan, competitive pricing adjustments fell from 18.2
percent hi 1984, to 7.3 percent in 1987, and then rose to 9.4 percent in 1993. The use of these
adjustments indicates that insurers exercise some further discretion in pricing workers'
compensation insurance, beyond setting different manual rates.
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At the same time, the cyclical pattern revealed in the use of these adjustments suggests
that insurers' pricing decisions are not completely independent. As noted in Section I, the
cyclical nature of commercial lines, pricing is a topic of considerable discussion among
industry observers. Analysts differ on the question of whether these price movements are
driven primarily by external economic factors (i.e., changes in interest rates, loss shocks, etc.)
or rising and falling tides of competition (Cummins, Harrington, and Klein, 1991).
Product Service/Design
Economists sometimes evaluate the pace of innovation in an industry as an element of
market conduct. In a competitive market, firms are expected to explore new products and
services to meet consumers' needs and new technologies to lower production costs. Insurance
companies innovate by developing more efficient ways to market and distribute their products,
underwrite, handle claims, and provide loss prevention services. Insurers also innovate by
developing new products and services that help policyholders tailor their transfer of risk and
related functions to fit their particular circumstances. Because of statutory restrictions, the
ability of insurers and employers to vary policy provisions is somewhat more constrained for
workers' compensation than for other commercial lines.
Despite these restrictions, workers' compensation insurers have managed to find ways
to vary their products and services. Innovations have occurred in the form of policies that
allow employers to retain greater risk for lower premiums, and in the unbundling of insurance
services so that employers need only purchase those that they cannot perform efficiently for
themselves. Under a retroactive rating plan, an employer's premium varies within a prescribed
range, depending on the employer's claims experience under the policy. With a large
deductible policy, an employer reimburses the insurer for losses up to a certain amount. These
types of policies allow employers to lower their premiums by purchasing less than full
insurance. This can ultimately lower costs for these employers to the extent that they are
induced to more effectively prevent accidents or reduce claim costs and also are able to avoid
insurers' expense and profit loadings on the loss costs retained by the employer. Some insurers
have enhanced their loss prevention and claims management services to better control claims
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costs and lower premiums. Insurers also have unbundled and sold loss prevention and claims
services to self-insured employers. These innovations suggest that the conduct of workers'
compensation insurers is responsive and adaptive to economic forces in ways that improve the
efficiency of the market.
Performance
According to economic theory, a competitive market will achieve an optimal allocation
of resources. Specifically, this means that the market price will equal the cost of producing the
last unit of output, each firm will produce at a level of output where its average cost is at a
minimum, and investors will receive a rate of return just equal to the cost of the capital they
have invested.
While competition ensures that prices will be as low as possible, it does not ensure that
a given commodity will be "affordable," or that prices will not rise over tune. Indeed, an
unavoidable increase in the cost of production requires an increase in the market price. Hence,
the efficiency of workers' compensation insurance markets should be judged in terms of the
relationship of premiums to the benefits received by employers and their employees. The level
and growth of claim costs, the availability of coverage, and insurer solvency also are
important aspects of workers' compensation market performance.
Prices
The level and rate of growth of workers' compensation insurance premiums are not, by
themselves, indicative of the market's efficiency, but they can be symptomatic of market
problems. This is definitely an issue in the U.S., where workers' compensation rates have
risen rapidly in many states hi recent years. Table 5.6 shows benefit payments and workers'
compensation costs to employers, each as a percentage of covered payroll, for the period
1982-1993. Costs rose fairly steadily over this period in the U.S. until 1991 from $1.75 to
$2.40. In 1992, however, the tide turned as employer costs fell to $2.31 and then to $2.30 in
1993. This is consistent with NCCI filings for rate/loss cost decreases in a number of states in
response to system reforms and improving experience.
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In Michigan, prices declined from 1982 as competitive rating was instituted, then rose
faster than the national trend hi 1984-1987. Michigan prices dropped relative to the U.S.
average again through 1990. As for the country as a whole, Michigan rates declined absolutely
hi 1992 and 1993. Rising workers' compensation premiums have been a significant issue hi
many states, imposing political pressure on the rate regulatory process and benefit provisions,
as well as inducing employers to look for lower cost alternatives to standard insurance
coverage. Some analysts contend that regulatory suppression of voluntary and residual market
rates has diminished employers' incentives to contain costs, which in turn has contributed to
cost inflation. 38 It appears that the economic and political pressures to contain workers
compensation costs have had some effect and reversed the steady upward trend since the early
1980s.
Benefit Costs
Benefit costs represent the largest portion of the total costs of the workers'
compensation system in the U.S. and are the principal driver of the premiums paid by
employers. In evaluating the efficiency of different workers' compensation systems, it is too
simplistic to start from a premise that "high" benefit costs are either good or bad. Ideally, the
system should adequately compensate workers for their medical costs and lost wages due to
injury, while also encouraging and facilitating their rapid return to work. Thus, benefits costs
that are too low can be just as much of a problem as benefit costs that are too high.
Unfortunately, it is very difficult to determine whether the "right" amount of benefits are
going to the "right" workers. The amount and distribution of benefits is primarily determined
by statute and workers' compensation administrators, but the way in which benefits are funded
and provided also has an impact.
In theory, private workers' compensation insurers should have an incentive to minimize
benefit costs consistent with state law. Insurers also should seek to provide these benefits
efficiently by minimizing their loadings for nonbenefit costs. This implies that a higher ratio of

38See Hager (1991) for an overview of this and other troubling policy issues as seen by the NCCL
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benefit costs to total premiums represents greater efficiency, but that is not necessarily the
case. Insurer expenditures for claims adjustment and loss prevention, up to a point, might
yield more than commensurate savings hi benefit costs and result hi a lower benefit/cost ratio.
Hence, it is necessary to evaluate the level of benefit costs in relation to system provisions and
other relevant economic variables, as well as the relationship between benefit costs and
premiums.
As was shown in Table 5.6, benefit costs as a percentage of covered payroll have risen
over the past decade in Michigan and the U.S. In Michigan, benefit costs increased from 1.59
percent, hi 1984, to 1.99 percent, hi 1991, representing a 25 percent increase (3.3 percent
annually). Benefit costs have increased at a faster pace hi the U.S. as a whole, from 1.21
percent to 1.79 percent, representing a 48 percent increase (5.8 percent annually). Benefit
costs in the U.S. increased further hi 1992 to $1.82 then fell sharply hi 1993 to $1.68,
following the drop hi overall employer costs.
Rapidly rising costs hi workers' compensation have been blamed on a number of
factors, including: more frequent workplace accidents and occupational illnesses; emergence of
new types of compensable injuries; medical cost increases and cost shifting; high benefit levels
that encourage claims; excessive litigation; and fraud (Burton, 1992). Inadequate rates and the
lack of cost containment incentives for residual market servicing carriers also have been
identified as contributing factors (Harrington, 1992; and Klein, Nordman and Fritz, 1993).
Additionally, cost pressures in the insured sector could be exacerbated by adverse selection, if
low-risk employers are moving to self-insurance to lower then* workers' compensation costs.
The recent decrease hi benefit costs could be the result of system reforms as well as private
insurer and employer cost containment efforts, particularly with respect to managed care
(Burton, 1995).
Table 5.7 provides information on the ratio of benefits (i.e., losses incurred) to direct
premiums earned for private insurers and selected state funds for Michigan and the U.S. for
the period 1982-1993. The benefit/premium ratio has been somewhat volatile over this period
hi Michigan, ranging from 59.4 percent to 102.0 percent. The benefit/cost ratio was 68.6
percent in 1993, which was somewhat below the historical average of 77.9 percent. The ratio
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for private insurers has been generally lower than that for the state fund in Michigan.
Benefit/cost ratios have been higher at the national level, both for private insurers and state
funds, These ratios were 80.2 percent and 94.8 percent respectively for private insurers and
state funds for the period 1982-1993.
Expenses
The second largest component of workers' compensation insurance cost is insurers'
expenses. Insurers perform a variety of functions in administering insurance policies that
generate costs. These functions include marketing, distribution/acquisition, loss prevention,
claims adjusting, investing, and general administration. Some of these are services that
employers might otherwise have to perform for themselves, such as loss prevention, claims
administration, and investing funds accumulated to pay losses. Other activities are necessitated
by the use of government or private entities as risk-pooling mechanisms. Of course, only
competing private insurance companies are forced to incur marketing costs; these are
precluded if all insurance is provided through a private or government monopoly.
Evaluating the relative costs of monopolistic versus competitive insurers involves a
difficult calculation. Competitive insurers incur additional marketing and acquisition costs and
also may not fully exploit all potential economies of scale. On the other hand, market
competition may be a more cost-effective way to achieve maximum efficiency in the
performance of insurance functions than the government oversight required for monopolistic
insurers. Of course, that is one of the major questions of this paper.
It is impossible to conclusively judge the relative efficiency of the different insurance
mechanisms in the U.S. from the information available. Detailed financial data on private
insurers' expense costs are available but there is no comparable metric on the quantity and
quality of services provided. Hence, it is hard to discern whether higher expenditures on
claims adjustment, for example, are due to better service or greater inefficiency. The analysis
is complicated by the fact that different jurisdictions have different legal and administrative
requirements which necessitate different levels of service. Another consideration is that higher
expenditures on some services, such as loss prevention and claims adjustment, may yield more
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than commensurate savings in loss costs. Consequently, lower benefit/premium ratios and
higher expense/premium ratios may actually reflect more efficient provision of workers'
compensation benefits to injured workers.
With these considerations hi mind, insurer expense data are reviewed here to gain some
perspective on the cost of the different functions performed by insurance carriers. While it is
not possible to reach definitive conclusions about the relative efficiency of different systems
with these data, relatively high expenses would raise the possibility of inefficiency and would
invite further investigation.
Table 5.8 shows expense costs reported for Michigan and the U.S. for 1992 and 1993.
The largest portion of these costs is allocated loss adjustment expense, which was 15.9 percent
of direct losses incurred in Michigan in 1993, compared to 16.2 percent in the U.S. Sales
expense was somewhat higher hi Michigan, 9.7 percent of direct premiums earned compared
to 8.1 percent nationally. State taxes on workers' compensation insurance were lower in
Michigan, 2.9 percent of premiums earned compared to 3.9 percent nationally.
These costs have been drifting upward hi the last three or four years. The increase is
due primarily to higher loss adjustment expenses, which could reflect more vigorous cost
containment efforts on the part of insurers.
Profits
Unfortunately, it is not easy to measure insurers' profitability for workers'
compensation. Most insurers do not confine their operations to one line of insurance, so it is
necessary to allocate expenses and investment income from insurers' total operations to
estimate profits for a specific line such as workers' compensation. An additional complication
is that insurers' surplus must be allocated to each line hi order to estimate total profits and a
rate of return on net worth. Further, insurer financial data are primarily reported on a
calendar-year basis, but calendar-year profits are a very imperfect measure of insurers'
performance. Premiums are collected over the relatively short term of a policy year, but claim
payments associated with that policy will stretch out over a number of years. Calendar-year
profits reflect premiums and investment income earned, losses incurred and expenses paid
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during the course of the calendar year. For a given calendar-year, these amounts originate
from a mix of policies written in many different years.
Understanding these limitations, two different measures of profitability are analyzed operating profits as a percentage of premiums earned and the estimated rate of return on net
worth. Table 5.9 shows these measures for Michigan and the U.S. for the period 1985-1993.
The data are taken from the NAIC's Report on Profitability By Line and By State and are
adjusted from a statutory reporting basis (SAP) to a generally accepted accounting
principles(GAAP) basis to facilitate comparisons with other industries which are subject to
GAAP accounting.39
The first measure reflects the portion of employers' premium dollars that insurers
retain as profits, after inclusion of all investment income and payment of all taxes. Investment
income represents a considerable portion of insurers' total income and is an important factor in
their pricing decisions. This is particularly true for long-tail lines such as workers'
compensation, where insurers hold policyholders' funds in reserve for long periods to pay
claims. Here we also see the cyclical nature of workers' compensation profitability, driven by
cyclical pricing. Despite its highly competitive market structure, profits in Michigan have been
higher than hi the U.S. as a whole. In Michigan, total profits as a percentage of net premiums
earned varied from 21 percent in 1985 to -0.1 percent in 1991, and then rose again to 23.2
percent in 1993. Michigan profits averaged 13.3 percent over the entire period, compared to
7.3 percent nationwide. Of course, the national average could be a reflection of low or
negative profits in some states because of high loss costs and regulatory constraints on prices.
Estimating the rate of return on net worth for workers' compensation insurers permits
rough comparisons with the rates of return for the property/casualty insurance industry and
other industries. Figure 5.1 compares the estimated rate of return on workers' compensation
insurance, in Michigan and the U.S., against the estimated rate of return for all
property/casualty insurance and Fortune 500 companies for the years 1985-1993. This analysis

39These GAAP adjustments are only an approximation based on statutory financial information. See
NAIC (1994) for explanation of the methodology used.
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confirms that insurers' profits for workers' compensation in the U.S. as a whole have fallen
below the rates of return in other industries. The estimated average U.S. rate of return on net
worth for workers' compensation for the period 1985-1993 was 8.3 percent, which was below
the estimated 10.8 percent rate of return for all property/casualty lines for that period and the
12.1 percent rate of return earned by the Fortune 500 companies. Property/casualty insurance
profits have been depressed by recent catastrophes as well as soft markets in certain
commercial lines, so the Fortune 500 average may be a better benchmark. The 1985-1993
Michigan rate of return for workers' compensation was 12.9 percent, which does not suggest
that workers' compensation profits in Michigan were excessive compared with the return that
investors might earn in other industries. The relatively high profits in Michigan in the mid1980s may reflect the rebound in rates that occurred after significant price cutting hi the years
immediately following the introduction of competitive rating. (See Table 5.6)
Profitability differs substantially by state. Table 5.10 suggests that there is a strong
relationship between increases in benefit costs and operating losses. The ten most profitable
states in 1990 had an average operating profit of 37.1 percent and only an 11.1 percent
increase in average benefit costs over the period 1985-1989. The ten least profitable states had
an average operating loss of 15.9 percent and a 39.5 percent increase hi average benefits costs
over this same period.
A positive relationship between operating losses and rising loss costs could be
explained by insurers' failure to accurately project future loss costs and set adequate prices or
it could be caused by government constraints on insurers' ability to increase prices to match
expected cost increases, or some combination of both. There is some evidence to suggest that
insurers have underestimated rising loss costs. The NAIC's examination of the National
Council on Compensation Insurance (NCCI), the primary industry advisory organization,
concluded that NCCI rate making procedures have, on average, underestimated loss
development by 3-5 percentage points and trend by 8-10 percentage points (Milliman &
Robertson, 1991). NCCI studies also suggest that insurers' reserves are substantially
understated which could cause insurers' loss projections to be underestimated.
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The differential performance of state funds contributes to the variation in state market
results. Some state funds are run at substantial deficits. In 1991, loss ratios ranged from 63.3
percent for the Minnesota state fund to 288.6 percent for the Nevada state fund. State funds
had a combined loss ratio of 109.7 percent compared to a loss ratio of 85.6 percent for private
insurers. There is a concern that several state funds are building up sizeable liabilities that will
have to be paid either by taxpayers or special assessments on employers and/or private
insurers (Kenney, 1991). This reflects a problem with the politicization of rates for some
government insurers.
Availability
Availability is a very important aspect of market performance in insurance, particularly
in lines such as workers' compensation where coverage is mandatory for most employers hi
most states, but no mandatory service requirements are imposed on private insurers.
Availability is a general term which can be interpreted in various ways. In theory, availability
could be defined in terms of whether the supply of insurance is adequate to meet the quantity
of insurance demanded at competitive prices. Strictly speaking, virtually all employers have
some source of workers' compensation insurance coverage available to them through residual
market mechanisms. However, the residual market has a number of disadvantages for
employers and is generally not a desirable source of coverage.
A more meaningful indicator is the availability of workers' compensation coverage in
the voluntary market. However, this variable is not easily observable from empirical data.
Different employers may face quite different circumstances in terms of the number of carriers
that are willing to offer them coverage and the terms they offer. A commonly used proxy for
availability is the proportion of total premiums written through the residual market. This is a
less than perfect proxy for availability as some risks may actually choose to obtain coverage
through the residual market when they could purchase coverage in the voluntary market. This
can occur when residual market rates are inadequate and some employers can obtain a lower
premium by insuring through the residual market. Still, the residual market share serves as an
important barometer of market conditions, recognizing that it is influenced by a number of
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factors including the relative competitiveness of the residual market. A large and growing
residual market indicates significant problems which can ultimately lead to the collapse of the
voluntary market.
As shown in Table 5.11, the proportion of direct premiums written in the residual
market in the U.S. increased sharply from 9.9 percent in 1985 to 28.5 percent in 1993.40
Operating losses for the residual market in NCCI states, as calculated by the NCCI,
mushroomed from $0.4 billion for policy year 1983 to $2.3 billion (excluding Maine) for
policy year 1989, and then fell back to $1.0 billion hi policy year 1993, as residual and
voluntary market reforms took hold. Insurers are assessed to cover these operating losses
based on their voluntary business. The countrywide residual market burden (operating losses
divided by voluntary market premiums), according to the NCCI, increased from 10.3 percent
of voluntary premiums written hi policy year 1985 to 18.3 percent hi policy year 1989, and
then fell back to 8.7 percent in policy year 1993.
The large growth in the residual market hi the U.S. could be a function of both
diminished availability of voluntary market coverage as well as regulatory policies that have
made the residual market the preferred source for coverage for some employers. Increases in
voluntary and residual market rates appear to have reduced operating losses and should
improve the availability and desirability of voluntary market coverage as insurers and
employers respond to improved incentives.
If premiums in the residual market are insufficient to cover losses and servicing carrier
fees, then an operating deficit will necessarily occur. This deficit, in turn, must be recovered
through assessments on insurers. To the extent that insurers are able to recover the
assessments through higher voluntary market rates, the burden of the residual market is borne
by employers who purchase workers' compensation coverage. This increases employers'
incentive to self-insure. Alternatively, to the degree that insurers are not allowed to recover
assessments through higher rates, they are induced to decrease their voluntary market

40It should be noted that the residual market share of premiums will be affected by the types of risks
written and the level of rates charged hi the residual market.
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business. This can force the voluntary market into a "death spiral" in which growing residual
market losses feed further shrinkage of the voluntary market which in turn increases residual
market losses. The NCCI has suggested that, historically, a state residual market share in the
range of 30 percent appears to be a critical threshold, beyond which further residual market
growth and losses escalate rapidly.
Regulators do not deny the potential for a death spiral to occur but they also raise other
issues about the performance of the residual market. Regulators have expressed significant
concerns about the quality of service that residual market risks receive and the incentives
servicing carriers have to properly administer policies and control costs. This can exacerbate
cost pressures as more employers are thrust into the residual market. Regulators also have
expressed concerns that an inordinate number of smaller employers are forced into the residual
market.
The severity of the residual market problem varies significantly among the states. In
some states, the residual market is virtually nonexistent while in other states it accounts for
almost half of the business written. In 1993, the residual market share ranged from 2.6 percent
in Idaho to 48.0 percent in South Carolina. Similarly, the residual market burden for policy
year 1993, as evaluated by the NCCI, ranged from zero in New Mexico to 47.9 percent in
Kentucky. While these results indicate significant market problems in some states, they are
considerably improved from several years ago when the markets in a few states, like Maine,
were threatened with total collapse. Several factors can influence the size of the residual
market and the burden it imposes on the voluntary market in a given state. These factors
include: the adequacy of/and relationship between voluntary market and residual market rates;
the stringency of residual market application requirements; the presence and underwriting
standards of a state fund; and the general condition of the voluntary market.
Insurers contend that the residual market growth and operating losses are caused by
inadequate voluntary and residual market rates. If insurers are unable to charge a premium to
an insured that is sufficient to provide a fair return on investment, they will be disinclined to
offer coverage voluntarily. The greater the degree of rate inadequacy, hi this view, the greater
the number of employers that will be thrust into the residual market.
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Solvency
An insurer's solvency is critical to the integrity of its contracts. State insurance
regulators' primary responsibility is to protect policyholders and claimants against insurer
insolvencies. This responsibility is met through financial regulation and state guaranty funds.
While guaranty funds ensure that the workers' compensation claims against insolvent insurers
will be paid, they diminish employers' incentives to purchase coverage from low-risk insurers.
Regulation must compensate by stringently monitoring and limiting insurers' insolvency risk.
State regulators seek to reduce but not necessarily eliminate the incidence and cost of
insolvencies. There is a need to balance insolvency risk with the cost and availability of
insurance. Some possibility of failure is inherent in a competitive market. Insolvency costs
paid by guaranty funds are initially passed back to solvent insurers through uniform pro rota
assessments on premiums. Some states allow insurers to recoup guaranty fund assessments
through higher rates while others allow premium tax offsets. Either way, a large number of
failures of workers' compensation insurers will impose significant costs on employers and/or
taxpayers.
As shown in Table 5.12 the number and proportion of insolvent insurers, with
workers' compensation as then: principle line of business, increased during the middle to late
1980s. It is not clear what these figures indicate with respect to the relationship between
workers' compensation market conditions and insolvencies. The insolvency of workers'
compensation writers may or may not have been caused or significantly influenced by their
workers' compensation experience. It is interesting to note that the number of insolvencies
represented by workers' compensation writers peaked at 9 in 1985, following the extremely
soft market conditions in 1983 and 1984.
Some analysts contend that regulatory suppression of workers' compensation rates
poses a significant threat to insurer solvency (Fein, 1991; and Kramer, 1991 and 1992).
Kramer claims that financially weaker and insolvent insurers tend to write a greater portion of
their business in states subject to rate suppression. While Kramer's data indicate a relationship
between poor financial performance and concentration in low profit workers' compensation
markets, his methodology does not necessarily support the conclusion that low profits and
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insolvency are caused solely or primarily by rate regulation (See Klein, 1992b). Regardless of
the underlying cause, workers' compensation losses do pose a solvency threat to insurers with
a large portion of business in this line. This threat has not escaped the attention of insurance
company rating agencies. In 1992, Moody's downgraded Liberty Mutual from an Aa2 to an
Aa3 rating and Kemper National from an Aa2 to an Al rating because of their concentration in
the workers' compensation market.
Regulation
The reliance on private insurers to provide workers' compensation coverage
necessitates a regulatory scheme to ensure reasonable rates, fair market practices, availability
of coverage, and solvent insurers. This section outlines the principal areas of regulation that
affect workers' compensation markets in Michigan and other states. It also discusses the
important considerations hi shaping regulatory policies to promote good market performance
as well as the public objectives for the workers' compensation system.
Entry/Exit
Entry into state workers' compensation insurance markets is regulated principally by
minimum capital and surplus standards and other financial requirements that determine
whether an insurer will be issued a certificate of authority to do business. Insurers are required
to obtain a certificate of authority for every state hi which they do business. The minimum
capital and surplus requirement to become licensed to write workers' compensation hi most
states is less than $2 million, and in Michigan it is $1.5 million. These amounts are not
significant hi relation to the premium volume of most U.S. insurers, and their effect on entry
is probably minimal.
Other solvency requirements, however, affect an insurer's ability to enter a market and
retain their authority to sell insurance. States also regulate insurers' investments, and reserving
practices and may take informal or formal action against companies determined to be in
hazardous financial condition. Many states require insurers to set aside a certain amount of
reserves for workers' compensation claims, based on a statutory formula.
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These regulatory actions have an impact on insurer pricing and underwriting decisions
for workers' compensation. To the extent that solvency regulation forces an insurer to commit
more capital, increase loss reserves, or choose more conservative investments, insurers will be
compelled to reduce their supply of coverage and raise their rates. Regulators also may force
an insurer to raise prices and/or tighten its underwriting selection for financial reasons.
Pricing
Because employers are required by law in most states to carry workers' compensation
insurance, there is an implicit governmental responsibility to ensure that coverage is available
at "reasonable" rates. This, in turn, has led to fairly close regulation of workers'
compensation rates and policy forms and other government involvement in the workers'
compensation market. Every state requires insurers to file workers' compensation rates with
the insurance commissioner. Historically, the primary concern was that workers' compensation
coverage should be available for employers and employees, rather than that rates be
"reasonable" or "affordable." Indeed, the main regulatory objective was to prevent destructive
price competition and ensure adequate rates. This was to prevent insolvencies and a
contraction of the market, which would leave employers without a source of workers'
compensation coverage. In the 1970s, the concern began to shift to excessive prices, as benefit
costs and rates began to climb rapidly in many jurisdictions.
Before 1980, every U.S. state that permitted private workers' compensation insurance
effectively had an "administered pricing" system. This is a system where all insurers use
uniform rates, filed by a rating bureau, which received the prior approval of the state
insurance department. Some states allowed deviations from bureau rates, and insurers typically
retained flexibility with respect to dividends paid to policyholders, but aside from these
exceptions, true price competition was essentially nonexistent.
The NCCI has been the primary advisory/rating organization hi workers' compensation
insurance and provides full services in 32 states and limited services in approximately half of
the others. State advisory/rating organizations serve regulators and insurers in the other states
that do not have monopolistic state funds. Advisory/rating organization activities include: the
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compilation and distribution of statistical data; development and filing of supplementary rating
information and manuals; development and filing of standard policy forms and endorsements;
administration of a uniform classification plan and experience rating system; administration of
the residual market; and research and public information activities.
Since 1980, a number of states have increased competition by easing requirements for
adherence to bureau rates and permitting insurers to file deviations. Other states, including
Michigan, went further and instituted a competitive rating system in which rates are not set by
a rating bureau or subject to prior approval, but are essentially governed by market forces.41
From a procedural standpoint, under competitive rating, insurers' rates are generally subject to
file and use (or use and file) requirements but are typically not disapproved. Under most
competitive state rating laws, including Michigan's, the commissioner must find that the
market is not competitive before disapproving a rate filing or reinstituting prior approval
requirements.
Under competitive rating, an advisory/rating organization files either advisory final
rates or advisory loss costs or both. In the first case, insurers can either adopt the advisory
rates, file a deviation from the advisory rates, or develop and file their own rates. If the
advisory/rating organization files loss costs only, insurers must develop their own final rates
which are usually a combination of the advisory loss costs and their expense and profit factors.
Alternatively, insurers may base their rates on their own loss costs or the advisory loss costs
modified by some factor. Under a loss cost system, advisory/rating organizations continue to
perform many of the functions they perform under the traditional bureau rate or advisory rate
system.
The movement to competitive rating began with the National Association of Insurance
Commissioner's (NAIC) adoption of a model competitive rating act in 1982 which included
workers' compensation insurance. A separate model competitive rating act for workers'

41Some analysts use the term "competitive rating" broadly to include prior approval states where insurers
are allowed to deviate from bureau or advisory rates. In this report, the term is used more narrowly to encompass
only systems where rates are not subject to prior approval regulation.
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compensation was adopted in 1983. Both the original "all lines" model and the separate
workers' compensation model provided for file and use approval of rates and a loss cost
system. In 1993, the NAIC incorporated workers' compensation into the "all lines"
competitive rating model act.
Since 1982, 31 states have instituted competitive rating laws and/or loss cost systems
for workers' compensation. Michigan had the distinction of being one of the first states to
enact a competitive rating and loss cost system in workers' compensation which became
effective hi 1983. Table 5.13 summarizes state rate regulatory systems for workers'
compensation insurance. States vary somewhat in their approaches to competitive rating and
advisory rates/loss costs. Michigan's approach is the most competitive in terms of minimizuig
insurers' reliance on advisory organization services.42
Regardless of the type of system, regulators are charged with the responsibility to
ensure that rates are not excessive, inadequate, or unfairly discriminatory. Regulators
scrutinize rate filings to determine whether these standards are met.43 Hearings are often held
either as contested cases or on a fact-finding basis. In assessing whether a filing is excessive,
regulators evaluate the quality of the underlying data as well as the assumptions used by the
filer with regard to loss development, trend, expense and profit loadings. Legitimate disputes
often arise over the choices made by filers in developing their final rates. Actuaries often
disagree over appropriate methodologies and assumptions contained hi the filings. Because rate
making involves developing a forecast or a "best guess" of the appropriate rate level to be
charged for a future time period, only hindsight will reveal the accuracy of the rates being
proposed. Disagreements that affect the overall rate level most often center around the choice
of trend factors, expense assumptions and profit loadings.

42See Klein (1991) for a review of states' approaches to loss cost systems.
43The intensity of the review depends on the type of rate regulatory system and the filing. Advisory/rating
organization filings typically get close review, regardless of the type of system. Generally, under competitive
rating systems, regulators will not intensively analyze individual insurer filings, although this is not true in all
cases. In competitive rating states, regulators tend to focus their efforts on monitoring insurers' prices and market
conditions, rather than dissecting insurers' rate filings.
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It is important to point out that the way in which states administer their rate regulatory
statutes also varies. For instance, although voluntary market rates are subject to file and use
approval hi some states, residual market rates are always subject to prior approval and
regulators may or may not allow them to exceed voluntary market rates. Consequently,
residual market rates effectively serve as a regulatory ceiling for voluntary market rates.
Prior approval states also vary in terms of how stringently they regulate rates. Insurers
and some analysts contend that a number of states suppress workers' compensation rates below
a competitive level (Fein, 1991; Harrington, 1992; Kramer, 1991 and 1992). It is argued that
the business climate and political pressures cause regulators to enforce inadequate rates. Klein,
Nordman and Fritz, (1993) determined that regulation has lowered premiums in some states
but also found evidence to indicate that rising costs and fierce price competition have hurt
insurers' profitability.44
While the evidence suggests that regulation is not the sole source of depressed profits
in workers' compensation in the U.S., there is no doubt that rate regulation can become
politicized with adverse consequences for the long-term performance of the market.
Unfortunately, complex and highly technical rate regulatory decisions must be made hi a
politically charged environment where various groups have significant economic interests at
stake. Workers' compensation can be expensive for some employers, particularly in high-risk
industries and high-cost states. Business groups often argue that workers' compensation rates
can have significant implications for a state's economic climate and its ability to compete
nationally and internationally for jobs. Economic competition with bordering states can be a
particular concern. Groups which have a considerable economic stake in rate regulatory
decisions exert substantial political pressure on the process.
Government involvement with workers' compensation insurance rates extends beyond
the insurance commissioner in many states. Historically, state legislatures had confined their
involvement to setting the statutory parameters for rate regulation, but in recent years they

^Klein, Nordman and Fritz (1993) discuss the different perspectives on the issue of regulatory rate
suppression and the contribution of other factors to market problems in workers' compensation.
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have become directly involved in setting insurance rates. Legislators also may seek to
influence regulatory decisions through more informal means, e.g. exerting leverage through
the appropriation process, threatening to withhold passage of insurance legislation, or voting
against confirmation of regulatory appointments. Governors also have actively intervened in
workers' compensation rate regulatory decisions because of concerns about the economic
effect of rate increases.
Until recently, there has been little empirical research on the effects of alternative
regulatory systems hi workers' compensation. The primary reason for this is that no state had
a competitive rating and/or loss cost system until 1982 and only a handful of states had
established such systems by 1985. Consequently, relatively few states have had a sufficiently
long experience with alternative rate regulatory systems to permit an empirical evaluation of
their long-term impact. While the conclusions of the researchers who have looked at this
question are not unanimous, they do not make a strong case for retaining strict control of
workers' compensation insurance prices.
Early studies by Klein (1986) and Hunt, Krueger, and Burton (1988) found that
competitive rating lowered workers' compensation premiums and profits in Michigan. The
General Accounting Office (1986) reviewed a number of state reports on the impact of
competitive rating which reached similar conclusions. Subsequent studies by Burton (1990),
Klein (1991), and Roberts and Madden (1992) suggest that there may be somewhat of a
rebound effect after competitive rating has been in place for several years. This research
indicates that prices and profits fall rather significantly in the years immediately following
deregulation, but then begin to rise again, although not necessarily to the same level they were
at before deregulation. Carroll and Kaestner (1995) also found evidence that competitive rating
decreases workers' compensation insurance prices, where prices are measured by the ratio of
premiums earned (minus dividends to policyholders) to the number of work-related injuries or
employees.
However, cross-section studies by Appel, McMurray, and Mulvaney (1992) and
Schmidle (1995) found some weak evidence that net workers' compensation costs to employers
may be higher and no evidence that costs are lower in competitive rating states, where
V-116

employer costs are measured by adjusted manual rates. The different indication of these
studies compared with the other studies may stem, in part, from their use of different employer
cost or price measures, different specifications of regulatory and other explanatory variables,
and data from different time periods.
Research by Klein, Nordman and Fritz (1993) indicates that prior approval regulation
lowers loss ratios (i.e., raises prices) in some states and raises loss ratios in other states,
depending on the degree of regulatory stringency. This result would be consistent with,
although it does not necessarily prove, the industry's contention that some states have
suppressed prices below competitive levels. On the whole, the research literature does not
provide strong support for the view that administered pricing or prior approval rate regulation
is necessary to prevent excessive prices in workers' compensation insurance.
Quality of Service and Market Practices
States regulate other aspects of the workers' compensation insurance market besides
rates, including policy forms and market conduct. To the extent that workers' compensation
benefits are set by statute, workers' compensation policies are more regimented than other
commercial policies. Recently, some states have permitted large deductible workers'
compensation insurance policies, and several states have enacted or are considering legislation
that would permit some form of 24-hour coverage that combines workers' compensation
insurance with accident and health insurance.
Market conduct regulation deals with insurers' marketing/sales, underwriting, and
claims adjustment practices. Regulators respond to consumer complaints and conduct
examinations to check whether insurers are charging correct premiums (according to their
approved rating plans) and paying claims appropriately. States generally do not interfere with
insurers' decisions with respect to which employers they accept for coverage, although
Missouri recently attempted to promulgate rules which would have required insurers to accept
employers which met certain minimum criteria. Also, states typically do not regulate ancillary
services provided by insurers such as safety consulting, loss prevention, or third-party claims
administration for self-insured employers.
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Data Reporting and Advisory Organizations
In the U.S., statutory data reporting requirements help to ensure that public officials
have adequate information to regulate private insurance markets. Statistical data collection is
an important component of any insurance system, public or private. In workers' compensation,
statistical data are used to determine prices and evaluate system performance. Historical
information on losses and premiums by state and classification are collected and used to
develop overall rate levels, classification rate differentials, and factors for other rating
adjustments. Expense data, which also are used in these rate calculations, are reported on a
statewide basis for some categories of expenses (allocated loss adjustment expense, acquisition
costs, state taxes and fees, and dividends to policyholders) and on a countrywide basis for
others (unallocated loss adjustment expense, general expense). In addition, these data, along
with other insurer financial information, are utilized to monitor market structure, conduct and
performance.
Data on individual employers' loss histories are collected and maintained for the
purposes of experience rating. Access to these data allow insurers to determine price and
perform appropriate experience rating adjustments for an employer even if they have not
previously insured the employer. Maintenance of a common data base on the loss experience
of individual risks is critical to maintaining competition in workers' compensation and helps to
reduce the informational barriers to competition that are present in other lines of insurance.
Another area that is somewhat unique to workers' compensation is the collection of
detailed data on claims which are used to track cost drivers and evaluate the potential impact
of changes to benefits and other system provisions. These data are collected through the
NCCI's Detailed Claims Information (DCI) system which was substantially expanded in 1989
to meet requirements established by a new NAIC model law and regulation on workers'
compensation data reporting. The NAIC models were further refined in 1994.
Insurers are compelled by law to report statistical data according to a standardized
format. State rating laws authorize the insurance commissioner to require insurers to report
any statistical information deemed necessary to ensure that rates comply with the standards
contained in the laws. The commissioner may designate a statistical agent to collect the data
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according to an established statistical plan promulgated or approved by the commissioner. In
practice, data collection for workers' compensation has been delegated to advisory /rating
organizations, recognizing the close association between statistical and rating functions.
Supplementary financial data also are obtained through the annual and quarterly financial
statements that insurers are required to file with state insurance departments and the NAIC.
The NCCI functions as a multi-state statistical agent for workers' compensation and
coordinates with the state advisory organizations to pool their data with the national data. This
is important for some components of rate analysis where individual state loss data is not
sufficiently credible to produce reliable cost estimates. The NCCI utilizes a uniform statistical
plan for all states for which it collects data with supplemental state reports to respond to
unique state requirements.45 In Michigan, the Compensation Advisory Organization of
Michigan (CAOM) is the designated statistical agent for workers' compensation, although it
contracts with the NCCI for some actuarial and data processing services.
The CAOM is supervised hi its data collection and distribution functions by the Data
Collection Agency (DCA), which consists of stakeholder representatives who approve the
format and content of the loss cost data distributed to insurance carriers. Seats are designated
for representatives of large, medium and small insurers, employers, the public, the Governor
and the Insurance Bureau (regulatory authority). The DCA must also approve the methodology
used in developing the advisory loss cost figures (termed "pure premiums") which insurers
presumably use in setting their individual rates. This structure was put in place at the same
time as competitive rating was started in 1983 and has provided some additional "public"
oversight of actuarial procedures in Michigan.
Role of State Funds
State funds play an important role hi the workers' compensation insurance market hi
the U.S. State funds are classified either as exclusive (monopolistic) or competitive. Nevada,
45A uniform statistical plan means that all insurers in all states governed by the plan report the same
standard data elements according to a common set of instructions and definitions. Uniformity (or at least
consistency) is essential to pooling data among different insurers for different states.
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North Dakota, Ohio, Washington, West Virginia and Wyoming have exclusive funds which
are essentially the sole providers of workers' compensation insurance in those states, as is true
of all provinces in Canada.46
Twenty other states have competitive state funds which compete with private carriers.
In 1991, competitive state fund market shares ranged from 6.2 percent in South Carolina to
73.5 percent in Montana. Michigan had a competitive state fund until 1994, when the state
sold it to Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Michigan. The Michigan State Accident Fund, as a state
government created entity, was the leading writer of workers' compensation hi Michigan with
16 percent of the market in 1993. State funds are significant writers in most of the states in
which they operate.
State funds were established initially to ensure the availability of workers'
compensation coverage to employers. Some have continued to operate as the insurer of last
resort. Others have relinquished that role with the establishment of other residual market
mechanisms, but still may be used as a means to provide coverage at a lower cost to promote
economic development or other public objectives. Some competitive state funds, such as
Michigan's, have tended to specialize in insuring small employers who traditionally have had
greater difficulty in obtaining voluntary market coverage. State funds have been established
recently in Louisiana, Maine, New Mexico, Rhode Island, Tennessee and Texas, and have
been considered hi several other jurisdictions as a solution to market problems.
The decision to private the Michigan State Accident Fund is interesting given its
relative market success and the recent trend hi other states to establish state funds where they
have not existed before. Michigan is thus seen to be "swimming upstream" on this policy
matter. In fact, the policy decision taken reflects a strong philosophical commitment to the
private sector on the part of the Governor. He was elected on a "less government is more"
platform in 1992 and has regarded the Michigan State Accident Fund as a needless public

46Private carriers in exclusive fund states may still provide excess coverage to self-insured employers or
write special sub lines or classes such as longshore workers.
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competition with private enterprise. When the Governor's party secured control of both houses
of the legislature in 1994, he moved directly to divest the state of the Accident Fund.
Residual Market Mechanisms
Residual market mechanisms play an important role in workers' compensation
insurance in the U.S. and have contributed significantly to market problems in recent years.
As discussed above, the size and growth of the residual market varies widely among the states,
and in some jurisdictions it has come close to swallowing the entire market. Nationally, the
residual market share of total market premiums has grown at an alarming rate from 5.5
percent in 1984 to 28.5 percent in 1993. Michigan has fared better in this regard than many
states with a residual market share of 15.4 percent in 1993.
The existence of residual market mechanisms in most states reflects policy makers'
recognition that insurance should be available to all employers given that they are required by
law to carry this coverage for their employees. It also reflects the regulatory policy which
allows insurers to refuse to sell coverage to certain employers, leading to the possibility that
some employers may not be able to find any insurer who will insure them. Consequently,
residual market mechanisms were established to ensure that employers who were unable to
secure coverage from the "voluntary market" would have an alternative source of coverage.
In most states, workers' compensation residual market plans are authorized by law.
The residual market plan of operation hi each state is filed with the insurance commissioner
and subject to regulatory approval. Plan activities subject to regulatory oversight typically
include approving rates, monitoring classifications, and monitoring the process used to assign
risks to servicing carriers.
Several states use their competitive state funds as the market of last resort, either by
custom or statutory obligation. The need for a residual market mechanism is obviated in the
exclusive fund states.
The day-to-day functions of the residual market are delegated to servicing carriers who
must meet certain qualification and performance standards. Servicing carriers perform the
normal insurer functions, such as issuing and underwriting policies, paying and servicing
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claims, providing loss prevention or loss minimization services to policyholders, auditing, and
supervising litigation and other defense duties. Servicing carriers also are required to file
quarterly reports on premiums written, losses paid and known outstanding losses. Servicing
carriers receive fees for performing these functions.
The NCCI administers the residual market in many states subject to regulatory
oversight. There are nine states where independent rating bureaus administer the residual
market mechanism. The role of each of these independent rating organizations is similar to that
of the NCCI hi administering residual market plans.
The funding of residual market mechanisms is a critical issue and can have significant
implications for the structure and performance of the voluntary market. Residual market rates
are set separately from voluntary market rates (particularly in competitive rating states) and
may or may not fully reflect any cost differential between the risks in these two markets.
Insurers are assessed for any shortfall hi premium income necessary to support the residual
market mechanism. The residual market operating loss is determined by subtracting incurred
losses and the servicing carrier cost allowance and other pool operating expenses from earned
premium and then adding pool interest income on cash flow (NCCI, 1991). An insurer's
assessment is typically based on its voluntary market share.
The magnitude of the residual market deficit (and implicitly the subsidy to residual
market risks) and its distribution between insurers and voluntary market risks affects insurers'
incentives to supply coverage and employers' demand for that coverage. If insurers are not
able to fully recoup residual market assessments through rate adjustments, the supply of
voluntary coverage will shrink, forcing more employers into the residual market. To the extent
that residual market assessments are passed through to voluntary market employers through
higher rates, those employers will be induced to reduce payrolls or self-insure. Either way, the
effect is to shrink the voluntary market and expand the residual market and residual market
burden, which exacerbates the problem.
Residual market administration also influences servicing carriers' incentives to properly
handle residual market risks and control claim costs. Historically, servicing carriers have had
limited incentives to control their assigned risk claim costs because these costs are fully ceded
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to state or national pools. In effect, a servicing carrier "pays" only a small fraction of its
assigned risk claim costs through the quota share reinsurance arrangement. Further, inadequate
residual market rates can diminish the incentives of residual market risks to limit claim costs.
These factors can become significant cost drivers in states with large residual markets and help
to propel the deterioration of the voluntary market.
Self-Insurance
Regulations governing an employer's ability to self-insure for workers' compensation
can also have an impact on the performance of the voluntary insurance market. In selfinsurance, a firm or group of firms sets up a fund to cover losses rather than purchasing
coverage from a private carrier or state fund. In effect, self-insurance is a substitute for and
competes with purchased insurance. Self-insurance may be cheaper for a given employer
because of: (1) administrative efficiencies it can achieve through funding its losses; and/or (2)
market inefficiencies created by structural barriers or government-imposed cross subsidies in
the rating structure. State regulatory criteria determining which employers are allowed to selfinsure also affect the size of this segment of the market.
Some self-insurance activity is expected, even under ideal market conditions, because
of efficiencies achieved through eliminating distribution and other transaction and
administrative costs when employers fund their own losses. Self-insurance also can give an
employer a greater incentive and ability to control losses. Of course, insurers also offer
potential efficiencies through their ability to spread risk and achieve economies of scale and
scope in loss prevention and servicing claims. Purchased insurance also offers some tax
advantages in that insurers can deduct discounted reserves for future claims payments as a
business expense, but self-insured employers cannot unless they establish a captive insurer.
Self-insurance tends to be more economical for large employers who can achieve lower unit
costs in claims administration and who are in a better position to sustain a large loss without
going bankrupt than small employers. In addition, self-insurance is facilitated by the
availability of separate loss prevention and claims services as well as excess insurance
coverage to reduce risk.
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The ability to self-insure gives large employers greater bargaining power in negotiating
price concessions from workers' compensation carriers. Consequently, insurers have been
forced to develop various devices to lower premiums for large employers and allow them to
retain a greater portion of their risk as an alternative to self-insurance. These devices include
premium discounts, experience rating, retrospective rating plans, dividend plans, schedule
rating and large deductible policies.
Despite the use of these pricing adjustments, the use of self-insurance for workers'
compensation has grown dramatically in the last several years. This increase is at least
partially attributable to rising workers' compensation insurance rates and higher residual
market assessments. According to estimates by Johnson & Higgins (1992), the proportion of
U.S. workers' compensation premiums accounted for by self-insurance grew from 18.1
percent in 1980 to 29 percent in 1991. Self-insurance accounts for a relatively large proportion
of workers' compensation benefit payments in Michigan (39.7 percent in 1989), but this
proportion has remained fairly steady during the last half of the 1980s. This high incidence
reflects the presence hi Michigan of a significant number of very large manufacturing firms,
particularly in the auto industry. Michigan allows both individual and group self-insurance.
The growth of self-insurance has important implications for the private workers'
compensation insurance market. A problem arises when low-risk employers are induced to self
insure because market rates are not actuarially fair. In this instance, the movement to selfinsurance can accelerate the deterioration of the voluntary market.

V-124

Table 5.1 Michigan - 20 Leading Workers' Compensation Insurers, 1993*

1993
1993
Market Cumulative
Share
Share

Insurer
Michigan State Accident Fund
America Group
Liberty Mutual
CNA Insurance Group
Amerisure Companies
CIGNA Group
Auto Owners Group
Frankenmuth Mutual Insurance Company
Hartford Fire & Casualty Group
Employers Insurance of Wausau
Kemper Insurance Group
Continental Corporation
Hastings Mutual Insurance Company
Fireman's Fund Group
Michigan Farm Bureau Insurance Companies
American International Group
Travelers Insurance Companies
Reliance Insurance Group
Aetna Life & Casualty Insurance Companies
Home Insurance Group of New York

16.0
9.7
7.2
5.2
4.6
3.6
3.0
2.9
2.9
2.5
2.4
2.3
2.1
1.9
1.9
1.9
1.7
1.7
1.4
1.3

16.0
25.7
32.9
38.1
42.8
46.4
49.4
52.3
55.1
57.6
60.1
62.4
64.5
66.4
68.3
70.2
71.9
73.6
75.0
76.3

*Market shares based on standard premiums from policy declarations
or unit statistical reports.
Source: Michigan Insurance Bureau
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Table 5.2 Number of Insurers and Market Concentration 1982-93
(a) Michigan*
No. of
Insurers

Year
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993

CR4
122
117
119
114
106
110
109
107
104
108
112
107

CR8
23.6
24.6
25.5
29.4
35.2
37.3
38.7
37.9
39.1
38.6
38.2
38.1

CR20
41.2
42.3
43.2
47.5
52.2
54.6
54.4
53.4
57.8
56.6
55.1
52.3

HHI
67.7
67.1
69.8
73.9
77.1
77.5
76.9
75.7
79.9
78.7
77.1
76.3

* 1982-1991 market shares based on standard premium from unit statistical reports.
1992-1993 market shares based on total estimated annual premium from policy
declarations.
Source: Michigan Insurance Bureau
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326
352
351
402
496
542
538
532
600
552
531
549

Table 5.2 Number of Insurers and Market Concentration 1982-93 (Continued)
(b) States' Average*
No. of
Insurers

Year
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993

105
111
106
105
99
98
95
96
96
95
92
92

37.4
36.1
36.3
38.3
41.7
43.0
44.3
44.5
45.0
45.3
46.5
47.2

HHI

CR20

CR8

CR4

54.3
53.0
53.2
55.7
60.0
61.8
62.6
62.8
63.0
63.2
63.3
63.6

80.6
79.1
80.4
82.1
85.2
86.4
86.5
86.2
86.2
86.2
85.5
85.6

* Market shares based on direct premiums written from annual statements.
Source: National Association of Insurance Commissioners
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696
654
670
714
842
883
967
964
992
1,032
1,090
1,198

Table 5.2 Number of Insurers and Market Concentration 1982-93 (Continued)
(c) U.S.
No. of
Insurers

Year
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993

CR4
377
393
388
380
381
382
367
370
368
365
360
359

CR8
20.8
19.8
19.5
20.8
22.5
24.0
23.9
22.6
22.1
22.6
20.9
20.3

CR20
32.9
33.1
33.6
35.5
38.2
39.9
39.8
38.7
38.6
38.0
35.9
34.6

HHI
58.4
58.3
60.8
62.9
65.6
66.9
67.5
66.5
65.1
65.1
61.4
60.0

* Market shares based on direct premiums written from annual statements.
Source: National Association of Insurance Commissioners
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230
226
241
259
291
306
309
295
290
285
254
238

Table 5.3 Entries and Exits, 1983-93
(a) Michigan
No. of
Insurers

Year
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
Average

Net
Change

Percent*

Exits

Percent*

Entries
117
119
114
106
110
109
107
104
108
112
107

6
7
3
4
7
5
1
3
7
7
3

4.9
6.0
2.5
3.5
6.6
4.5
0.9
2.8
6.7
6.5
2.7

11
5
8
12
3
6
3
6
3
3
8

9.0
4.3
6.7
10.5
2.8
5.5
2.8
5.6
2.9
2.8
7.1

110

5

4.3

6

5.5

* Percent of previous year's insurers.
Source: Michigan Insurance Bureau
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Percent*
-5

-4.1

2
-5
-8

1.7
-4.2
-7.0

4
-1
-2
-3

3.8
-0.9
-1.8
-2.8

4
4
_5

3.8
3.7
-4.5

-1

-1.1

Table 5.3 Entries and Exits, 1983-93 (Continued)
(b) States' Average
No. of
Insurers

Year
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
Average

Entries

Exits

Percent*

Net
Change

Percent*

97
92
91
88
89
89
88
87
87

9
7
9
7
7
7
6
6
7

9.3
7.2
9.8
7.7
8.0
7.9
6.7
6.8
8.0

11
12
10
10
6
7
7
7
7

11.3
12.4
10.9
11.0
6.8
7.9
7.9
8.0
8.0

90

7

7.9

9

9.3

* Percent of previous year's insurers.
Source: National Association of Insurance Commissioners
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Percent*
-2
-5
-1
-3

-2.1
-5.2
-1.1
-3.3

1
0
-1
-1

1.1
0.0
-1.1
-1.1

0

0.0

-1

-1.4

Table 5.3 Entries and Exits, 1983-93 (Continued)
(c) U.S.
No. of
Insurers

Year
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
Average

Percent*

Exits

Percent*

Entries

Net
Change

380
381
382
367
370
368
365
360
359

23
24
24
17
19
19
18
21
24

5.9
6.3
6.3
4.5
5.2
5.1
4.9
5.8
6.7

31
23
23
32
16
21
21
24
21

8.0
6.1
6.0
8.4
4.4
5.7
5.7
6.6
5.8

370

21

5.6

24

6.3

* Percent of previous year's insurers.
Source: National Association of Insurance Commissioners
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Percent*
-8

-2.1

1
1
-15

0.3
0.3
-3.9

3
-2
-3
-3

0.8
-0.5
-0.8
-0.8

3

0.8

-3

-0.7

Table 5.4 Distribution of Policies by Manual Rates, 1993

LO
N3

Class

Class

Code

Description

No. of

High

Low

Policies

Rate

Rate

Percentage of Policies by Range (Low to High)
1

2

3

4

5

0011

Farm-Mkt or Truck

2083

7.84

3.01

28

61

10

0

0

0042

Landscape Gardening

2678

11.43

5.36

4

26

60

7

3

0129

Dairy/Livestock Farm

2192

14.03

6.33

18

79

2

0

0

1925

Die Casting Mfg

42

15.54

10.64

14

26

29

5

26

2003

Bakeries

590

9.3

5

23

25

44

4

3

2157

Bottling Softdrinks

15

19.94

13.31

47

7

20

20

7

2501

Misc Sewing Mfg

275

7.87

4.81

6

25

49

13

6

2790

Pattern/Shoe Mfg

286

4.1

1.58

13

29

42

10

6

2812

Cabinet Mfg

392

10.1

5.79

16

64

15

4

2

2881

WoodenGoods Assembly

247

8.85

3.86

4

56

26

13

1

3076

Metal Goods Assembly

407

5.77

3.58

15

37

15

16

16

3096

Tool Mfg

986

6.52

3.69

35

51

9

5

0

3113

Tool Mfg-NOC

345

6.18

3.68

34

46

16

2

2

3116

Tool Mfg DiesJigsFx

864

6.26

3.1

18

44

30

7

2

3145

Screw Mach Pro Mfg

233

8.02

4.13

24

11

33

24

9

3146

Hdw Mfg-NOC

287

9.06

6.04

8

37

31

10

14

3179

Elec App Mfg-NOC

289

8.14

4.1

34

21

29

15

1
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Class

Class

Code

Description

Percentage of Policies by Range (Low to High)

No. of

High

Low

Policies

Rate

Rate

86

14.75

8.69

47

31

10

6

6

2

1

5

4

3

3257

Mfg With Wire

3400

MetalGoods Mfg-NOC

230

16.91

11.4

11

53

15

10

11

3612

Pump & Machine Mfg

150

9

5.66

31

15

25

23

6

3628

Machinery Mfg NOC

633

6.26

3.34

0

15

64

18

3

3629

Mach Parts Mfg-NOC

806

5.18

2.64

17

39

35

6

3

3632

Machine Shop-NOC

1060

11.99

6.31

2

71

14

8

5

3634

FlowMeter& Valve Mfg

78

8.01

3.03

14

42

29

12

3

3635

Metal Grinding Mfg

63

8.58

4.56

17

29

29

22

3

3643

Elec Pwr Equip Mfg

254

9.13

2.26

3

67

21

8

1

3681

Tele/Elc-ApprtsMfg

106

9.74

4.27

16

17

32

32

3

3685

Instr Mfg-NOC

212

4.16

2.11

33

37

20

9

0

3724

Apparatus Installtn

815

18.76

7.64

0

47

34

19

0

3827

Auto Engine Mfg

34

7.67

3.22

6

3

62

15

15

4299

Printing

1523

5.23

2.89

3

25

58

7

7

4361

Photographer

464

2.15

1.23

23

49

22

3

2

4459

Plastics Mfg-Basic

110

9.73

4.44

18

45

23

14

1

4484

Molded Plastics Mfg

409

16.81

8

15

58

12

12

3

4511

Analytical Chemist

903

2.91

1.18

1

43

30

22

4
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Class

Class

Code

Description

Percentage of Policies by Range (Low to High)

No. of

High

Low

Policies

Rate

Rate

48

4.51

2.7

4

13

56

13

15

5

4.34

0.75

20

0

0

40

40

2

1

4

3

5

4558

Paint or Putty Mfg

4817

Chemical&Die Mfg-NOC

5022

Masonry Erection

1316

25.84

13.88

43

45

9

3

1

5183

Plumbing Instl&Serv

2270

10.32

6.17

38

28

27

6

2

5190

Elec Wiring Instltn

2132

8.12

3.08

0

1

66

31

2

5191

Office Mach Instl

1418

3.33

1.44

5

15

27

41

12

5221

Concrete Work Floors

1832

15.16

9.03

5

27

57

8

3

5403

Carpentry-NOC

1297

21.76

9.07

0

36

56

7

0

5437

Carpentry-Finishwrk

1639

17.25

6.84

61

28

10

1

0

5445

Wallboard Instltn

795

17.29

10.42

65

27

6

1

1

5476

Painting/Papering

1490

19.65

12.39

28

52

15

3

2

5538

ShtmtlWrkErctn-NOC

1136

13.64

8

4

36

52

7

1

5606

ExecSupervsr Contrt

1926

5.62

2.65

3

37

52

7

0

5645

Carpentry-Detached

4705

18.93

10.62

21

73

4

1

0

6217

Excavation-NOC

1537

20.99

9.3

2

30

58

8

2

7208

Drivers-Trckng-NOC

837

24.16

14.56

3

18

74

3

1

7219

Trckng NOC-No Drvr

201

24.16

14.32

12

26

48

7

6

7230

Parcel Delivery

25

9.83

6.91

16

24

44

12

4
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High

Low

Policies

Rate

Rate

10368

12.24

5.22

1

35

54

10

1

5

4

3

2

1

7380

Drivers NOC

7403

Air Carrier Noncrew

24

5.61

3.68

25

4

33

33

4

7600

Elec Line Stringing

211

9.34

2.87

16

27

38

15

3

7610

Radio/TV Broadcasting

362

1.58

0.7

4

36

40

18

2

7720

Police Officers

655

8.59

4.22

2

88

8

1

1

8001

Florist

867

3.4

1.68

31

42

25

3

0

8006

Retail Grocery

1446

4.69

2.94

21

46

28

3

3

8008

RetlClothing Store

1519

2.25

1.12

1

57

34

6

2

8010

Hardware Store

4136

3.66

1.8

8

49

37

5

0

8013

Store-Jewelry

548

1.09

0.6

15

24

46

12

3

8017

Retail Store-NOC

9569

2.91

1.44

3

22

66

8

1

8018

WholesaleStore-NOC

1011

10.01

5.21

1

7

49

31

13

8033

Supermarket

1100

6.37

3.05

11

83

5

1

0

8039

Department Store

35

3.38

1.95

14

6

14

34

31

8044

Furniture Store

571

6.96

3=69

40

41

18

1

1

8106

Iron/Steel Merchant

166

16.01

8.67

10

4

20

45

22

8227

Contractor's Yard

1328

9.63

4.61

3

66

24

4

4

8232

Bldg Materials Yard

613

10.81

5.47

7

54

23

9

6

Table 5.4 Distribution of Policies by Manual Rates, 1993 (Continued)
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Class

Class

Code

Description

No. of

High

Low

Policies

Rate

Rate

Percentage of Policies by Range (Low to High)
1

2

4

3

5

8292

Storage Warehouse

320

13.84

5.68

8

50

22

15

6

8387

Auto Serv Station

2730

8.54

4.07

9

12

62

15

2

8393

Auto & Trek Body Shop

1402

7.28

3.56

11

58

10

20

1

8395

Auto Repair Shop

5371

8.56

3.79

8

30

60

2

0

8601

Survyr/Engnr/Archt

1410

2.62

0.95

7

21

60

10

1

8742

Outside Sales

25687

1.27

0.48

0

32

50

17

0

8748

AutoSales/Leasing

1070

1.5

0.7

2

7

78

11

1

8755

Labor Union

339

1.74

0.87

73

22

1

3

0

8803

Auditors/Accts

953

0.58

0.2

58

25

11

6

0

8810

Office Clerks

73883

0.61

0.27

2

28

53

13

4

8820

Attorney

2004

0.99

0.29

10

56

30

5

0

8829

Nursing Home

152

10.68

6.68

10

63

11

16

1

8831

Animal Hosp & Grooming

760

3.64

2.1

51

34

11

3

1

8832

Physician

7436

0.86

0.38

18

71

10

1

0

8833

Hospital Prof Emp

217

2.75

1.68

6

12

47

32

4

8835

Domstc & Nursg Servs

521

7.91

2.97

2

18

8

68

4

8868

Schl&Chrch ProEmpl

7417

0.64

0.27

52

28

19

1

1

9015

Janitorial Service

11108

11.27

4.09

9

25

62

4

0

Table 5.4 Distribution of Policies by Manual Rates, 1993 (Continued)
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Class

Class

Code

Description

No. of

High

Low

Policies

Rate

Rate

Percentage of Policies by Range (Low to High)
1

2

3

4

5

9052

Hotel Oth Empls

1335

7.75

4.05

10

72

13

5

0

9058

Food Serv Wrkrs

10664

5.66

2.21

0

74

24

1

0

9060

Prvt Club Empls

700

4.14

2.59

2

19

62

14

3

9061

Clubs-NOC

1181

5.98

3.08

3

24

22

51

0

9101

Schl&Chrch Othr Emp

2477

7.09

3.06

51

24

16

9

0

9403

Refuse Collection

134

25.68

15.74

4

5

9

76

6

9501

Paint Shop Only

372

14.4

5.91

15

31

48

5

0

9519

HshldApplInstl&Serv

787

7.49

2.99

2

71

25

2

0

9522

Upholstering

225

6.74

3.63

51

24

13

5

6

9586

BarberBeautyParlor

1774

1.72

0.63

29

31

37

3

0

9620

Funeral Operation

414

2.34

1.3

43

25

25

5

1

5.1

2.39

9

36

43

10

2

Weighted Averages

Source of Data: Compensation Advisory Organization of Michigan

Table 5.5 Michigan & U.S. Competitive Pricing Adjustments, Policy Years 1984-93*

U.S.**

Michigan

Year
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993

18.2
11.1
7.7
7.3
9.0
11.3
9.4
7.3
10.9
9.4

12.9
9.4
6.9
6.6
7.6
7.5
6.6
6.4
6.6
6.9

* As percent of standard earned premium.
Departures from advisory loss costs not included.
** NCCI states only.
Source: National Council on Compensation Insurance
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Table 5.6 Michigan & U.S. Benefits & Costs as Percentage of Covered Payroll, 1982-91

U.S.

Michigan*
Costs

MI/U.S.
Cost

Benefits

Ratio

Costs

Ratio

Year

Benefits

1982

n.a.

2.49

1.16

1.75

0.66

1.42

1983

n.a.

2.18

1.17

1.67

0.70

1.30

1984

1.59

2.01

0.79

1.21

1.66

0.73

1.21

1985

1.68

2.23

0.75

1.30

1.82

0.71

1.22

1986

1.60

2.57

0.62

1.37

1.99

0.69

1.29

1987

1.63

2.75

0.59

1.43

2.07

0.69

1.33

1988

1.78

2.71

0.66

1.49

2.16

0.69

1.26

1989

1.86

2.73

0.68

1.58

2.27

0.70

1.20

1990

1.98

2.79

0.71

1.66

2.36

0.70

1.18

1991

1.99

2.91

0.69

1.79

2.40

0.75

1.21

1992

n.a.

2.86

1.82

2.31

0.79

1.24

1993

n.a.

2.79

1.68

2.30

0.73

1.21

*Insured sector only

Source: Compensation Advisory Organisation of Michigan, Workers'
Compensation Monitor, and Social Security Administration
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Table 5.7 Benefits (Losses Incurred)/Direct Premiums Earned, Michigan & U.S., 1982-93

Michigan
Private

State
Fund

Total

U.S.
Private

State
Funds

Total

1982

59.4

59.4

63.2

96.7

64.7

1983

78.5

85.3

70.2

96.7

83.1

1984

85.1

85.1

83.2

96.7

83.8

1985

74.9

114.8

74.9

82.6

122.5

83.1

1986

76.7

120.0

81.6

84.2

112.6

84.8

1987

76.3

78.3

76.6

83.0

89.0

83.1

1988

85.1

79.5

84.2

85.8

84.7

85.7

1989

79.5

88.7

81.0

85.5

88.2

85.7

1990

85.6

102.0

88.6

85.2

85.6

85.2

1991

102.0

87.9

99.7

85.4

92.9

85.9

1992

62.7

75.4

85.3

82.7

88.0

83.1

1993

68.6

81.5

70.3

72.1

83.9

73.0

Average

77.9

92.0

81.0

80.2

94.8

81.8

Source: National Association of Insurance Commissioners
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Table 5.8 State-Specific Expense Costs Michigan & U.S. Average, 1992-93*

1993

1992

Michigan
Loss Adjustment
Sales
State Taxes
Dividends to Policyholders

15.9
9.7
2.9
2.9

15.4
9.6
2.9
2.8

U.S.
Loss Adjustment
Sales
State Taxes
Dividends to Policyholders

16.2
8.1
3.9
4.6

13.6
8.2
4
4.6

* As percent of direct premiums earned (losses incurred for loss adjustment
expense).
Source: National Association of Insurance Commissioners
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Table 5.9 Profits - Michigan and U.S. 1985-93

Michigan
Total Profits*

Year
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
Average

U.S.
Total Profits*

ROR**

ROR**

21.0
14.8
16.5
10.8
12.2
7.9
-0.1
13.7
23.2

23.7
17.9
18.9
11.2
11.8
7.1
-0.1
10.1
15.5

8.5
8.0
7.3
3.3
4.7
4.4
4.6
9.4
15.4

11.8
11.1
10.1
4.3
5.5
5.0
4.9
8.6
13.4

13.3

12.9

7.3

8.3

* Total profits including investment income attributable to capital and surplus as a percentage
of net premiums earned.
** Total profits as a percentage of estimated net worth.
Source: National Association of Insurance Commissioners
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Table 5.10 Workers' Compensation Insurance - Distribution of States - Operating Profits

Quintile

1990 Mean
Operating
Profit (%)

1990
Aggregate
Operating
Profits
($000)

Mean
Residual
Market Share

1989
Average
Benefit Cost
($)

1985-89
Benefit Cost
Change (%)

Average Rate
Approved/
Filed (%)

Competitive
Pricing
Adjustments
(%)

Top Fifth

37.1

301,005

11.9

2.0

11.1

69.8

6.1

2nd Fifth

7.4

956,862

14.9

1.2

17.3

91.0

5.7

3rd Fifth

0.8

38,284

19.7

1.3

25.2

83.4

7.7

4th Fifth

(3.3)

(185,203)

34.3

1.9

29.8

50.8

6.0

(15.9)

(1,205,099)

46.1

2.1

39.5

38.8

4.6

4.8

(91,151)

27.2

1.7

24.9

69.9

6.0

Bottom Fifth
All States

Source: National Foundation for Unemployment Compensation & Workers' Compensation, National Council on Compensation
Insurance, and NAIC

Table 5.11 Residual Market Share and Burden - Michigan & U.S., 1982-93

Michigan
Mkt. Share**

Year*
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993

U.S.
Mkt. Share**

Burden***
4.4
4.1
2.8
4.1
4.9
3.4
4.4
2.9
2.2

6.8
10.5
11.7
10.6
10.1
10.7
10.7
13.1
15.4

Burden***
9.9
16.3
19.0
19.6
20.9
24.1
25.9
28.5
28.5

* Calendar year for market share and policy year for burden.
** Percentage of direct premiums written in residual market mechanism.
*** Residual market net operating loss as a percentage of voluntary premiums written.
Source: National Council on Compensation Insurance
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10.3
14.7
18.0
16.9
18.3
15.7
12.2
10.7
8.7

Table 5.12 Insurer Failures, U.S., 1982-93

Total
P/C Insurer
Failures

Year
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990

Workers' Comp. Insurers*
Pet.
No.
8
11
26
49
25
19
35
39
32

0
1
4
9
3
6
2
6
3

Other Insurers**
No.
Pet.

0.0
9.1
15.4
18.4
12.0
31.6
5.7
15.4
9.4

* Insurers with workers' compensation as principal line of business.
** Insurers with principal line other than workers' compensation.
Source: A.M. Best
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8
10
22
40
22
13
33
33
29

100.0
90.9
84.6
81.6
88.0
68.4
94.3
84.6
90.6

Table 5.13 Workers' Compensation Insurance State Rate Regulatory Systems
As of March 1993
State

Rating System

Role of Rating
Organisation

Alabama

Prior Approval

Loss Costs

Advisory

N/A

Alaska

Prior Approval

Rates

Required15

Uniform %

Arizona

Prior Approval

Rates

Required

Arkansas

Prior Approval

Rates

Advisory

Uniform %
Yesc

California

Prior Approval

Rates

Required

Min. Rate

Colorado

Prior Approval

Loss Costs

Advisory

N/A

Connecticut

Prior Approval

Loss Costs

Advisory

Delaware

Prior Approval41

Rates

Required

N/A
Yesc

Dist. of
Columbia

Prior Approval

Loss Costs

Advisory

N/A

Florida

Prior Approval

Rates

Advisory

Uniform %

Georgia

File and Use

Rates/Loss
Costs

Advisory

No Provision

Hawaii

Prior Approval

Loss Costs

Advisory

N/A

Idaho

Prior Approval

Rates

Required

Uniform %

Illinois

Use and File

Rates/Loss
Costs6

Advisory

Upon Notice

Indiana

Prior Approval

Rates

Advisory

Yesc

Iowa

Prior Approval

Rates

Required

Yesc

Kansas

Prior Approval

Rates

Required

Yesc

Kentucky

Use and File

Loss Costs

Advisory

N/A

Louisiana

Prior Approval

Loss Costs

Advisory

N/A

Maine

Prior Approval

Rates

Required

Yesc

Maryland

File and Use

Loss Costs

Advisory

N/A
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Adherence3

Deviations

Table 5.13 Workers' Compensation Insurance State Rate Regulatory Systems (Continued)

State

Rating System

Role of Rating
Organisation

Adherence3

Massachusetts

Prior Approval

Rates

Required

Deviations
Yesc

Michigan

File and Use

Loss Costs

Advisory

N/A

Minnesota

Use and File

Loss Costs

Advisory

N/A

Mississippi

Prior Approval

Rates

Advisory

Missouri

Prior Approval

Rates

Required

Permitted
Yesf

Montana

File and Use

Rates

Advisory

Permitted

Nebraska

Prior Approval

Ratesg

Required

Uniform % g

Nevada

Monopolistic
State Fund

New Hampshire Prior Approval

Rates

Required

Uniform %

New Jersey

Prior Approval

Rates

Required

No Provision

New Mexico

Prior Approval

Loss Costs

Advisory

N/A

New York

Prior Approval

Rates

Required

Uniform %

North Carolina

Prior Approval

Rates

Required

Uniform %

North Dakota

Monopolistic
State Fund

Ohio

Monopolistic
State Fund

Oklahoma

Prior Approval11

Rates

Required

Uniform %

Oregon

Prior Approval

Loss Costs

Advisory

N/A

Pennsylvania

Prior Approval

Rates

Required

Uniform %

Rhode Island

Prior Approval

Loss Costs/
Rates1

Advisory

N/A

South Carolina

Prior Approval

Loss Costs

Required

South Dakota

Prior Approval

Rates

Required

N/A
Yesc
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Table 5.13 Workers' Compensation Insurance State Rate Regulatory Systems (Continued)

State

Rating System

Role of Rating
Organisation

Tennessee

Prior Approval

Rates

Required

Uniform %

Texas

File and Use

None

N/A

Utah

File and Use

Loss Costs

Required

N/A
Yesc

Vermont

Use and File

Rates/Loss
Costs

Advisory

Permitted

Virginia

Prior Approval

Rates

Advisory

Yesf

Washington

Monopolistic
State Fund

West Virginia

Monopolistic
State Fund

Wisconsin

Prior Approval

Rates

Required

None Permitted

Wyoming

Monopolistic
State Fund

Adherence2

Deviations

a Classified as required when adherence is required for all companies or bureau members.
Classified as advisory when adherence is either prohibited or there is no provision for
adherence.
b Alaska does allow the filing of a schedule rating plan as an independent not subject to the
adherence provision.
c Deviations from the class rates, schedules, rating plans or rules respecting any kind or
combination of insurance are permitted.
d Under Delaware law, Delaware is a file and use state. However, traditionally, no rates
are used unless first approved.
e Illinois has a loss rate option available to insurers since 1/84. Insurers are allowed to use
either loss costs or rates.
f Uniform % downward with support, upward deviation not allowed.
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g Loss costs effective 01/01/92, but National Council on Compensation Insurance is
exempt from filing loss costs until 7/1/93. There is no provision for deviations, as of yet,
in the new regulation.
h In Oklahoma insurers may increase or decrease a filed rate by no more than 15% without
prior approval (Flex Filing).
' Rates are filed for the residual market and insurers with less than 1% market share. Loss
costs are filed for insurers with 1 % or greater market share.

Source: Klein, Nordman, and Fritz (1993), Table 11.
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Figure 5.1
Percent

Rate of Return on Net Worth

Cn

o

Rate of Return
U.S. - WC

All Property/
Casualty Insurers

Fortune 500

MI-WC

Source: National Association of Insurance Commissioners

VI. COMPARATIVE WORKERS' COMPENSATION SYSTEM PERFORMANCE:
BRITISH COLUMBIA AND MICHIGAN MODELS
Introduction

Nearly 25 years ago, the U.S. National Commission on State Workmen's (sic)
Compensation Laws enunciated the broad objectives for a modern workers' compensation
program. They included:
Broad coverage of employees and of work-related injuries and diseases.
Substantial protection against interruption of income.
Provision of sufficient medical care and rehabilitation services.
Encouragement of safety.
Effective system for delivery of the benefits and services.
(National Commission, 1972)
Over the intervening years, especially the past decade, the emphasis has shifted somewhat.
The goal of cost effectiveness has assumed much greater importance in many jurisdictions.
Provision of "sufficient" medical care has come to be defined largely in terms of managed
care, employer choice of physician, and other such initiatives. Some states have actually
reduced wage-replacement proportions while maintaining that they still provide "substantial"
protection against income interruption. The emphasis on early return to work is another
example of shifting program values. Nevertheless, the goals enunciated by the U.S. National
Commission still provide a framework to evaluate workers' compensation systems today.
An authoritative evaluation on these general principles remains an elusive goal; our
objectives hi this report are somewhat more modest. We are not trying to definitively evaluate
the overall performance of these two workers' compensation systems; we are trying to learn
what we can about the ways in which system features and performance seem to reflect the
degree of public sector or private sector participation. In particular, we are interested in
lessons that can be derived from examining the way in which public monopoly and private
market insurance systems influence workers' compensation outcomes. In this section, we
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present a comparative analysis of system performance, touching on the general issues
identified by the U.S. National Commission. In the final section of the report, we will present
observations that relate to workers' compensation insurance issues.
It is important to begin this comparative analysis with some strong cautionary notes. In
truth, workers' compensation systems cannot be directly compared, as each system is an
organic whole, embedded hi a specific legal, political, social, and economic environment. As
such, it is clear that there is a danger of improper attribution of specific behavioral patterns to
one systemic cause, when there may well be much broader forces at work to shape such
behaviors. In addition, making comparisons across systems necessarily highlights some system
features and ignores others. In particular, features that can be quantified, whether accurately
or not, are more likely to be selected for comparison than features that are more qualitative in
nature. This does not mean that the quantitative dimensions are more important, it simply
means that they are easier to compare. This report is undoubtedly guilty of these failings, but
before proceeding with our comparative analysis, some specific influences that lie behind our
comparisons should be made explicit.
Noncomparable Aspects
As discussed earlier, the jurisdictions selected for this comparative exercise were
chosen for a number of reasons. While they are "representative" of two different system types
(for convenience labeled public and private), they are not "typical" of all the systems that
might be called public or private. British Columbia and Michigan workers' compensation
systems were selected as "exemplary" models of the public and private approaches to workers'
compensation respectively. But as noted in the previous paragraph, no workers' compensation
system exists in a vacuum, and it is hazardous to label these two specific systems as "public"
and "private" and then imply that conclusions about the characteristics or performance of such
systems can be generalized.
It is not possible to be certain which factors are affecting system performance hi any
specific aspect. Given a particular finding, one cannot be certain that one is looking at a
public-private system difference, or a Canadian-U.S. difference, or a West Coast-Midwest
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difference, or any of a dozen other competing explanations. We offer our informed
observations, based on considerable familiarity with these two workers' compensation systems.
It is up to the reader to evaluate this material and decide what is relevant, what is useful, what
is valuable for his or her purposes. We urge all readers to keep the following qualifications in
mind, as the final sections of the report are digested.
Influence of Self-Insurance
There is a tremendous difference between these two systems that cannot be captured hi
a satisfactory way. In British Columbia, self-insurance is restricted to a handful of large
employers (provincial and federal government, railroads, and airlines), amounting to less than
5 percent of benefit costs in 1993. In Michigan, by contrast, 46 percent of indemnity benefit
payments were made by self-insured employers in 1993, the highest proportion in the U.S.
Undoubtedly this difference has very significant implications for system performance.
It can be presumed that self-insurance is more attractive to "good risks," since they
have more incentive to avoid the "average pricing" effect of the insurance mechanism.47 Thus
an employer who feels that his/her accident or claims performance would be better than
average, might have a financial incentive to self-insure, depending on the experience rating
regime available. On the other hand, employers who regard themselves as worse than average
performers in this dimension might believe that they derive a financial advantage from
accepting the average price, again depending on the experience rating regime. This "adverse
selection" issue is also an important influence on mechanisms designed to guarantee that every
employer can secure workers' compensation insurance, regardless of safety and claims
records. (See Section VII below)
But the other problem is that there are no data available about the performance of selfinsurers within the Michigan workers' compensation system, beyond the aggregate share of
indemnity payments. So the problem of population bias that may be introduced by thenexclusion from the insurance mechanism is further complicated by a lack of data with which to

47But see Victor (1985) for a contrary view.
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assess the impact of their exclusion.48 There is no way to adjust for this problem, so it must be
kept in mind that nearly half of the Michigan workers' compensation system is missing from
many of our observations, and that this would be expected to bias measures of overall system
performance due to adverse selection.
Claim Termination
There is another significant difference between British Columbia and Michigan
workers' compensation systems that cannot be controlled in a comparative analysis. British
Columbia claims never "close," that is, they always have the potential for additional benefit
payments, depending on the circumstances of the claimant. In Michigan, and most other U.S.
jurisdictions, there is a legal mechanism to "close" workers' compensation claims, so that the
insurance carrier (or self-insured employer) can be certain that no additional dollars will flow
to that claimant for that particular injury. In Michigan, this has evolved into a highly stylized
"redemption" system, which allows insurers and employers to make "compromise and
release" agreements with injured workers that specify a financial payment in exchange for
release from further liability for the named injuries (See Section IV for more details). This is
not allowed in British Columbia, or other Canadian jurisdictions.
The existence of such an option probably changes the workers' compensation system in
many fundamental ways. It introduces an element of certainty into an uncertain business for
workers' compensation insurers. However, it also provides the incentive for "nuisance claims"
that may be filed with the intention of soliciting a small cash settlement in exchange for
avoiding the trouble and expense of a formal hearing. There is no way to demonstrate the
actual existence of such claims, but employers and insurers in Michigan firmly believe that
they exist.

48See Hunt (1982) for evidence that, in fact, large differences in performance do exist between the selfinsured sector and the insured sector in Michigan.
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Role of Administrative Agencies
The WCB of British Columbia is relatively unique in North America in that it
combines the functions of prevention, compensation and rehabilitation for work-related injuries
and illnesses into one administrative agency. These are important policy missions, and one
would presume that combining them into one agency would provide some unity of purpose
and, perhaps, economies of scope or scale. Without an adequate study, it is impossible to
determine if these theoretical advantages have actually been realized.49 However, the
difference in size of the public sector is startling.
The WCB of British Columbia has over 2,500 employees, while Michigan's public
sector complement is less than 450 for these "same" functions. Of course, there is no direct
comparability between the tasks performed, and the private sector employees (insurance
companies, rehabilitation firms, prevention consultants, etc.) that are performing the bulk of
these tasks in Michigan's predominantly private workers' compensation system cannot be
counted. But the point is that the entire landscape of disability prevention, compensation, and
rehabilitation services is vastly different hi the two environments, and one must assume that
this has implications for system performance. This will become clearer as we proceed through
this section of the report.
Stakeholders' Role
Another striking difference between British Columbia and Michigan workers'
compensation systems is the involvement of stakeholders in the system. Until 1991, with the
formal institution of worker and employer stakeholder representation in WCB governance,
British Columbia really was not constrained by the direct involvement of stakeholders, other
than injured workers and their representatives, in the workers' compensation system.
In Michigan, hi contrast, private stakeholders make most of the decisions, and their
self-interest is never far from the surface. From the private physician who provides initial
treatment of an injured worker, through the private sector claims adjuster who decides whether

49But see Hunt, Earth, and Leahy (1991) for a dubious opinion of such synergy in British Columbia.
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to accept the claim in the first instance, to the for-profit rehabilitation provider who assists the
worker with return-to-work, to the contingency fee attorney who may assist the worker to
settle a litigated claim, many private stakeholders are involved.
Further, change in the workers' compensation system in Michigan involves a delicate
balance between the "public interest" and many competing "private interests." All the people
who make their living, to one degree or another, from the workers' compensation system have
a legitimate concern about their self-interest. They each bring a unique one-dimensional
perspective to their evaluation of system change. The practical effect of this diversity of
private interests is to make the public interest considerably harder to identify, as it is
complicated by the arguments put forth by various private interests.
Effect of Other Institutions
Last, but by no means least, is the effect of other institutions that are not a part of the
workers' compensation system, but that can have powerful influences on its results. For
example, since access to medical care is guaranteed in Canada, the issue of compensability or
noncompensability of a given condition for workers' compensation benefits may be a matter of
relative indifference to the worker, and perhaps to the provider, when seeking initial medical
treatment. The final assignment of treatment costs to the health plan or to the WCB is really
just a bookkeeping exercise.50
In Michigan, however, the compensability or noncompensability of a given condition is
a critical question when seeking initial medical treatment. To the worker, it may mean the
difference between being treated or not, or whether he/she will be able to see a given
provider, since the employer has first choice of physician and some professionals simply will
not take workers' compensation claimants as patients. Compensability is critical to the treating
physician as well, because it not only indicates which insurance carrier should be billed (and
what kind of documentation the injured worker needs to establish his/her coverage), but also

50But see Hunt, Barth, and Leahy (1996) Chapter 5 for a discussion of perverse incentives for providers
in the British Columbia system.
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whether the potential exists for disputes over the claim, involving deposition of medical
testimony, extra forms, etc. Most medical intake forms in the U.S. ask whether the presenting
condition is work-related. To the employer, the difference between a charge on his/her health
care plan (probably not experience rated) or workers' compensation insurance plan (probably
experience rated) may also be very significant.
This is just one obvious example; there are doubtless many more. The pension plans,
other disability insurance schemes, unemployment insurance systems, tax treatment of
benefits, labor relations environment, and many other dimensions of working life differ
substantially among Canadian and U.S. jurisdictions, and between British Columbia and
Michigan. Some, or all, of these probably affect the behaviors of each and every participant in
the workers' compensation systems of British Columbia and Michigan. Our analysis cannot
control for these myriad differences, but the reader is forewarned not to forget them entirely.
System Performance Comparisons
We will begin our comparative analysis with the issue of coverage. It is obvious that
the degree of protection of wage-earning capacity offered by the workers' compensation
system depends critically on whether the injured worker is covered or not. Thus, this issue is
treated even before questions of prevention incentives and adequacy of wage replacement.
Coverage
British Columbia moved very close to "universal" workers' compensation coverage in
1994. The only exceptions are "casual" workers (less than 8 hours per week), day care
workers (less than 15 hours per week), professional athletes, and owner/operators (and certain
family members) of individual businesses and independent labor contractors (who are eligible
for Personal Optional Protection coverage by application). All other employed workers,
including farm workers and fishery workers) are covered by the Workers' Compensation Act.
(AWCBC, Comparison of Workers' Compensation Legislation in Canada, 1995)
In Michigan, nonagricultural employers of three or more workers are covered.
However, if at least one of these is employed full-time (at least 35 hours per week) for a
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significant portion of the year (13 of 52 weeks), then all employees must be covered. So,
effectively coverage begins with one full time worker. Agricultural employers are covered
only if they employ at least three workers under these same duration and time requirements.
Household employees are covered if they are employed full-time (35 hours or more per week).
Real estate salespersons and brokers are excluded from coverage. (USDOL, State Workers'
Compensation Laws, 1995)
There are no reliable numerical estimates available of covered individuals under either
system. However, British Columbia seems to have a slight advantage in coverage with no
numerical exemptions, and in offering coverage by application for small business owneroperators and labor contractors. There is no elective coverage available in the Michigan
market.
Injury and Illness Incidence
While the incentive structures that influence behavior may differ, there are some broad
system outcome measures that would appear to be comparable. One of these is the incidence of
lost workday cases. It is logical that the incidence of workplace injuries and illnesses that give
rise to lost work time should be comparable across systems, even if the factors determining
their incidence are not. This would provide a "bottom-line" measure of the effectiveness of
prevention incentives. Unfortunately, it is necessary to present the measure without controlling
for industry structure, behavioral differences resulting from benefit provisions, measurement
differences, etc.
In Michigan, these data are collected by the U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of
Labor Statistics and are not derived from the workers' compensation system. They arise from
the employer's requirement under the 1970 federal and 1974 Michigan Occupational Safety
and Health Acts to keep a log of all work-related injuries and illnesses, whether these are
compensable or not. These data are definitely not used for firm-level enforcement activities,
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but still may be thought of as self-incriminating by many employers, and are therefore
regarded as an understatement of actual experience.51
In British Columbia, the comparable statistics arise as a by-product of the workers'
compensation system, and may therefore be influenced by coverage and compensability
considerations. Since the uncovered workers in British Columbia are included hi the
denominator of total employment, there is a significant underestimate of injury rates.
Fortunately the lack of a waiting period in British Columbia means injuries and illness
involving at least one lost workday are included in WCB figures. The major discrepancy that
compensability might introduce is due to the noncompensability of some repetitive trauma
injuries in British Columbia. Presumably these are excluded from the statistics available from
the WCB, and this might result hi some downward bias for the British Columbia figures, as
well.
Another difference is that U.S. figures are calculated on the basis of full-timeequivalent employment rather than on a head-count basis. The effect is to inflate the Michigan
incidence compared to a head-count employment basis, since the denominator is smaller. The
magnitude of this overstatement is estimated to be 3-4 percent, based on analysis of the various
employment figures collected by Bureau of Labor Statistics. In addition, Michigan injury and
illness data are for 1992 (the last available) while British Columbia data are for 1993; this is
not thought to introduce any particular bias to the comparisons.
Table 6.1 indicates that British Columbia has a slightly higher incidence of workrelated injuries and illnesses. Since the Michigan economy is about 2.5 tunes the size of the
British Columbia economy (as measured by employment levels), the per employee figures
should be used for comparisons. Total incidence of work injuries and illnesses per 100
employees is about 12 percent higher, but cases involving tune away from work are nearly 50
percent more common hi British Columbia. This difference presumably reflects, hi part, the

51According to a study of Michigan injuries and illnesses in 1986 that compared the Bureau of Labor
Statistics survey results with workers' compensation records, only about one-fourth of lost workdays are actually
included on the logs. This reflects both underreporting of injuries and lost workday durations. See Oleinick, et. al.
(1993).
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more generous wage-loss benefits in British Columbia, as well as the absence of any waiting
period for wage-loss benefits.52 Of course, it would also reflect incentives for loss prevention
and reporting differences between the two systems.
Unfortunately it is not possible to standardize these measures for the industrial
structure of the two areas, because of the noncomparability of the classification systems within
which the data are reported. However, it seems likely that the dominant primary (extractive)
industries in British Columbia (fishing, logging, mining) might be expected to have higher
injury rates than the secondary (manufacturing) industries which are so important in Michigan.
WC Claims Incidence
As discussed earlier, there is a wide discrepancy in the entitlement to wage-loss
benefits between Michigan and British Columbia. For the purpose of claims incidence, the
most important of these is the 7-day waiting period for wage-loss benefits in Michigan. Since
British Columbia pays wage-loss benefits from day 1, and since most injuries and illnesses do
not involve a full week of lost work time, it is obvious that British Columbia's claims
incidence will be very large compared to Michigan's. That is reflected in Table 6.2, where
British Columbia shows a wage-loss claim incidence more than three times the Michigan rate.
Also not surprising are the figures shown hi Table 6.2 for "medical-only" claims.
These are workers' compensation claims that involve no wage-loss benefits, but only payment
for medical treatment. In this case, the Michigan incidence is 2.5 times that shown for British
Columbia.53 This difference also reflects the Michigan waiting period, since the bulk of British
Columbia cases will involve both wage-loss and medical benefits, and therefore are not
counted as "medical-only" claims. When these two very disparate figures are summed, the
total workers' compensation claims incidence for Michigan is revealed to be nearly 30 percent
higher than for British Columbia.

52See Worrall and Butler (1985) for an early U.S. study of this relationship.
53It is worth noting that the average cost of the medical-only claims is comparable at $254 (US) for
British Columbia and $279 (US) for Michigan.
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In summary, British Columbia reports more work-related injuries, but fewer workers'
compensation claims per 100 workers, when including both wage-loss and medical-only
claims. So how is this paradox to be explained? Since the differences are so great, and reflect
known reporting differences, it would be unwise to speculate on the degree to which system
incentives and behavioral responses contribute to these results. However, it seems clear that
the impact of the health care system is critical. Particularly since all of the Michigan
disadvantage arises from medical only claims, it is likely that the availability of universal
health care coverage in British Columbia reduces the incentive for injured workers to make
sure that their claim gets treated as a workers' compensation claim.
Vocational Rehabilitation Benefits
As discussed in Sections II and IV respectively, British Columbia and Michigan both
provide very significant vocational rehabilitation services for injured workers. In British
Columbia, the WCB provides these services directly with a staff of nearly 100 Vocational
Rehabilitation Consultants and Managers. Michigan relies on outside vendors to provide
vocational rehabilitation services, with only a handful of staff at BWDC to scan claims for
rehabilitation potential, make referrals to private sector and public sector providers, monitor
performance, handle complaints, etc. Interestingly, the state vocational rehabilitation agency
(Michigan Rehabilitation Services) operates in direct competition with private sector agencies
for referral of workers' compensation clients (Insurance Division of MRS).
Data kept by Michigan and British Columbia on vocational rehabilitation outcomes is
very limited, so only the most basic statistics can be cited here. Both systems record about
9,000 referrals for vocational rehabilitation services each year. Since the Michigan working
population is 2.5 times the size of British Columbia's, this implies that Michigan's referral rate
for vocational rehabilitation services is considerably lower. In terms of outcomes, during 1994
a total of 2,490 individuals were returned to work through vocational rehabilitation in British
Columbia. Approximately 55 percent of these are returned to their original employer. The
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British Columbia system claims a success rate of 49 percent for those claims with significant
interventions.54
In Michigan, 3,621 individuals were successfully returned to work in 1993, with a
claimed success rate of 38 percent. (BWDC Annual Report, 1995) It is further reported that 85
percent of the successful cases involved a return to work with the original employer. While
these statistics are not directly comparable, they do serve to indicate that British Columbia has
substantially more vocational rehabilitation activity (and expense) than Michigan.
Unfortunately, data are not sufficient (even in British Columbia) to firmly establish the costbenefit ratios for vocational rehabilitation services.
Aggregate WC Benefit Payments
Table 6.3 shows aggregate benefit payments in 1993 for the British Columbia and
Michigan workers' compensation systems. The aggregate benefit payments hi British
Columbia in 1993 were about $307 (US) per employed person, compared to $329 (US) in
Michigan, a difference of about 7 percent. This includes the effects of the more generous
benefit structure in British Columbia (75 percent of gross to a maximum of $566 (US) per
week, versus Michigan's 80 percent of net pay to a maximum of $457 (US) per week), the 7day waiting period for wage-loss benefits in Michigan (versus no waiting period in British
Columbia), differences in average wage levels, and a host of program specific and
measurement distortions that are contained within the data. Of course, the annual payout is not
the most meaningful way to measure the cost of the system, since it simply represents the flow
of expenditures to a dynamic case population. We report it because it is the only workers'
compensation system measure available for self-insured employers in Michigan. It is also
remarkably similar across the two systems.

54See Hunt, Earth, and Leahy (1996), Chapter 6 for a full exposition of vocational rehabilitation services
and outcomes in British Columbia.
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Incurred Benefit Costs
A more meaningful comparison is obtained from Table 6.4 which shows estimated
incurred benefit costs, including capitalized costs of future payments. These figures more
properly measure the number of claims incurred in 1993 and their estimated cost, in present
value terms.55 Table 6.4 indicates that the insured sector in Michigan incurred future wage-loss
obligations of $522.7 million (US) in 1993. Assuming that employment in the insured sector is
proportional to wage-loss payments (probably an understatement), one can assign this figure to
54 percent of the employment base in Michigan, yielding an average cost of incurred wageloss benefits per employee of $244 (US). This compares to $299 (US) per employee in British
Columbia, a difference of over 20 percent.
On the other hand, Table 6.4 also shows that Michigan's incurred health care costs are
only slightly higher than in British Columbia. When both wage-loss and health care costs
are added together, it is shown that incurred benefit costs are about 13 percent higher in
British Columbia than for the privately insured sector in Michigan. Given the exclusion of the
self-insured employers from the Michigan numbers, and assuming they have better "than"
average workers' compensation experience, this figure would probably understate the incurred
cost differences for the average employer. Still, the rather remarkable conclusion is how
similar these levels are, considering all the system differences that have been discussed here.
Promptness of Payment
This is an interesting comparison, since it is fairly objective but still complicated by
system procedures, case populations, noncomparabilities, etc. Table 6.5 shows the measures of
promptness of payment that are available for these two systems. The figures for British
Columbia were developed in a special study of promptness of payment that applied to claims
registered in the first half of 1994. British Columbia pays considerable attention to "pay-lag"
figures, but since they use a formal standard of 17 days, routine data reporting concentrates on

55The Michigan numbers include allowances for IBNR (incurred, but not reported). This is a very rough
estimate in any case. Trying to estimate what the ultimate costs of a workers' compensation claim will be is not an
exact science.
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the proportion of all claims that are paid within the 17 day standard (usually around 50 to 60
percent).
Michigan keeps pay-lag statistics to monitor private insurer/employer performance in
making prompt payments. The Michigan data on tune from injury to notification come from a
study conducted by the Upjohn Institute for the Bureau of Workers' Disability Compensation
in 1989, and reflect a sample of cases closed in October of 1986 (Hunt and Lance, 1989).
Unfortunately there are no more recent data available from Michigan, and it is unknown how
representative these results may be of current performance. However, it is worth noting that
the average pay-lag from these data was 29 days, the same figure as reported by BWDC for
1993.
Table 6.5 reports mean time (in days) from date of injury to notification of the
administrative agency (WCB or BWDC, respectively) and mean time (in days) from
notification to first payment. The difference in performance between the two systems is clear
in the injury to notification discrepancy. While this takes an average of 15 days hi British
Columbia, it takes over two months on average (67 days) in Michigan. This reflects the
influence of the large number of litigated claims in Michigan, where the claimed injury is
frequently very old before either the employer/insurer or the BWDC hears about it. On the
other hand, the median (50th percentile) value for Michigan is 13 days, a very good
performance considering that there is a 7-day waiting period before benefits begin. Of course,
some would say it is unfair to call these delays "pay-lag" since presumably the payer likely
has no knowledge of the existence of the claim until notification.56
The actual "pay-lag" is represented by the second entry in Table 6.5, "notification to
payment." This measures the time from awareness of a compensable claim to mailing the first
benefit payment. In this case, the mean performance of the two systems is quite comparable at
27 days and 29 days respectively. In addition, analysis of the Michigan data and interpolation

56Although this is not so clear in the Michigan case, where it is the employer who is required to notify
BWDC of the probable claim. It may be that the employer has known of the injury for some time before deciding
to acknowledge that it might become a workers' compensation claim.
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of the British Columbia data indicate that the typical (median) claim receives payment in about
11 or 12 days from notification. These are both good promptness of payment performances.
Dispute Resolution
As indicated earlier, the Michigan workers' compensation system is a great deal more
litigious than that of British Columbia. Table 6.6 indicates that when considered against the
base of new wage-loss claims established, the Michigan "dispute" rate is nearly four tunes
higher than that of British Columbia. However, there are a number of qualifications that
should be entered here about the specifics of the comparison. First, the table ignores the
Medical Review Panels hi British Columbia and understates the impact of the Mediation
Division in Michigan. Both are ignored for the sake of simplicity and comparability. However,
it should not obscure the fact that a large share of disputes are settled informally in Michigan
via mediation services, particularly disputes over health care service and vocational
rehabilitation matters and these are not shown in the table.
Because the Mediation Division annually disposes of nearly 5,000 disputes over
medical claims, it was also judged to be appropriate to drop the much smaller separate appeal
channel of Medical Review Panels in British Columbia. Second, the denominator for this
calculation is somewhat inappropriate. The requests for review do not arise simply from one
year's claims, but reflect the entire history of successful and unsuccessful claims hi the past. In
particular, the Michigan system looks substantially more litigious in Table 6.6 than
conventional wisdom would dictate, because the denominator includes only accepted wage-loss
claims and magistrate awards from the previous year, not redemptions, wash-outs, and other
miscellaneous dispositions. However, using the current year new claims as a denominator
provides a rough yardstick to assess the relative magnitude of disputation in the systems.
Third, it is clear that the "request for review" in Michigan serves to involve the public
agency as a party hi determinuig the facts or relevant law in compensation matters, whereas hi
British Columbia it is an appeal from a public agency decision on these matters. Thus, there is
a vastly different degree of public participation hi the decision making before the request for
review. In addition, since the Michigan adversarial system provides the employer/insurer with
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the opportunity to exercise the initiative to refuse a claim, it is to be expected that more claims
will be disputed than in the inquiry system of British Columbia.
Nevertheless, it is true that the Michigan system is a great deal more contentious and
that it is dominated by lawyers in a way that would be horrifying to the Canadians. Nearly
every contested case in Michigan has a plaintiff attorney attached, while appeals to the WC
Review Board hi British Columbia only have about 15 percent attorney involvement. Further,
attorney fees are prohibited by the WCB, while it is routine for the plaintiff attorney to take
between 15 and 30 percent of the award, on a contingent fee basis, hi Michigan. Thus, the
discrepancy in benefit levels noted earlier in this report is further compounded when the case
becomes contested, since the lower Michigan benefit levels must be shared with the worker's
attorney.
After the initial review level, it is interesting to note that Table 6.6 indicates that the
situation is reversed, with British Columbia having the higher appeal rate.57 This reflects two
major factors. First, a great majority (over 60 percent) of the Michigan "dispositions/
decisions" are negotiated compromise and release settlements, or redemptions, that terminate
the employer/insurer liability. Appeal from these decisions is allowed only hi extreme
circumstances, since both parties are presumed to have been represented by counsel and
capable of making an informed decision. So, the actual number of first level decisions that
could be appealed is less than half that indicated in the table.
Second, appeal is nearly costless in the British Columbia system. There is probably no
attorney involvement, and there is no financial consequence to seeking an additional "bite at
the apple." In the Michigan system, if the claimant has pursued the matter through the
magistrate hearing level and secured no benefit award, the attorney has usually not only not
been compensated but will have absorbed the costs of the litigation. Thus, he/she would not be
expected to push the appeal to the next level with uncertain returns.

57Plus for comparability, we have excluded WCB Appeal Division cases (about one-third of total activity)
that do not emanate from WC Review Board decisions.
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Employer Costs
Table 6.7 compares the costs of workers' compensation coverage from the employer
perspective. The average 1993 assessment rate for employers in British Columbia was $2.11
per $100 of payroll (in Canadian Dollars). Applying the average assessment rate to the average
weekly wage in 1993 of $561 (CD) (or $435 US), and assuming a 52-week work year, yields a
total annual cost per employee of $477 (US). The Michigan average standard premium rate in
1993 for the combined voluntary and assigned risk markets was $2.79 per $100 of payroll
(US). Applying this rate to the Michigan average weekly wage of $507 (US) in 1993 and
assuming a 52-week work year yields a total per employee cost of $736 (US), or some 54
percent higher than in British Columbia.
There are three major explanations for the magnitude of this difference. First, the
average weekly wage is about 17 percent higher in Michigan than in British Columbia. In
addition, all wages are assessable for workers' compensation premium in Michigan, whereas
wage payments of over $39,225 (US) to any individual would not be assessed in British
Columbia. Since we know that Michigan employers pay a higher average premium rate, and
that they pay it on higher wages on average, it is no surprise that Michigan employers pay
more overall for workers' compensation coverage. Second, the British Columbia public
workers' compensation system enjoys the benefit of the earnings from the $4 billion (CD) in
reserves it is holding to pay long-term claims into the future.58 The WCB uses a discount rate
of 3 percent for calculating the reserves required for long-term disability claims and other
obligations. Thus, if the real rate of return earned on funds held as claim reserves is greater
than 3 percent, the additional earnings effectively go to reduce the amount of assessment
income that must be raised in the current period. The investment portfolio that the WCB
manages earned an average return of 9.2 percent in 1993 (7.5 percent after inflation). The
result was that about 33 percent of WCB income was derived from investments.

58At the end of 1993, the WCB of British Columbia was estimated to be 97 percent funded against future
expected benefit costs, a remarkable achievement for a public workers' compensation system.
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Third, on the U.S. side, the incurred benefit payments made to claimants must be
"marked up" to allow private insurers to recover their administrative costs, plus a fair return
on their investment. It was shown earlier (Table 5.8) that Michigan workers' compensation
insurance carriers incurred loss adjustment costs of 15.9 percent, sales expenses of 9.7
percent, and state tax costs of 2.9 percent of the premiums collected. In addition, an average
of 2.9 percent was returned to policyholders in the form of dividends. Thus, at least 30
percent of the premium dollar goes to cover operating expenses. Table 5.9 presented earlier
also showed that in most years, workers' compensation insurers in Michigan made profits of
about 13 percent of net premiums. In other words, the administrative costs, taxes, dividends,
and profit for private insurance carriers create a gap of approximately 40 to 45 percent
between the benefits paid to workers and the costs to employers.
Administrative Costs
Table 6.8 compares the public administrative costs of the workers' compensation
systems in Michigan and British Columbia. As expected, given the nearly total public
responsibility for adrninistering the workers' compensation system in British Columbia, the
public administrative costs are much higher. Table 6.8 indicates that the public cost of
administering the system is about $77 (US) per worker in British Columbia. This includes
adjudication, record keeping, dispute resolution, public advisers for both employees and
employers, three layers of appellate bodies and all the other overhead associated with a public
workers' compensation system. In Michigan, public administration costs were approximately
$5 (US) per worker in 1993, but this only provides a record keeping system and a dispute
resolution system, all the rest of the costs are borne privately.59
It is impossible to get a precise assessment of the private cost burden, but a start can be
made by applying the loss adjustment costs and sales expenses of approximately 25 percent
(Table 5.8) to the $1.3 billion (US) in benefit payments in Michigan in 1993 (from Table 6.3).

59It is a part of the cost of the dispute resolution system because only the mediators and magistrates are on
the public payroll. Representation of the parties is a private obligation.
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The result would be a private administrative cost estimate of $325 million (US) in 1993 for
both the insured and self-insured sectors. Adding this to the public administrative cost figure
in Table 6.8 would bring total public and private administrative costs in Michigan to $345
million (US), or $86 (US) per worker. These are very rough approximations, of course.
In addition, this figure does not include the private costs of litigation. There are very
few private lawyers operating in the workers' compensation system in British Columbia, so we
can disregard this cost item, and the cost of the public advisory services is included among the
WCB administrative costs. However, in Michigan with a fairly litigious system, very
substantial additional private transaction costs are incurred in disputed cases. On average,
from one-fourth to one-third of the successful worker litigant's award goes to legal costs and
attorney fees. Presumably, this is matched by a similar cost on the defendant side (representing
the insurance carrier or the self-insured employer). Thus, overall, as much as one-half of
lump-sum benefit payments may be charged to private transaction costs.
Unfortunately, there are no sufficient data with which to estimate the overall cost
contribution of the litigated sector. However, data from several years ago indicate that
approximately 26 percent of all successful claims were litigated, and 73 percent of those
received some lump sums (56 percent received only lump sums), it is obvious that it could be
a very large number.60 If we assume that just half of the total compensation received by
litigated claimants is a result of the successful litigation, then the estimated private transaction
costs would be one-fourth of these benefit payments. Since litigated claims constitute about 25
percent of all successful claims in Michigan, this would yield an estimated total of 6 to 7
percent of overall benefit payments. This figure is a very rough estimate, but gives an
appreciation of the overall magnitude of these hidden private transaction costs in Michigan.
It also helps us understand why employer costs in Michigan are so much higher, even though
incurred benefit payments are roughly comparable hi the two systems.

^These parameters are drawn from Hunt (1982) and relate to Michigan workers' compensation claims
closed in 1978.
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Table 6.8 also shows the public expenditures on prevention activities in the two
jurisdictions. The costs are reflected in activity levels, as the WCB completed nearly 48,000
workplace inspections in 1993, writing a total of 61,487 orders and levying penalties and fines
of $1.2 million (US). In addition, the WCB conducted over 4,600 educational presentations
and completed over 7,000 consultation reports. By comparison, the MIOSHA Division of the
Bureau of Safety and Regulation in Michigan, facing a workforce 2.5 times that of British
Columbia, completed about 7,000 workplace inspections, writing about 12,000 citations, and
levying penalties of $50 million (US). In addition, the Safety, Education and Training Division
conducted over 4,500 training sessions and made over 18,000 consultation visits in fiscal year
1993. This analysis makes it clear that British Columbia mounts a considerably greater effort
at prevention, particularly on the enforcement side. Michigan does relatively well at voluntary
compliance efforts, but simply does not put enough inspectors in the field to cover the
employer population in Michigan.
Summary
The British Columbia public workers' compensation system reports 12 percent more
work-related injuries, and 48 percent more lost workday injuries than does Michigan. Yet, it
apparently identifies fewer workers' compensation claims on a per capita basis. However, all
of this difference is hi the medical-only claims, since British Columbia actually pays three
times as many wage-loss claims. These differences are thought to be due to the lack of a
waiting period for wage-loss benefits in British Columbia, and to easier access to the general
health care system for both job-related and non job-related injuries and illnesses than is true in
Michigan.
Overall, annual benefit payments to injured workers are slightly lower in British
Columbia (about 7 percent), but incurred benefits are slightly higher (about 13 percent). This
difference presumably reflects the prevalence of lump-sum payments in Michigan, which are
very rare hi British Columbia. All of the incurred cost differences are among the wage-loss
claims, as British Columbia reports 22 percent greater incurred wage-loss benefits per worker.
Incurred medical and rehabilitation benefits are remarkably similar.
VI-170

Michigan and British Columbia are both very good hi promptness of payment, given
notification of injury. However, approximately four tunes as many claims are litigated hi the
Michigan system, reflecting the presence of plaintiff attorneys and a presumption of initiative
on the insurer, or self-insured employer, side. In Michigan, insurance carriers generally have
the right to deny benefits initially, or to stop benefits subsequently. Both actions are subject to
administrative hearing upon request of the injured worker, but the initiative is still with the
employer. This is true of choice of physician as well, where Michigan permits the employer to
select the physician for at least the first 10 days of treatment, while British Columbia allows
the worker to choose.
In terms of employers' costs of workers' compensation coverage, British Columbia
enjoys an advantage of about 35 percent, when measured in U.S. dollars per worker. This is
due to lower average wages, lower combined public and private administrative costs, and
much lower transaction costs. The transaction cost differences are comprised of both sales and
promotion expenses in the private system and the friction costs of litigation. Given that the
average wage difference is about 17 percent, we hazard the guess that about half the employer
cost advantage hi British Columbia is due to the workers' compensation system itself.
This review has shown some striking similarities and some surprising differences
between the performance of the British Columbia and Michigan workers' compensation
systems. In general, the advantage goes to British Columbia. Benefits are paid without a
waiting period and with considerably higher maximum weekly wage-loss protection.
Nevertheless, incurred benefit costs are roughly similar. British Columbia pays higher public
administrative costs, but when an estimate of Michigan's private administration and transaction
costs are factored in, British Columbia actually looks significantly less expensive. Finally,
when we look at the bottom line, employer's costs of workers' compensation coverage, British
Columbia wins hands down. In the final section, we will consider the insurance implications of
system differences, and some lessons that may be drawn from this review of public and private
workers' compensation insurance mechanisms.
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Table 6.1 Incidence of Work-Related Injuries and Illnesses
1992
Michigan

1993
British Columbia
Total

per 100
Employees

Total

per 100
Employees

Total Work Injuries and
Illnesses*

195,117

11.7

405,658

10.4

Lost Workday Injuries**

71,969

4.3

113,736

2.9

* British Columbia data came from WCB reports and reflect different reporting
standards than MIOSHA log data shown for Michigan.
** Lost workday injuries for British Columbia include only those resulting in some
payment for wage-loss before 12/31/93. Michigan figures are based on a survey of
MIOSHA log data and reflect only cases with days away from work.

Source: British Columbia data from WCB 1993 Annual Report; Michigan data
(unpublished) from MIOSHA Information Division.
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Table 6.2 Incidence of Workers' Compensation Claims, 1993
British Columbia
Total

Michigan

per 100
Employees

Total

per 100
Employees

Wage-Loss Claims
Established

79,503

4.8

60,541

1.5

Medical Only Claims
Established

56,186

3.4

358,172

9.0

135,689

8.1

418,713

10.5

Total Claims Established

Source: British Columbia data came from WCB 1993 Annual Report. Michigan data
are from unpublished tabulations provided by BWDC (wage-loss claims) and BWDC
Annual Report, 1993 (medical only claims).
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Table 6.3 Workers' Compensation Benefit Payments, Calendar Year 1993, in U.S. Dollars
Michigan

British Columbia
per
Employee

Total

Total

per
Employee

Health Care Payments
(incl Rehabilitation Costs)

$129,598,450

$78

$374,064,251

$94

Wage-Loss Payments

$381,620,930

$229

$934,060,557

$235

Total Payments*

$511,219,380

$307

$1,308,124,808

$329

* Total includes wage-loss, health care, and rehabilitation benefits on a paid basis for
calendar year 1993.

Source: British Columbia figures from 1993 Annual Report, Note 6, p. 41. Michigan
figures from Funds Administration and BWDC 1993 Annual Report, p. 9.
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Table 6.4 Incurred Workers' Compensation Benefit Costs Calendar Year 1993, in U.S.
Dollars
British Columbia

Michigan*

Total

per
Employee

Total

per
Employee

Wage-Loss Benefits

$498,857,364

$299

$522,674,073

$244

Health Care Benefits

$271,835,659

$163

$359,738,630

$168

Total Incurred Benefit
Costs

$770,693,023

$463

$882,412,703

$411

* Insured sector only. It is assumed that employment is proportional to paid indemnity
losses in 1993.

Source: British Columbia figures from 1993 Annual Report, p. 36. Health care benefits
include rehabilitation expenses. Michigan figures from Michigan Data Collection Agency
Publication, 1995, Exhibit I, pp. 3-4. Michigan figures exclude loss based assessments and
claim adjustment costs and are based on 1993 calendar/accident year data with appropriate
loss development factors.
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Table 6.5 Promptness of Payment
British Columbia*

Michigan**

Injury to Notification (mean value)

15 days

67 days

Notification to Payment (mean value)

27 days

29 days

* British Columbia data are from a special study of timeliness based on all claims
registered hi the first half of 1994.

** Michigan data are from BWDC statistics for 1993 and from a random slice in-time
sample of claims closed hi 1986. The sample of claims was compiled by the W.E.
Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.

Source: British Columbia data are from WCB Performance Reports, 1994, pp. 27, 31.
Michigan data are from Intrastate Differences in Workers ' Compensation Costs:
October 1986 Closed Case Study (Kalamazoo, MI: W.E. Upjohn Institute for
Employment Research) September 1989, p. 37.
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Table 6.6 Dispute Resolution Activity, 1993
British Columbia*
New Wage-Loss Claims
Established

Michigan**

79,503

60,541

7,573

22,496

9.6%

37.2%

Dispositions/Decisions

6,968

23,399

Appeals

1,429

1,178

Requests for Review

20.5%

5.0%

* For British Columbia, the Requests for Review refer to Workers' Compensation
Review Board appeals received and Dispositions/Decisions refer to Review Board
panel findings and summary decisions. Appeals refer only to Review Board decisions
appealed to WCB Appeal Division.

** For Michigan, Requests for Review refers to Petitions for Hearing received and
Dispositions/Decisions includes decisions and redemptions, but not mediator
resolutions. Appeals refers to Appellate Commission activity only.

Source: For British Columbia, Annual Report of the Appeal Division for 1993; for
Michigan, BWDC Annual Report 1993.
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Table 6.7 Employer Cost of Workers' Compensation Coverage for 1993, in U.S. Dollars*
British Columbia

Employer Cost of
Workers' Compensation
Coverage

Assessment
Rate

Cost per
Employee

2.11

$477

Michigan**
Standard
Premium
Rate
2.79

Cost per
Employee
$736

* Employer costs per worker are estimated by applying the average assessment or
premium rate to the average weekly wage times 52 weeks.

** Insured sector only. It is assumed that employment is proportional to paid
indemnity losses in 1993. Michigan figure includes the placement facility results.

Source: British Columbia data from WCB Annual Report, 1994, p. 54. Michigan
data are from Michigan Insurance Bureau, Preliminary Report and Certification
Regarding the State of Competition in the Workers ' Compensation Insurance Market,
1995, Exhibit 7.
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Table 6.8 Public Administrative Costs 1993, in U.S. Dollars*
British Columbia
per
Employee

Total
Administration
Prevention
Total

Michigan
Total

per
Employee

$122,737,985

$77

$19,915,223

$5

$21,437,209

$13

$11,264,000

$3

$144,175,194

$90

$31,176,223

$8

* See text for estimates of private transaction costs.

Source: For British Columbia, WCB 1993 Annual Report; for Michigan, compiled from
statistics provided by Deputy Director, Michigan Department of Labor.
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VH. POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR VICTORIA

Introduction
This section outlines the most important considerations involved hi making policy
choices about the relative roles of the public and private sectors hi Victoria's workers'
compensation insurance system. The outcomes of any particular set of choices depend on the
specific circumstances of a workers' compensation system and its environment. Thus, it is not
possible to make predictions about the effects of different policy decisions that would
necessarily hold true for any system (e.g., moving from public to private financing will always
improve economic efficiency). However, it is possible to share insights from the British
Columbia and Michigan experiences that may have some application to the policy options
facing Victoria.
In a broad sense, there are two interrelated sets of institutional arrangements that must
be considered. As discussed earlier, there is a continuum of public and private sector
participation hi workers' compensation systems. But accompany ing these options is another
continuum with respect to the degree of regulation. In essence, policy makers must choose a
set of institutions and policies from the available array that promises to achieve the social
objectives of adequate and equitable benefits for injured workers at fair and reasonable costs
for employers. The linkage between these choices is illustrated by the apparently universal
need to monitor the adequacy of insurer performance where private insurers have a substantial
role in assuming risk and administering benefits and other workers' compensation services.
Most governments act as though some system outcomes are too important to be left entirely to
unregulated private market forces.
Although this report contrasts public and private models for workers' compensation
systems, it is obviously possible to have various "mixed" systems which could assign some
functions to a government agency or public insurer and other functions to the private sector.
For example, as in Victoria, the government could assume risk and finance benefits but private
firms could administer claims. But choices about different features of a workers' compensation
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system are interdependent and should not be considered in isolation. For instance, the impact
of delegating claims administration to private firms might be influenced by whether claim costs
are publicly or privately financed. So it is not possible to identify a combination of public and
private functions that would necessarily be optimal for every workers' compensation system. It
is feasible to utilize the framework of the core workers' compensation insurance functions
outlined in the introduction to this report to discuss the implications of different approaches to
public and private provision of these functions.
Marketing and Distribution
Even a public insurer must perform some administrative functions in issuing and
servicing workers' compensation coverage, but marketing and distribution activities become
much more significant when a number of private insurers compete for business. Private
insurers must inform potential buyers about their products and prices and solicit business.
Constraints on private insurers' products and prices might induce insurers to limit their
expenditures on marketing and distribution, but this also could lower the potential efficiency
gains from competition and innovation. Moreover, even with regulatory limits on prices and
products, private firms will seek ways to differentiate and market themselves to buyers.
Additionally, in the U.S., private insurers are able to reap economies of scope in using
the same marketing and distribution facilities for several lines of commercial insurance,
including workers' compensation. It is not uncommon for agents and insurers to package and
sell workers' compensation insurance with other commercial property and liability coverages.
Agents and insurers are able to acquire information about the risk characteristics and various
insurance needs of a firm at the same time and use that contact to market and sell several
policies to the firm. This lowers per-unit marketing and distribution costs as reflected in
premium discounts to buyers of multiple policies. The potential for achieving these economies
in other jurisdictions, such as Victoria, depends on the marketing and distribution systems
employed by private insurers.
At the same time, competition among private insurers in soliciting business necessarily
adds an additional layer of cost in terms of expenditures on advertising, in-house sales
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facilities and activities, commissions and brokerage fees, and other acquisition costs.
Expenditures on commissions and direct acquisition costs alone constituted 8.1 percent of
workers' compensation insurance premiums in the U.S. in 1993. This figure does not include
costs for marketing and distribution facilities and activities that are not separately detailed in
financial reports. These additional costs must be balanced against any efficiency gains that
would be achieved from utilizing private insurers competing for business.
Underwriting Selection
It is easier for a public monopoly insurer to provide workers' compensation insurance
for all or most employers, as it is not subject to the same problem of adverse selection to
which private insurers are exposed.61 A public monopoly insurer need not worry about adverse
selection as long as all employers are forced to buy coverage from it. This allows a public
monopoly insurer to pool high-risk employers with low-risk employers and exercise greater
flexibility in allocating benefit costs between these groups. On the other hand, private insurers,
and public insurers that compete with private insurers or self-insurance, are subject to adverse
selection unless they have the ability to reject certain risks. In the U.S., private insurers seek
to coordinate their pricing structures and their selection of risks to avoid an excessive
concentration of high-risk employers, or they seek to specialize in these types of risks.
U.S. insurers also use underwriting selection to specialize in certain industries and
types of employers. Because it is costly for insurers to acquire information about an industry
and specific employers that is relevant to risk selection and proper pricing, insurers can gain a
comparative advantage over competitors through specialization. This allows insurers to offer
more competitive prices and services to employers for whom they have acquired information
that is not readily accessible to other insurers. The regulation of insurer underwriting selection
and pricing can have significant effects on the efficiency and equity of a workers'
compensation system.

61This assumes that self-insurance is limited as an option under a public monopoly system.
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Ensuring Availability of Coverage
In theory, the proper coordination of pricing and underwriting selection should ensure
that most employers are able to obtain coverage at an actuarially fair price. However, hi
practice, certain structural problems can occur which may make it difficult for some employers
to obtain coverage on a voluntary basis. An availability problem can arise when private
insurers' rating structures do not accommodate certain high-risk employers, or employers for
whom it is difficult to calculate and charge a proper premium. Insurers will be disinclined to
offer coverage voluntarily to these employers who must seek coverage from some other source
or go out of business.
Given incomplete information and insurers' need to make subjective assessments about
employers' risk characteristics, this problem can be driven by false perceptions as well as hard
facts. For instance, in the U.S., small employers historically have had a difficult time
acquiring voluntary market coverage, although some state funds and specialty carriers have
demonstrated that such employers can be written profitably at competitive rates. Availability
problems also can arise in the "hard-market" phase of the underwriting cycle when insurers
tighten their underwriting criteria and reject or fail to renew policies for some employers.
Some U.S. states have restricted insurers' ability to reject risks in personal auto and
homeowners insurance, but such restrictions have generally not been imposed in workers'
compensation. Attempts to force insurers to accept all risks who meet certain minimum criteria
have generally failed, as insurers have found other ways to avoid business that they do not
want. Insurers can discourage certain risks by raising their rates, providing lower quality
service, or failing to market policies to them. In 1993, hi response to legislation promoting
depopulation of its residual market, the Missouri insurance director sought to promulgate a
depopulation plan that would have required workers' compensation insurers to accept an
application for insurance from any employer that met certain minimum criteria.62 Insurers
blocked implementation of the plan based on a legal technicality.

62The employer's classification would have to be one that the insurer was writing.
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Regardless, reliance on private insurers to provide workers' compensation insurance
requires a mechanism to provide coverage to employers who are unable to obtain coverage
from the voluntary market. The options are some form of residual market facility or a public
insurer that will cover risks rejected by the voluntary market. Various types of residual market
mechanisms have been employed in the U.S., including reinsurance pools, joint underwriting
associations, and assigned risk plans. Reinsurance pools are the predominant mechanism used
in the U.S. for workers' compensation.
The structure of residual market mechanisms and the regulation of the voluntary market
can have significant implications for the performance of the overall workers' compensation
system. Regulatory suppression of voluntary and/or residual market rates below costs can
cause the voluntary market to shrink and the residual market to grow at an accelerating rate.
This can ultimately result in the implosion of the voluntary market as increasing assessments
on voluntary market premiums to cover the soaring residual market deficit drives more
employers into the residual market (e.g., Maine). Residual markets have remained relatively
small hi states like Michigan where rates are generally adequate to cover costs.
Other aspects of residual market mechanisms can affect system performance and the
quality of service to employers and workers. Mechanisms that assume all or most of the risk
and use private insurers as servicing carriers are subject to cost inflation as servicing carriers
have little economic incentive to contain costs or provide good service if then* performance has
no effect on the fees they receive. Until recently, this was a serious problem in the U.S., with
its primary reliance on a reinsurance pool for residual market workers' compensation risks that
assumes 100 percent of the losses. Insurance regulators and workers' compensation
administrators pressured the NCCI to institute a number of reforms to better monitor and
correct servicing carriers' performance. Initial indications are that these reforms are having a
positive effect and contributing to the overall improvement in the workers' compensation
market (NCCI, 1995).
It also should be pointed out that efforts to make residual market mechanisms selfsupporting can have adverse impacts on low-risk employers who are forced into such
mechanisms. Ideally, every risk hi the residual market would pay an actuarially fair premium,
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but this is difficult to accomplish in practice given the inherent imperfections in workers'
compensation pricing schemes. In the U.S., residual market losses have been reduced by
eliminating certain pricing discounts available to voluntary market risks and adding rate
surcharges. These indiscriminate pricing adjustments may have resulted in more adequate
prices for high-risk employers, but they also may have resulted in excessive prices for low-risk
employers forced into the residual market. The presumption that any employer unable to
obtain voluntary market coverage is high-risk and should be charged an extra premium will not
always be true.
The combination of a properly administered reinsurance pool and a competitive public
insurer may offer the best solution to the availability dilemma for some private systems. With
appropriate pricing and administration, the reinsurance pool could be operated with a minimal
subsidy (if any) and retained for only the highest-risk employers who cannot be insured by the
voluntary market. The public insurer could insure low-risk employers unable to obtain
voluntary coverage and gain efficiencies by specializing in certain types of employers (e.g.,
small employers) who tend to be rejected by private insurers. This approach would help to
keep the residual market small and manageable while avoiding penalties against low-risk
employers who might otherwise be forced into the residual market. This scheme has worked
fairly well for states such as Michigan.63
Benefit Provisions and Policy Design
The "social contract" nature of workers' compensation requires the government to
mandate the benefits to which workers are entitled. The basic insurance coverage which
employers are required to carry ensures that these benefits are paid. Allowing private insurers
to underwrite workers' compensation insurance raises the question of whether they will be
constrained to a standard policy or will be allowed to develop different policies to respond to
employers' needs and preferences. Workers would receive the same benefits regardless, but

63But note that Michigan sold its competitive state fund to a private health insurance carrier in 1995. It
will be interesting to see how this affects the availability and price of coverage to small employers.
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insurers could sell and employers could choose among insurance policies which offer various
options in terms of risk assumption, as well as services such as loss prevention and claims
management. Varying insurance policies would directly affect employers' costs and incentives
and indirectly affect workers. In theory, permitting variation in insurance policies could
improve economic efficiency by allowing the market to respond to differences among
employers in terms of their ability to assume risk, or need for related services. A public
insurer need not be constrained to one standard insurance policy, but innovation in policy
design is more likely to be facilitated by competition among private insurers.
The structure of the market and regulation will affect the types of policies that are
offered by private insurers and purchased by employers. Because of the agent-principal
problems discussed in Section I, there is potential for system objectives to be undermined by
allowing private insurers to offer different kinds of policies. For example, if an insurer sells a
policy that pays lowers benefits than those prescribed by law, the employer would be
responsible for paying the difference. However, the employer might seek to avoid or be unable
to cover its residual obligation to an injured worker, forcing legal action by the government or
the worker. Hence, regulators would need to ensure that the insurance policies that are sold
satisfy employers' requirements for coverage and that workers' interests are not compromised.
Workers' compensation administrators and insurance regulators in the U.S. are
currently wrestling with these issues in making decisions about allowing the sale of alternative
workers' compensation coverages, such as various forms of 24-hour coverage and large
deductible policies. The managed care "movement" hi the U.S. offers another example. As
private and public insurers have moved aggressively to add managed care, especially of health
care costs, to their array of policy services over the last five years, regulators have largely
been silent in the face of these initiatives. While there seems to be clear evidence that managed
care techniques can reduce workers' compensation medical costs, there has been very little
investigation of the implications for the quality of care. It is worth noting that organized labor
has definitely been skeptical of these changes. Thus, one could argue that this policy
innovation remains unproven, even though remarkably widespread. Interestingly, neither
Michigan nor British Columbia have been leaders in this particular policy evolution.
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Pricing and Premium Verification
A public monopoly insurer can implement an array of different pricing or cost
allocation schemes depending on public policy objectives and the political and economic
environment. A public monopoly insurer has more flexibility in allocating costs among
employers because it is not subject to the problem of adverse selection if all employers are
required by law to purchase workers' compensation insurance from it. The particular pricing
scheme implemented will have an impact on economic efficiency and equity, however, even if
employers have no choice hi terms of the amount of coverage they purchase.
Employers who pay premiums less than their expected losses will be induced to overconsume insurance by hiring more labor or increasing their risk in other ways beyond what is
optimal for society. Conversely, employers who pay more than an actuarially fair premium
will be induced to under-consume insurance by hiring less labor or taking other actions to
lessen their risk which are not efficient. Consequently, workers' compensation pricing
schemes that contain cross-subsidies lead to efficiency losses which ripple through the
economy. Cross-subsidies also can cause claim costs to escalate and ultimate cripple a public
insurer.
The pricing schemes that are feasible under a private market system are more limited
than those that can be implemented by a public monopoly insurer. In a competitive market,
insurers are induced to approximate actuarially fair prices based on the information available
to them. Insurers will seek to circumvent regulatory attempts to enforce pricing structures
other than what would be established by the market. Insurers can circumvent regulatory
restrictions through devices such as revising then: adjustments to manual rates, modifying
dividend plans, reclassifying employers, and changing their quality of service. Regulators can
affect prices but they cannot totally control them as long as insurers retain some flexibility in
determining premiums for particular employers and varying their quality of service.
Regulatory efforts to restrict overall rate levels below costs or enforce cross-subsidies through
the rate structure will cause market dislocations and reduce economic efficiency.
Over tune, states in the U.S. have moved away from a uniform, administered pricing
system for workers' compensation to an approach that embraces a fair degree of price
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competition among insurers. The historical concern that unfettered price competition would
produce a rash of insolvencies and undermine system protections has not proven to be well
founded. On the whole, competitive rating has seemed to work relatively well compared to
prior approval and administered-pricing systems. Several previous studies indicate that prices
tend to fall after the institution of competitive rating, although they may also rebound to some
extent after several years. Other studies suggest that, over the long run, workers'
compensation prices are either no different or are possibly even higher under competitive
rating.
However, this does not necessarily mean that the prices in competitive rating states are
excessive, as some prior approval jurisdictions may have suppressed prices below competitive
levels. There can be strong economic and political pressures on regulators and legislators to
suppress rates when they are subject to prior approval, particularly in high-cost states. This, in
turn, can cause losses to escalate further and increase pressure on prices as employers fail to
pay the full cost of coverage and incur excessive risk.
The experience in the U.S. indicates that prior approval rate regulation can lead to
severe market problems and even at best does not appear to offer efficiencies which justify its
additional costs. It is not surprising then that 31 states have followed Michigan's lead in
implementing competitive rating for workers' compensation, and other states are considering
such a move. Of course, competitive rating is facilitated in the U.S. by the generally
competitive structure of the insurance industry and the workers' compensation market.
There does appear to be a cyclical aspect to workers' compensation pricing, shared
with other commercial lines, resulting in some market instability which could be more severe
under competitive rating. Regulatory attempts to prevent cyclical pricing are likely doomed to
failure (see Cummins, Harrington, and Klein, 1991), however. As noted above, it is difficult
to prevent insurers from circumventing regulatory restrictions, although regulators may
hamper insurers' efforts in ways that are not necessarily efficient. Indeed, Cummins and
Outreville (1987) contend that regulatory lag in approving rate changes can even exacerbate
cyclical pricing.

VH-188

However, there is a role for regulation in a competitive rating system. At a minimum,
regulators should monitor market structure, conduct and performance to ensure that prompt
regulatory intervention occurs if competition fails and serious problems develop. Michigan has
developed a system for monitoring competition in workers' compensation markets that could
be used as a model for other jurisdictions. 64 Second, while it is not essential for regulators to
prior approve rates, there are advantages to requiring insurers to file rates and authorizing
regulators to disapprove rates if competition is lacking or if an insurer's rates threaten its
solvency.
While filing requirements necessarily introduce some lag in implementing price
changes, the exercise of filing and supporting rates can force some insurers to develop more
actuarially sound rates than they might otherwise implement. Regulatory standards also can
limit indiscriminate use of certain pricing adjustments by insurers, such as "schedule credits,"
which can contribute to pricing volatility. Third, there is value to having one or more advisory
organizations collect statistical data on loss experience and disseminate cost analysis that can
help insurers develop more accurate rates. These organizations should be regulated to ensure
that they disseminate only information that facilitates competition and not information that
provides a focal point for reducing competition.
Loss Prevention
Loss prevention and safety engineering services play an important role in helping to
reduce workplace accidents and workers' compensation costs. 65 A public insurer can perform
loss prevention services or rely on private companies to provide these services to employers.
A government agency, such as the WCB of British Columbia, could gain efficiencies from
coordinating workplace safety regulation and loss prevention programs. Such services can be
bundled with other workers' compensation services, or unbundled and funded by separate
assessments or user fees. Allowing employers to purchase different levels and kinds of loss

^See Michigan Insurance Bureau (1995).
65See Hunt, Habeck, VanTol, and Scully (1993).
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prevention services should enable them to purchase the optimal amount and kinds of services
and improve economic efficiency. This presumes that the allocation of workers' compensation
costs to employers provides an incentive to reduce their risk of loss.
Similarly, private insurers could provide loss prevention services to their policyholders
or delegate this function to other private vendors or even a government agency. In a private
market system with actuarially fair prices, insurers and insureds both have incentives to make
optimal investments in loss prevention services. As part of their competitive strategy, private
insurers hi the U.S. have enhanced their loss prevention services to combat rising costs. The
private market can be a good source of innovation in this area if incentives are structured
properly. For example, Firemen's Fund Insurance Group in the U.S. has instituted a program
called SmartComp that enables an employer to determine the long-term financial impact of its
workers' compensation claims and assess the savings from loss prevention measures. Private
insurers and other vendors also may be able to take advantage of loss prevention methods they
have developed for other types of risk, such as product liability and property damage.
Claims Adjustment and Case Management
A public insurer can perform claims adjustment and case management functions or
outsource these activities to private companies. What is most efficient will depend on the
particular system. Retaining these activities within a government agency could help to ensure
that claims are administered in the best interests of injured workers, presuming that is what
administrators understand their role to be. Certain economies of scope also might be achieved
if a public insurer combines these activities with other workers' compensation functions it
performs. For instance, a public insurer could utilize information obtained from investigating
and adjusting claims to help identify causes of work-related accidents and strategies to reduce
them.
There also could be advantages to outsourcing claims administration for some public
systems. Competition among private vendors could lead to greater efficiency. This is more
likely to be the case if private vendors can take advantage of economies stemming from their
expertise and facilities hi administering claims for other types of insurance, e.g., health
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insurance. However, the efficiency of outsourcing also will be affected by how vendors are
selected and reimbursed. If vendors' performance is not effectively controlled through the
enforcement of standards and/or economic incentives, they could deliver poor service and
claim costs could escalate.
Privatizing the financing of workers' compensation costs, as well as claims
administration, could yield additional efficiencies. If private insurers have a financial stake hi
paying benefits, they will have an increased incentive to minimize costs through effective
claims management. However, in a private workers' compensation insurance market, there is
an inherent tension between the interests of private insurers, employers, and workers hi
administering claims. This necessitates administrative supervision and regulation to balance the
interests of the different stakeholders and ensure that system objectives and workers' interests
are not unduly compromised by insurers' incentive to minimize claim costs.
Effective regulation is needed to harness private market incentives to keep costs low
while protecting injured workers' right to adequate benefits.66 However, additional government
monitoring costs will offset some of the efficiencies which may be achieved with private
market systems. Moreover, it is not feasible for regulators to closely monitor every
transaction, so some claims will still be mishandled and disputes will arise. Regulation also
could induce insurers to overpay some claims to avoid sanctions and adverse administrative
rulings.
Depending on the legal framework, a private market system may also lead to greater
litigation and higher transaction costs hi providing benefits to injured workers. Comparisons
between Michigan and British Columbia hi Section VI of this report make that clear. The
litigation rate is much higher hi Michigan, partly because of the system characteristic that the
employer/insurer usually takes the initiative and the worker reacts. Typically, the worker
reacts by retaining an attorney. With attorney fees ranging from 15 percent to 30 percent of
the recovery, it is easy to see that substantial transaction costs are incurred. What is not so

is does not presume that public monopoly insurers are perfect in terms of meeting public goals in the
administration of workers' compensation benefits, but the process by which public choice and policy are
reconciled is a different one than that employed with private firms.
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obvious is whether there is truly unnecessary litigation in such a system. In a cost driver study
of six U.S. states, the Workers' Compensation Research Institute estimated that attorney
involvement contributed from -0.2 percent (Michigan) to 3.9 percent (Florida) per year to
overall system cost growth. While this is a very substantial range, it also raises the issue of
whether a significant portion of the attorney representation observed was unnecessary.67
Another example is the transactions costs necessary to properly allocate claim costs to
individual employers. In Michigan, there is a great deal of disputation among
employer/insurers where the injured employee had multiple employers. This is particularly
problematic hi the case of occupational illnesses that may have resulted from exposures over
many years. Insurance carriers spend significant resources in attempting to shift the cost, in
whole or in part, to another insurer, or to the second injury fund. Until recently, this kind of
activity was almost completely unknown in British Columbia, presumably owing to the limited
private incentives inherent hi such activity. Hunt, Earth and Leahy (1996) document the
beginnings of a private consulting industry in British Columbia to take advantage of such
opportunities created by the workers' compensation experience rating program that was
implemented in the late 1980s.
Solvency Protection
Solvency is a concern for both public and private insurers, but different potential
problems arise under the two systems. For public insurers, there is the danger that political
pressures or poor management will cause revenues to lag behind expenditures, causing a
deficit. Employers and workers are not directly threatened if this occurs, assuming that the
government guarantees that benefits will be paid. However, the means by which accumulated
debt is repaid (e.g., increased premiums, special employer assessments, general tax revenue,
etc.) can result in inequities among those who benefited from the deficit and those who bear
the burden of paying the accumulated debt.

67See Victor, et al. (1992).
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Private insurers also face the risk of insolvency, which can be exacerbated by corporate
structures that limit the liability of owners for any debts they may incur. Insolvency risks can
be further increased hi lines such as workers' compensation where an employer buys insurance
to cover a third party. If its insurer becomes insolvent, an employer also may seek to escape
its obligations to injured workers by declaring bankruptcy. Consequently, employers' incentive
to purchase insurance from "safe" insurers is diminished. Additionally, political pressures can
cause regulators to suppress rates below costs which can ultimately result in insurer
insolvency.
To ensure that workers' compensation claims are paid, government must limit the
insolvency risk of private insurers and cover the claims of those insurers that become
insolvent. The U.S. utilizes a combination of relatively stringent insurer solvency regulation
and state guaranty funds to provide this protection. Solvency regulation and guaranty fund
mechanisms must be properly coordinated to ensure that insolvency costs are minimized and
do not overwhelm the market. While there have been relatively few insolvencies of workers'
compensation insurers in the U.S., the flat pricing of guaranty fund coverage encourages
greater insolvency risk that must be offset by tighter financial controls on insurers (Barth and
Klein, 1995).
Less stringent regulation must be compensated by greater risk sharing by insureds, but
this is difficult to accomplish for a line such as workers' compensation where injured workers
may ultimately bear the cost of unpaid claims due to insurer insolvency. Any jurisdiction that
contemplates moving from public to private provision of workers' compensation insurance will
need to carefully consider the regulatory and guaranty mechanisms that must be in place to
ensure that insurers' claims obligations are met. A system that provides extensive guarantees
to employers and workers will encourage an excessive amount of insolvencies unless
regulators constrain insurers' financial risk and the price of solvency guarantees are risksensitive.
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Statistical Reporting and System Monitoring
As with any social insurance scheme, monitoring the performance of the workers'
compensation system is essential to ensuring that its objectives are being met in a cost-effective
way. A public insurer can compile and analyze the necessary data internally as part of its
management information system. With private insurers, some mechanism must be established
by which data related to their activities are collected and analyzed. The functions of collection,
compilation and analysis can be delegated to public and/or private entities. This requires
additional regulation to ensure that private insurers report the required data to the appropriate
entities, that those entities properly perform their functions, and that the various data are
integrated to evaluate system performance.
Until recently, workers' compensation statistical reporting lagged far behind
information needs in the U.S. because of inattention. Further, integration of workers'
compensation statistical data in the states has been hampered by the division of functions
between regulatory agencies and private entities. Recent enhancements to workers'
compensation databases hi the U.S. have played a key role in facilitating analysis of and
support for the system reforms that have helped many states to improve their markets.
Conclusion
We have considered many issues in this report, from the arcane question of how
availability of workers' compensation insurance coverage can be guaranteed for all employers
to the basic question of who is in charge of making sure that injured workers receive their
benefits in a timely manner. We have used two exemplars to carry our discussion. The systems
of Michigan and British Columbia illustrate many of the policy choices that must be made to
structure a logically consistent workers' compensation system. What we have not done is to
prescribe solutions for Victoria. Only those intimately familiar with Victorian institutions and
traditions can perform that task. Thus, we offer no conclusions with respect to what Victoria
should do, only the observations that our comparative analysis has provided.
First, there are many paths to an effective and efficient workers' compensation system.
We have examined two of them, and offered our observations about the implications of these
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different paths. Second, we have used the issue of public vs. private institutions to attempt to
generalize our discussion, but we are well aware that the choices are not so stark as that
implies. Third, we have explored, by implication, the apparent tradeoffs between direct public
agency action and alternative approaches to the regulation of private agent actions in the
context of workers' compensation systems.
Ultimately, the goals of workers' compensation systems are simple. The means of
achieving those goals are anything but simple. They involve sophisticated choices among a
considerable array of policy options. Our hope is that this analysis will help to provide insights
that are useful to Victorian policy makers as they consider the future of their workers'
compensation system.
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